Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

39. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Your Conversation with Ambassador Porter—Talking Points

You are scheduled to see Ambassador Porter at 5:00 p.m. today.²

Suggested Talking Points:

• — NSSM 27. The NSC took a preliminary look at NSSM 27 on August 14.³ You hope that it will consider the finished paper in late October. The President’s preliminary reactions are of interest: He wanted the study couched in concrete five-year planning terms. He ruled out the “top option” of increased ROK preparedness plus a major US presence, but at the same time he appeared to accept the possibility that a substantial US presence will be required for the indefinite future. How should our role in Korea look five years hence?
• —Supplemental MAP for Korea. The President has shown interest in providing additional MAP to Korea this year. Congressman Broomfield has already submitted an amendment adding $100 million to the Korean MAP package, and we are considering how to handle this.⁴ As Ambassador Porter knows, Defense has twice submitted suggestions in recent months for supplemental MAP aid, once for $108 million and once for $88 million. We have held these up pending the chance to integrate them with the thinking that comes out of NSSM 27. In specific terms, we found a strange sense of unreality and a lack of focus. It was unclear whether the supplemental was intended to meet the North Korean air threat or its infiltration capabilities. Moreover, in the Korean context, we are suspicious of a counter infiltration program which seems to rely on a sophisticated, integrated radar network, and which made no provision at all for high speed patrol craft, which seemed to be the prime necessity. What does Ambassador Porter think of the priorities for MAP at this stage? How much will this cost?
• — ROK Self-confidence. Given the economic performance of the ROK, we are mystified by the degree to which it seems to remain mesmerized by the North Koreans. Why don’t the ROKs undertake a more active campaign to seize the propaganda initiative from North Korea? The Communists propose postal exchanges and family reunions. Given the relative economic and political conditions of the two countries, one would think that the ROK could seriously embarrass the North Koreans by promoting their own exchanges. Why is it still so important to the ROK to prevent North Korea diplomatic contact abroad? They are fighting a losing battle, over the long term; would they not be well advised to get off it?
• —The Third Term. Are we right in assuming that Park is a shoo-in to get his third term amendment in the referendum next month? How will this affect the Korean political scene? Will the opposition be strengthened or weakened by his decision to press ahead for a third term amendment? Did the short-cutting of parliamentary procedures in the past two months seriously damage the prospects for democracy in Korea?

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.
2. No record of the meeting has been found.
3. See Document 34.
4. In a memorandum to Kissinger, also dated September 19, Holdridge recommended supporting Broomfield’s amendment. He noted that it provided the necessary legislation for the $100 million in additional Korean MAP that President Nixon favored and could be tailored to the conclusions reached from NSSM 27 because it was not tied to specific expenditures. He added that the Broomfield amendment funds would be available for use in subsequent years, unlike other MAP proposals for Korea. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69)