Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

122. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

• My Trip to Japan

Overview

I believe my June 9–12 visit to Japan successfully served its basic purpose of furthering understanding between our two countries and strengthening the U.S.-Japanese partnership.

I went to explain the new shape of the world that we perceived, the overall foreign policy and specific courses that you are pursuing to meet changed conditions, the roles of the U.S. and Japan in the world, and our evolving bilateral relationship. I also went to listen to their general and specific concerns about U.S. policy and their view of the future, and to get a better feel for Japanese motivations, psychology and outlook.

Within the confines of less than three working days, I talked with the broadest possible cross-section of Japanese political, economic, intellectual and media leadership. I spent four hours with Prime Minister Sato, three and a half hours with Foreign Minister Fukuda and over two hours with the other main challenger for the succession, Minister of International Trade Tanaka. I also saw other leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, including heads of various factions and former Foreign Ministers during two lengthy working meals. Private sessions were also held with leaders of the two main opposition parties, the Socialists (the first time in several years apparently that a top American had seen them) and the Komeito party. Several hours were spent formally and informally with the leaders of Japanese business, two and a half hours with top media representatives, and two hours with a cross-section of university professors. Finally, my live television press conference at the conclusion of my visit and the extensive media coverage throughout, which was generally straight and positive, served to get our major themes across to the Japanese public at large.

Additionally, I believe my visit gave our new Ambassador, Robert Ingersoll, and his top staff a fuller appreciation for your foreign policy in general and policy toward Japan in particular, and I believe the wide exposure to all leadership elements in Japan should enhance the Ambassador’s prestige and entree.

On your behalf I conveyed privately and publicly announced your invitation to the Emperor to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time. I also informed Sato and Fukuda about my upcoming trip, thus making clear we were taking them into our confidence and arming them for any Japanese domestic discussion of the trip.

Following are brief highlights of the major issues that were discussed, including U.S.-Japanese relations, Japan’s role in the world, China, the Soviet Union, Indochina, Korea and economic issues. There is also a brief rundown of each of my meetings.

Obviously, we cannot expect major lasting accomplishments from such a short visit by itself. In addition, the almost universally positive play in Japan to date will inevitably be subject to editorial carping in coming days by certain elements. Nevertheless, based on my own instincts, the comments we received from both Japanese and Americans, and the basic media coverage, I believe this trip cleared away much underbrush and put us in a position to make a fresh departure in our relations with Japan.

U.S.-Japan Relations

The note which I struck in general was that the U.S. valued its relations with Japan very highly indeed, and believed that the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance was vital to peace in the Pacific. We ourselves were satisfied with the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and felt that it should be kept in its present form for the foreseeable future. If any changes were proposed, they would have to come from the Japanese. Of course, we recognized that Japan was an important, mature country and we would be willing to consider any adjustments in the Security Treaty the Japanese might wish to make.

This was against a backdrop in which the U.S. emphatically was not withdrawing from Asia but was determined to stay on under conditions acceptable to the American people. In answer to Japanese concern, I made a point of saying this meant, too, that we would stay on in South Korea.

In the foregoing light I stressed that we had no intention of pushing Japan away from the U.S. If Japan wanted to pursue a more self-sufficient course, it had to do that on its own and not because we forced it in this direction. It was not the policy of this Administration that Japan should develop nuclear weapons, or develop its conventional forces beyond the capability of defending Japan’s home islands. We did not see Japan playing a regional military role, but hoped that it would help stabilize the region by continuing to give economic assistance.

I noted that we saw no inconsistency between the friendly relations between Japan and the U.S. and the policies we have pursued with Moscow and Peking. We wanted to consult closely with the Japanese leaders on moves which would affect our common interests. We regretted the lack of advance notice regarding the announcement of your Peking visit, but the circumstances were unique and we foresaw no repetition.

There was no effort to rebut my position, and I believe my words sunk in.

