Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

41. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Helicopter Crew Members Held by North Koreans

Secretary of State Rogers has sent a memorandum to you (Tab A)² noting that the North Korean attitude at the Military Armistice Commission meetings since the helicopter incident³ gives us no room to believe that Pyongyang will accept anything less than past procedures, including an apology, to effect the release of the helicopter crew. On humanitarian grounds, he suggests that the time may now have come to reconsider our current negotiating position,⁴ and recommends that we follow the precedents in the Pueblo and the 1963–64 helicopter cases. He attaches two conditions: we should sign the document of the nature desired by the North Koreans only when assured that signature will secure early release of the crew members; and that we should defer until after the Korean Item debate in the General Assembly signature of any language which goes beyond that suggested in a draft telegram containing instructions to our MAC representative (Tab B).⁵

The instructions to our MAC representative hedges on the matter of calling the incident a “criminal act” by saying only that the DPRK regards this as a criminal act for which the UNC side tenders an apology. This is a slight back away from the previous formulation, and State proposes to stand fast on it, until at least after the UNGA consideration of the Korean Item.

Recommendation

I doubt that the North Koreans will yield on their demand for an apology on their terms, and may even balk at State’s reformulation. If we want the men back, we will sooner or later have to go through this drill. I am assured by State that the language as proposed will not cause us any particular problem in the UNGA debates, nor affect the continued UN presence in South Korea. I would favor, therefore going ahead as State requests.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.
2. Dated October 2, attached but not printed.
3. A U.S. helicopter on a training mission on August 17 inadvertently flew into North Korean airspace over the DMZ and was shot down. Its three injured crewmen were captured. The North Koreans refused at three public meetings of the Military Armistice Commission and in two private meetings to consider their return until the United States publicly apologized.
4. In telegram 147500 to Seoul, August 31, the Department instructed the UN Command senior member, General Adams, to “express regret and acknowledge unintentional violation of the armistice agreement,” but to “specifically avoid the use of the word ‘apology,’” and “under no circumstances should he admit that the flight over North Korean territory was an intentional violation of North Korean airspace for military or intelligence purposes.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident)
5. Attached but not printed.
6. Nixon initialed his approval on October 8. The President’s approval of the draft instructions was conveyed to the Department of State on October 14; the instructions and the draft were transmitted in telegram 177837 to Seoul, October 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident)