123. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
SUBJECT
- Tanaka Government: Early Prospects Are for Continuity in Japanese Foreign Policy
Several early indicators of Prime Minister Tanaka’s2 foreign policy proclivities point strongly in the direction of continuity in Japan’s basic foreign policies. It is in the foreign affairs area that Tanaka has been something of an unknown quantity.
—In a television interview July 5, Tanaka reaffirmed the vital importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Japan, saying it was “like water and air” to Japan, without which Japan “cannot survive.”
—Tanaka appointed as his Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, who served earlier as Foreign Minister (1963–66) and who as the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party’s second largest faction swung his weight behind Tanaka’s election in mid-June. Ohira also believes Japan’s foreign policy must be premised on the U.S.-Japan alliance, and in his previous stint as Foreign Minister was consistently reliable and cooperative in his dealings with us. Equally important, Tanaka did not choose as his Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, who is also a former Foreign Minister and who also, as a major LDP faction leader threw his support to Tanaka last month. Miki is not so committed to the U.S.-Japan alliance and is more inclined to independent Japanese initiatives. Tanaka has said he would leave foreign policy largely to his Foreign Minister and the Foreign Office. This should act as a constraint on Tanaka’s reputed impulsiveness, especially until he has acquired more experience in foreign affairs.
—On China policy, Tanaka has already committed himself publicly to early normalization of relations with Peking, but has noted that [Page 450] bilateral relations between states are not a one-way street. This may reflect the toughening in Japan’s position clearly articulated to Assistant Secretary Green July 6 by Vice Foreign Minister Hogen, when he said that Japan’s bargaining position with Peking was stronger than previously realized. (Hogen also said that Japan would not sever its non-diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and that it would not yield to any PRC pressures on the U.S.-Japan security relationship.) Foreign Minister Ohira’s views also support this approach: he has said that Japan should normalize relations with Peking on a pragmatic, balanced basis that takes account of its relations with Taiwan.
These indications of continuity in Tanaka’s foreign policy are bolstered by at least two fundamental influences on him:
—Tanaka himself is basically a moderate who is deeply rooted in Japan’s postwar conservative political tradition. His departures are in his having risen through early and striking success in business—and without the benefit of a university education—rather than through the traditional bureaucratic route, and in his image of youth, flair, and decisiveness.
—Tanaka’s freedom of action is limited by the Japanese political system, in which the prime minister is only the first among equals, in which the cabinet—like other groups in society—is collectively responsible for its policy decisions, and in which the balance of influence in government among the entrenched bureaucracy, big business, and political groups works against non-consensus politics.
Tanaka’s impact on Japan’s foreign policy, at least in the near term, is likely to be more in style. He is likely to be more assertive and self-confident, and as regards relations with us, particularly in the economic field. Given his most recent post as Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and his business background, it is in Japan’s economic relations with us that he is likely to assert himself first. Together with his nationalistic MITI Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Tanaka can be counted on to resist efforts to pressure Japan to make reforms that may assist particular U.S. trade interests but are contrary to Japan’s interests. At the same time, he has strongly committed himself when he was MITI Minister to reduce Japan’s large trade surplus with the U.S.
As to Tanaka’s domestic policy, it is here, the area of his past experience, that he can be expected to concentrate his energies, at least for the present. His long-standing expertise in domestic problems has been the basis for his unusually broad popularity. He has proposed far-reaching social welfare measures, and has promised to bring government close to the people. Tanaka’s election as LDP President probably primarily reflects the feeling within the Party that the LDP had to make itself more responsive to the demands of Japan’s modernizing society, particularly in the urban areas. (The impact of your China initiative on the election was probably felt most as one among several factors [Page 451] causing Sato to lose a considerable part of his previous influence within the Party, and thus not able to exert the pressure on the selection of his successor that he might otherwise have been able to.)
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VIII, May–Dec 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to the transmittal sheet, Nixon saw it on July 18. Holdridge sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum on July 8 suggesting, with the concurrence of Hormats, that Kissinger sign it and send it to the President. Nicholas Platt, had sent Kissinger a memorandum on July 7 that provided an assessment of Tanaka, the new cabinet, and recent political events in Japan. (Ibid.)↩
- On June 17, Sato announced plans to retire from his position as president of the LDP. Tanaka won a vote within the LDP to become its president and, on July 6, the House of Representatives elected him Prime Minister.↩