Japan’s Role in the World

Some Japanese had rather peculiar notions of the implications of your “five-power world.” They thought it meant that we were pushing Japan to become a military power or that we put Japan in the same category as Russia and China.

I made clear that this was nonsense. Your philosophy under the Nixon Doctrine, I stressed repeatedly, was not to cast them adrift in a multipolar world but just the opposite: to treat Japan as an important and mature country with a significant role to play, so that our alliance was suited to modern conditions. Japan’s role in the world was for the Japanese to determine.

There were many categories of power: In the military sphere there are really only two powers, and there was, and would be, no pressure on Japan from us to take on a military role. In the economic sphere it was a multipolar world, and here Japan’s role was crucial. The task of statesmanship was to develop a reliable process of multilateral problem-solving among the Free World economic powers.

The Japanese were interested in this. They seemed reassured that we still saw our close tie with them as the foundation of our policy.

The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan

There were two aspects of the China problem which the Japanese constantly harped upon:

—Had you struck any secret deals with Chou En-lai over Taiwan during your visit to the PRC?

—What would the reaction in the U.S. Administration be if Japan accepted Chou En-lai’s three conditions for the normalization of relations with the PRC?²

In addition, there was Japanese apprehension that, now we had “leap-frogged” Japan in making high-level contact with Peking, we would move rapidly toward the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations and leave Japan in the lurch.

I assured the Japanese that no secret deals had been struck in Peking over Taiwan. In the Joint Communiqué we had acknowledged only what the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain regarding the status of Taiwan and did not challenge, i.e. took note of, this position. We wanted the Taiwan issue to be settled peacefully by the parties concerned (and felt that the PRC would not use force), but we would not pressure the ROC into opening a dialogue with the PRC. Our military and political relationships with Taiwan would continue.

On Japan’s acceptance of Chou En-lai’s three conditions, I said that it would be extremely regrettable if the U.S. and Japan became engaged in a rivalry over improving relations with Peking. I foresaw only a gradual improvement in U.S.-PRC relations, while Japan already had extensive economic and even some political contacts with Peking. Our respective moves should be taken in such a way as to prevent the PRC from driving a wedge between us, which it wanted to do.

Incidentally, the “leap frog” theme clearly indicates that it was not so much the substance of your China initiative which bothered the Japanese as the fact that we did what they badly wanted to do first.

Once again it is hard to judge the impact of my words, but the headlines and news stories played up positively this aspect of my statements. Still, it will be very difficult for the Japanese to stop fulminating over China policy, given the extent to which it is involved in domestic politics and the succession question.

Soviet Union

There was not a great deal of discussion on our Soviet policy or the Moscow Summit. Our China policy clearly was of greater interest to the Japanese. Much of the interest in our Soviet policy was on economic matters, including prospective Japanese development of Siberia and our possible involvement. They seemed concerned about Soviet naval strength in the Far East—especially if our presence should decline.

With Moscow as with Peking, I made clear that we distinguish between our friends and potential adversaries and that the Free World should not engage in a race toward either capital.³ My general presentation was to describe the agreements in Moscow as falling into three categories: First, those like environment, science and space which reflected the fact that we were two advanced industrial countries with common problems and opportunities. Secondly, the SALT Agreement which was an exclusive problem between the world’s two superpowers and which fully safeguarded our strategic posture. Thirdly, the basic principles of bilateral relations which constitute an aspiration and a framework for our future relations, although we were not naive about its binding quality. I also indicated that we expected further progress on trade issues during the summer.

Indochina

There were many questions about our Vietnam policy, particularly in my meeting with Japanese academics. I explained your policy at length, stressing that you were determined to see it through and that the only issue left was the Communist demand that we overthrow our ally to appease our enemy. I pointed out on many occasions—I think with effect—that Japan has a direct interest in our constancy toward our allies. It could only be unsettling to Japan if we did sell out an ally’s interest. On the other hand, our steadfastness toward a small ally on the periphery of Asia should be particularly reassuring to the major ally on whom we founded our Asian policy.

Korea

Regarding Korea, I assured the Japanese that I knew of no present plans to reduce U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea, that any future reductions would not affect materially U.S. military capabilities there, and that in any case we would consult closely with the ROK and Japan. As in other parts of Asia we were staying on in South Korea as part of the Nixon Doctrine, and would maintain our treaty relationship with the ROK. This position answered the main area of Japanese concern—that the U.S. not pull out of Korea. I also referred in passing to the important relationship between the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the defense of South Korea.

The Japanese did not press me on the subject of improving U.S. and Japanese relations with North Korea. They were unanimous that the defense of Japan made Korea an area of special sensitivity to Tokyo—though without the emotional overtures of China.

Economic Issues

Although the main focus of my talks was on political matters, there was considerable discussion of economic problems including what some Japanese believed to be protectionist, and essentially anti-Japanese, U.S. economic policies. The Japanese recognize the problems which their large trade surpluses will cause, and noted that they were making efforts to deal with the problem. I emphasized the importance of their moving promptly to decrease the surpluses.

In response to their queries on what could be done to solve economic problems between us, I stressed that Japan, along with U.S. and Europe, is one of the three pillars of the free world economy. What was required now was a cooperative effort among the three powerful economic centers to reform the international monetary and trading systems, and to work out a framework which would enable us to identify and deal with problems before they become major political issues. Such an approach would allow us to handle problems not on an ad hoc basis—which means that pressure from special interest groups often forces governments to take positions not in the overall national interest—but in a broader context which allows us rationally, and cooperatively, to set broad guidelines and policy consistent with our national interests, which can constitute a framework in dealing with individual problems.

Another issue raised at various times was whether the United States would be willing to play a part in joint ventures between Japan and USSR in Siberia. I explained that we had no objection to the Soviet Union and Japan exploring joint ventures with one another; if U.S. firms wanted to participate and required U.S. Government financing, we would have to look at our participation on the merits of the case, but in principle we would have no objection to our companies discussing this.⁴

My Meeting with Sato

I spent four hours in frank conversation with Sato over dinner at his residence, on June 10. Throughout this discussion the Prime Minister’s basic conversatism [conservatism] shone through—in his strong support of your Vietnam policy, in his wariness that the Communist powers might attempt to split the Free World, in his preference for the older, more traditional, Fukuda over Tanaka, and in his general distrust of youth.

Sato, who is among the most impressive Japanese, nevertheless demonstrated their typical quality of talking pragmatically and tactically, rather than on a philosophic or strategic basis. Almost the entire conversation consisted of his asking me questions about our policy. Thus, although one might expect that of all people this man who is leaving office in a few days could dwell on the future and broader concepts, instead we talked mostly about specific policies that we have been pursuing.

We spent a considerable time on China.

—I traced the development of our policy toward the PRC, emphasized that there were no secret deals, and said that we expected our relations with Peking to develop gradually.

—He indicated that he had been concerned not so much over the so-called “shokku” shock, of our policy but rather the motivations behind it. He suggested some envy that we were able to get around the Taiwan issue in our dealings with Peking, which was impossible for Japan because its domestic situation and trade interests gave Peking greater leverage.

—He approved of our line with the Chinese that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty should reassure Peking about Japan’s future military role and he showed interest in the state of China’s nuclear program.

—He also said that Chiang Kai-shek’s views were now quite moderate on U.S. policy, that he recognized that we had to make our moves, and was showing more flexibility toward the Taiwanese, including representation for them in the cabinet.

—In response to his queries, I briefly described the powerful presence of Mao and the intelligence of Chou.

On Vietnam:

—I made clear your determination to see the conflict through, that our policy was to isolate North Vietnam physically and psychologically, and that we would not overthrow Thieu.

