40. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Textile Negotiations and Korea
Marshall Green has sent you a memorandum (Tab A)2 requesting that Phil Trezise be authorized to tell certain highly-placed Japanese on a confidential basis that we intend to discuss textiles with the [Page 111] Koreans after the Korean Referendum on President Park’s third team. He indicates, correctly, that I have not concurred in this course.
Marshall’s rationale is that (a) the Japanese have been stirred up by a press conference recently given by Secretary of Commerce Stans in which Stans took a very hard line on restricting Japanese textile imports, and (b) the Japanese therefore will want to know from Trezise (who is going to Japan to negotiate liberalization of Japanese imports from the US and not to talk about textiles) whether others are also facing US import restrictions on textiles. The point is put forward that Trezise’s whole mission may be prejudiced if he cannot tell senior Japanese that the ROK, Hong Kong, and the GRC are also involved. I presume that the assumption, although not stated, is that misery loves company and that the Japanese will feel all right about the restrictions on them if they are aware that others are also subject to restrictions.
My problem concerns the President’s decision not to bring up the textile question with the Koreans until after the Referendum, and his assurance to Park in San Francisco3 that the textile question would be handled “discreetly.” In my judgment, we can have no assurance that the Japanese who would learn about Korean involvement would not leak; on the contrary, I believe that they would have every incentive to leak. They would not be addressing Trezise as individuals but as representatives of an entire industry that is bothered by restrictions, and would certainly wish to pass on whatever Trezise tells them to the manufacturers they represent—who in turn would probably make the information public, even if the people at the top did not. The result would be that Park and the Koreans would learn about the boom being lowered on them before the Referendum, which is precisely what we are trying to avoid. Worse, the Koreans would learn about the matter from the Japanese press, which hardly could be considered discreet handling. We would be likely to end up with two angry Presidents on our hands. I have told all this to Marshall Green, who, as you may recall, was the very one who wanted to delay informing the Koreans until after the Referendum. All this can be avoided if we simply do what the President said.
I do not agree with the argument that Trezise’s whole purpose will be compromised if he cannot discuss textile restrictions. The Japanese are thoroughly aware of the growing resentment in the US of the fact that the Japanese howl about our restrictions and yet are extremely rigid in excluding US-manufactured goods from Japan. They must know that they are going to have to make concessions on their part if they wish to avoid US import quotas being imposed on them. This is the argument which will count, not the knowledge that there are others who will share their bed of pain on textiles.
[Page 112]Incidentally, the Referendum is now set for October 27. I think that we ought to be able to hold the line for three more weeks, having done so this long. I checked this out with Bob Hormats in Fred Bergsten’s office, who strongly agrees.
Recommendation
That you not concur in Marshall Green’s request.4
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.↩
- Dated October 3, attached but not printed.↩
- See Document 35.↩
- Kissinger initialed his approval on October 8.↩