38. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

SUBJECT

  • Status Review of WSAG Papers

PARTICIPATION

  • Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman
  • State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • William Cargo
  • Defense
  • G. Warren Nutter
  • CIA
  • Thomas H. Karamessines
  • JCS
  • Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson
  • NSC Staff
  • Col Alexander M. Haig
  • Harold H. Saunders
  • John H. Holdridge
  • William G. Hyland
  • Col. Robert M. Behr

Summary of Decisions

[Omitted here is the summary of decisions unrelated to Korea.]

2. Korea Papers—agreed actions:

a.
Add section on Soviet-North Korean Mutual Defense Treaty.
b.
Add section for Presidential review, which supports concept of a “quick, ferocious and decisive” response to a major NK provocation.
c.
Subject to additions described above, Korea Papers are considered complete. They will require amendment as necessary and review every three months.

[Page 108]

3. General—

As a part of the overall contingency planning process, a check-list item should be an early determination of satellite surveillance requirements along with a set of implementation procedures.

The meeting began at 4:45 P.M. with Secretary Johnson in the chair in the absence of Kissinger who was detained in the President’s office. The acting chairman suggested that the agenda be limited to a wrap-up of the Korean papers and a discussion of the Sino-Soviet paper. The Middle East papers are not yet, he stated, in a form to be addressed by the principals. He called upon Cargo to set the stage for discussions of the Sino-Soviet paper.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]

Kissinger then turned to the Korea papers, asking if they were ready for WSAG approval. Secretary Johnson replied affirmatively, but subject to the addition of the text, and short discussion, of the Soviet-North Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. Kissinger said he had only one reservation about the Korea scenario, and that had to do with the effectiveness of alerting procedures and DEFCON level as signal of U.S. resolve. He noted two things to be avoided in handling a crisis situation—on the one hand timidity, and on the other hand, those actions signalling prelude to major war. Would not a quick and ferocious response that would clearly be a “one shot” operation be a more suitable course in order to discourage North Korea from further response? He will write up this alternative, giving the President the benefit of both views. After this addition, the Korean scenarios will be considered finished, with the understanding that they will be up-dated as required when military dispositions change. Additionally, they will be reviewed every three months.

No definite date was set for the next WSAG meeting other than that one would be required before Secretary Johnson returns from vacation on October 6, 1969.

The meeting adjourned at 6:30 P.M.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970 [6 of 6]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Situation Room at the White House. Behr forwarded the minutes through Haig to Kissinger under a September 22 memorandum.