—He applauded your firm stance, said that the biggest mistake we could make would be to overturn the government, and asked how Japan could help us. I replied that they should have no contacts with Hanoi in the near term and that they should give more economic assistance to South Vietnam. He responded that they had planned to give some humanitarian aid also to North Vietnam, but would now delay this until after the war was over.

—As I pointed out in several other public and private sessions during my visit, I emphasized the implications for our major ally Japan of our steadfastness with a small friend, South Vietnam. I concluded that we thought we had the Vietnam situation well in hand and that only a McGovern victory could bring defeat.

In response to his questions about the Moscow Summit:

—I gave him the rundown on the three types of agreements that I explained to other groups as well as those bilateral agreements which reflected the fact that the U.S. and USSR had common problems as advanced industrial countries; the SALT agreement involving the only two countries who could destroy the world; and the basic principles which we recognized were no instant panaceas but rather useful guideposts for future relations. I emphasized that our strategic position in the SALT Treaty firmly guaranteed our national security.

—In response to his questions I said that the Sino-Soviet split was obviously serious but that we would not try to exacerbate it.

Sato asked about the Korea situation.

—I replied that there might be some adjustment in our forces over time but that we would always consult Japan. I emphasized that we had made no deal with either China or Russia, and said that we had the impression that those two countries’ policies with regard to Korea were prompted more by their own rivalry rather than any desire to really press North Korean demands upon us.

Toward the end of our conversation I managed to ask my only question, inviting his comments on the succession question.

—He made clear his preference for Fukuda because of his age and experience, his traditional education, his knowledge of international affairs and his greater world reputation. Tanaka he clearly thought was tough and intelligent, but unpolished and somewhat of an unknown factor, particularly on international affairs.

—He stressed that he would do everything he could to help Fukuda, but that even with this assistance he placed Fukuda’s chances at no better than 50–50, given the support that Tanaka enjoyed in many quarters, especially among the younger elements. Either man, however, he emphasized, would pursue policies within the basic Liberal Democratic Party framework.

I forewarned Sato about my upcoming trip to the PRC, saying that we would give him advance notice when the date was firmly set. He indicated that the announcement of the trip might affect the debate in the Diet over some remaining legislative issues but that this would be manageable, particularly since he would be able to say that this had been discussed with him in advance. He specifically asked me to put in a good word with the Chinese on behalf of Japan and its wish to improve relations with the PRC.

The conversation ended with Sato again stressing the need for the Free World to stick together and expressing his hope for your reelection. Although our conversation did not dwell as much on future U.S.-Japanese relations as I would have liked, I believe it was nevertheless very helpful in giving him a firsthand rundown on your perspective and policies. He clearly came away reassured about the basic U.S. course and demonstrated that, whatever the recent turbulence in our bilateral relations, he and Japan remain our good friends.

My Meeting with Fukuda

I had a three and a half hour breakfast with Fukuda on June 11. Fukuda appeared more relaxed than he seemed last January at San Clemente.⁵ The succession problem was much on his mind. He went over in some detail the complexities of the Japanese political system in choosing a new party president and prime minister, but he also gave the impression of being confident as to his chances. The tenor of his remarks on the future of U.S.-Japan relations did not suggest a man whose political career was coming to an end.

As might be expected from a Foreign Minister, Fukuda’s remarks touched upon a broad range of political issues and more peripherally on economic matters. I dealt with these along the lines outlined above. There were in addition a number of points of particular interest.

—He acknowledged that your China initiative had caused him problems, since in his words Japan-PRC relations comprise the most important problem for the Japanese Government.

—He felt that the first two of Chou En-lai’s three conditions for normalizing PRC-Japanese relations had been pretty well overtaken by events and would become acceptable once government-to-government negotiations began. He meant to hold firm on the third, however (abrogation of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty) pending an actual agreement on normalization of Japan’s relations with Peking. The impression he tried to convey was that he would not be pushed around by the Chinese (though he of course might not be able to resist pressures for acceptance).

—He was worried over the Vietnam war, but primarily because he felt that the war and the arms race with the Soviet Union had eroded U.S. economic strength and staying power. I suggested that Japan should hold off contacts with Hanoi over the next several months and he agreed.

—He responded very affirmatively to my statement that the White House wanted to have the closest possible relationship with the top Japanese leaders. He indicated that the confidentiality of any arrangement to this end could be assured. He was receptive to the idea of a meeting between you and the new Japanese Prime Minister later this summer.

—He was concerned over the possibility of expanded Soviet efforts to exercise influence in Asia. However, he hoped for U.S. participation in Siberian development. I told him that Secretary Peterson had been put in charge of this matter, and that there would be consultations with Japan on it.⁶

—He valued highly Japanese relations with Indonesia. I said we did the same.

—He did not appear perturbed when I informed him of my impending visit to Peking, but took the news calmly. Perhaps Prime Minister Sato had already informed him of it, which had given him time to think it over.

—He handled very well the question of an invitation from you to the Emperor to visit the U.S., promising to tell me before my press conference whether I could make this invitation public, and indeed did so.

My Meeting with Tanaka⁷

Tanaka and I met for over two hours at breakfast on June 12. Like Fukuda, he appeared calm and confident about the outcome of the succession contest. From some of the points he made, though, I believe that there was some insecurity in his position and that he was trying in subtle ways to gain U.S. sympathy if not necessarily support. For example,

—He went to some lengths to explain that he had always been a member of the Liberal-Democratic Party (and hence inferentially was identified with stalwart pro-U.S. Prime Ministers) while some of the other contenders, notably Fukuda, arrived much later on the LDP scene.

—He said that he thought the way you had handled your China initiative was correct, and in fact he said so at the time of your July 15 announcement. He added that we should not engage in a U.S.-Japanese race to Peking.

—He expressed the belief that the U.S. should help to settle the Taiwan issue between Japan and the PRC “as a family friend.” In this way, the U.S. would participate in the settlement and help to draw the others closer.

—He claimed credit—justifiably—for settling the textile issue between Japan and the U.S.

Somewhat surprisingly, Tanaka did not take the opportunity to go much farther afield than Taiwan and the PRC in discussing political issues. Rather, he concentrated more on economic questions. In particular, he went into considerable detail in discussing the possibility of joint U.S.-Japan participation in the Tyumen oil field development scheme with the USSR. (I responded to this as outlined above.) I sense that he feels much more certain of himself in economic matters than political ones.

I took the opportunity of informing him that regardless of who became Prime Minister, the White House wanted to establish close and cordial relations with this individual. Tanaka seemed pleased.

As you know, Tanaka at 55 is about ten years younger than the other would-be successors to Sato. He appears to be a very vigorous, direct, and dynamic man, and I have no reason to believe that as Prime Minister he would take Japan down an anti-U.S. course. Being identified with economic matters, he undoubtedly has a clear concept as to where Japan’s interests lie.

Meetings with Other Leaders and Groups

Liberal Democratic Party Leaders. I had a luncheon meeting Sunday with three executives of the ruling LDP: Nakasone, Kosaka, and Mizuta (who is Finance Minister). The most interesting was Nakasone, a dynamic and ambitious young politician, a former student of mine, who was until recently their equivalent of defense minister. Nakasone expresses a vague kind of assertive nationalism: He hints vaguely at defects in the NPT and at the desirability of peaceful changes in the 1945 world settlement (territorial and UN charter revisions) to give Japan a greater role. At the same time Nakasone recognizes Japan’s role must be economic and not military. He has visions of Japan and the U.S. leading a Free World program to spur prosperity in Asia. He also had an imaginative suggestion of an automatic adjustment process for smoothing out economic disputes between Japan and the U.S. before they become crises.⁸

Former Foreign Ministers. I had the opportunity to have dinner with four former Foreign Ministers—Fujiyama, Aichi, Miki, and Ohira—of whom the last two are also contenders for the Prime Ministership. Neither Miki nor Ohira spoke a substantive word the whole evening. I suspect that their being with me together made it difficult for each to say anything which might tip their hands. Each controls substantial blocs of votes in the LDP, and might be able to swing the election one way or another for Tanaka or Fukuda even if they cannot win themselves. One or the other could again be Foreign Minister.

Fujiyama’s and Aichi’s remarks were rather puerile. Fujiyama wanted a more “positive” U.S. attitude toward ending the Vietnam war, which meant in effect accepting Hanoi’s terms, while Aichi was worried about a possible “anti-establishment” attitude among aid recipients in the underdeveloped world requiring the developed countries to be more generous. I took issue with both of them, and I believe with some effect.

Japanese Socialist Party. My meetings with the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)—the first with Party leaders by a senior American official since Robert Kennedy—dealt primarily with Vietnam, U.S. bases in Japan and Japan’s relations with China. The JSP leaders expressed the view that U.S. “aggression” in Vietnam should cease as soon as possible, and that they could not tolerate further use of Japanese bases for support of the war. The Party did, however, welcome your visit to Peking—although other parties in Japan were “shocked”—because it felt that your visit would contribute to a reduction of tension with China and be an element in ending the war in Vietnam. It was disappointed that it had seen no evidence of the latter.

In responding to this, I explained in some detail your Vietnam policy and the reasons why we cannot settle war on the basis of the other side’s proposed “Government of National Concord.” I further explained—in response to the JSP leaders’ fear that the U.S. was restraining Japan’s efforts too closely to China—that we had no judgment on what policy Japan should adopt vis-à-vis the PRC, no intention of complicating Japan’s efforts in this regard, and no intention of substituting Japan’s forces for our forces in Asia. With regard to the Japanese-U.S. security treaty, the JSP leaders were ambivalent, but what came through clearly was their view that if Japan felt it could not continue to rely on the U.S. for its defense, this would increase Japanese pressure to rearm.

Komeito. My meeting with officials of Komeito (Japan’s third largest party) gave me the opportunity to pursue with the Party Secretary, who had just returned from North Korea, his observations on his trip. The Secretary, who had met with Prime Minister Kim, was struck by the heavy-handed police state which existed in North Korea—which exceeded his expectations—and by the self-centered character of Kim. He also made the point that—contrary to what he had earlier believed—if U.S. troops were removed from the South it was entirely possible that the North would move into the South.

JUSEC Meeting. Following my opening meeting with Embassy officials on June 10, 1972, I met for approximately two and one-half hours with my hosts, the Japan-U.S. Economic Council (JUSEC) which is composed of the leading businessmen in Japan. This semi-public session gave me a good opportunity to set the framework for my visit and all my subsequent conversations.

I began the meeting with a forty minute presentation of the major themes of your foreign policy and issues in U.S.-Japan relations along the lines described above. On economic matters, I emphasized the importance of our finding a framework to deal with economic issues in a rational way, before they become major political problems.

In the question and answer session, the Japanese businessmen asked for more details relating to our moves toward China, how we saw the Japanese role in Asia evolving, and whether we envisaged a change in the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. I explained further our reasons for improving relations with China, stressed the priority of our partnership with Japan and stated that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was in the common interest of both countries and that we saw no need to change it.

The meeting gave me a better idea of Japanese concerns, and I dealt with the questions frankly and in as specific terms as possible. My overall impression was that Japanese businessmen were concerned about how the United States saw Japan in the years ahead, where Japan itself was going, and what role we envisaged for Japan in the economic and military spheres. I believe my answers reassured them that we were not casting them adrift, that we regard their friendship as of the utmost importance to us, and that we want to pursue a policy of cooperation to deal with political and economic issues on an amicable basis.

Meetings with Senior Editors. I began this June 11 meeting of approximately two hours with a statement similar to that with which I led off the JUSEC meeting. I also covered in some detail your Indochina policy, in response to criticism of our Vietnam policy which I had read in the Japanese press. The question and answer session proceeded in a manner similar to that of the JUSEC meeting. The editors wanted to hear our views on the concept of a collective Asian security arrangement, as proposed by Brezhnev, and I explained that if this were directed against the PRC we could not participate. I added that it would be shortsighted and foolish to attempt to play the PRC off against Moscow and vice versa.

Academic Leaders. At a luncheon I had Monday with international relations scholars, a disproportionate amount of time was taken up with answering questions from two who had signed a public letter to me on Vietnam.⁹ The others in the group were more eager to discuss other topics and were far less hostile. They asked the standard questions, particularly our policy toward Taiwan and Korea, as well as about the future of U.S.-Japanese relations. Like academics everywhere, they were sure they had figured out the rational calculation and complicated purposes that underlay all our actions.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit Jun 1972 [3 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it. Memoranda of conversation for most of Kissinger’s June 1972 meetings in Japan are ibid., Box 22, HAK Trip Files, Japan Trip Memcons, June 1972, The President. Following Kissinger’s trip, Ingersoll reported to Kissinger that there had been annoyance expressed by some Japanese bureaucrats due to the nominally unofficial nature of his visit, which had been hosted by the Japan-U.S. Economic Council, and the problem of keeping track of Kissinger’s statements. (Memorandum from Ingersoll to Kissinger, June 23; ibid., Box 538, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VIII, May–December 1972)
2. Japan must (a) acknowledge that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, (b) acknowledge that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, and (c) abrogate the Japan-ROC peace treaty of 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Nixon highlighted this sentence.
4. Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote: “K—This might [be] an interesting one to follow up on.”
5. Fukuda was part of the official Japanese party that participated in the January 6–7 U.S.-Japanese summit, held at the Western White House in San Clemente. See Documents 111–113.
6. On June 8, the day of Kissinger’s departure for Japan, Peterson sent a memorandum to Kissinger, encouraging joint U.S.-Japanese economic cooperation. He noted: “At one level, it would be easy to say that the reactions or perhaps overreactions to the “Nixon shocks” (and the related lack of consultations problem) are paranoiac and pathological, and not matter of substance. At another level, it would seem to me that there is a psychological problem (that we don’t really care about them and are pre-occupied with the Soviet Union and China) and a domestic political problem (Sato and friends aren’t truly leaders in our eyes or we would have treated them differently). I would state the obvious and that is that some highly visible methods of joint cooperation that begin to assume some of the coloration of the recent Summitry might be a temporary antidote until you can have a real Summit. I could see a variety of areas where we might cooperate with Japan in the setting up of Commissions to look at (1) trade, (2) investment—particularly third country investments, including maybe even gas in the Soviet Union, (3) the whole range of urban problems (transportation, pollution, education, etc.) which are strikingly similar in Japan to the U.S.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Agency Files, Box 214, Commerce—Jan–Jun 1972—Vol. III)
7. See Document 121.
8. A memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s luncheon meeting with high-ranking LDP members reports this discussion as follows: “Nakasone: But in the economic sphere, there is an absolute necessity to work out an automatic adjustment arrangement. Kissinger: After there is a new Prime Minister, it will be very worthwhile. If we wait till there is a crisis, the problem can’t be solved. But how would it work in practice? Overall? or by product? Nakasone: Overall, based on the balance sheet of the previous year. Kissinger: On individual products? Nakasone: On an overall basis. The internal item-by-item basis can be left to the discretion of business leaders and government.” (Memorandum of conversation, Tokyo, June 11, 12:15–2:15 p.m.; Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 22, HAK Trip Files, Japan Trip Memcons, June 1972, The President)
9. Yoshikazu Sakamoto and Hiroharu Seki, professors at the University of Tokyo and participants in a June 12 meeting with Kissinger, had signed a public letter to Kissinger protesting U.S. Vietnam policies. (Letter from Masataka Banno, et al., to Kissinger, June 9; ibid.)