Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ¹

Seoul, June 13, 1972, 0939Z.

3426. Subj: North-South Contacts. Ref: Seoul 3376.²

1. On 13 June 1972, I had an hour and forty-five minute talk with ROK CIA Director Yi Hu-rak about the recent visit to Seoul (29 May–1 June) of the North Korean delegation headed by Vice Premier Pak Song-ch’ol. [less than 1 line not declassified]Yi Hu-Rak’s assistant, Kim Sang-in, were also present.

2. Yi Hu-rak began our discussion with an apology for his delay in getting together with me, stating he had taken a rest in the countryside beginning almost immediately after the North Korean delegation’s departure from Seoul. Yi said he had returned to Seoul only on 12 June and had not yet briefed other ROK officials on developments connected with North Korean delegation’s visit. Yi then gave me two file folders, one of which contained what he described as a complete record of the minutes of the North Korean delegation’s visits with President Park Chung Hee and himself. The second folder contained accompanying memoranda and reports on the delegation’s visit. We are translating and expediting the transmission of these documents to the Department. From an initial inspection of these records, we note that the North Korean delegation was composed of five representatives: Vice Premier Pak Song-Ch’ol; Kim Tok-Hyon, Chief, Organization and Guidance Department, Korean Lenor [Labor?] Party; Yi Chang-Sik, Vice-Chief of the Organization and Guidance Department; Kim Chae-Song, aide to Pak Song-Ch’ol; and Kim Ch’ol-Su, who was the accompanying physician.

3. Yi Hu-Rak said he thought that the most important result of the visit was the achievement of an “agreed coordinating committee,” which Yi did not want to describe otherwise as formal or informal or as official or unofficial. Pak Song-Ch’ol had brought with him from Pyongyang an official proposal that a coordinating committee be established. Yi pointed out that this proposal had resulted from his own initiative in suggesting a means of coordinating North-South relations during his earlier visit to Pyongyang. In addition to the coordinating committee, Pak Song-ch’ol had suggested during his discussions with Yi Hu-Rak that several other committees be established. According to the proposal the coordinating committee would deal with political and unification matters and there could be additional committees for military, economic, and other subjects. Yi counter-proposed leaving aside additional committees until the need for them seemed more apparent. He suggested to Pak Song-Ch’ol that agreement be reached on a comprehensive frame of reference for the coordinating committee along the lines of improving relations between North and South Korea and resolving problems between them. Pak Song-Ch’ol accepted Yi’s definition of the functions of the coordinating committee. The composition and work of the committee had not yet been determined but meanwhile Yi and Kim Yong-Chu had an established channel for communication.

4. Pak Song-Ch’ol proposed the issuance of a joint communiqué on the fact of these visits and discussions, but President Park had rejected this proposal. According to Yi Hu-Rak, the most important problem now facing the ROKG with respect these developments is when, where, and how to make a public announcement about them. Both President Park and Yi Hu-Rak feel the need to proceed cautiously and think that this is not yet the right time to bring out the fact and content of these exchanges. One of their principal concerns is that the U.S., Japan, and other third countries might conclude too quickly that tensions on the Korean Peninsula were being effectively resolved. Another main consideration is the continuing need to prepare the ROK population properly in terms of national morale and unity.

5. At this point, I expressed the view that it would be advantageous for the ROK to make the fact of these developments public as soon as feasible. I told him that, during my discussion with President Park on June 10, I had mentioned there was already widespread talk in the diplomatic community here about secret official visits back and forth between Pyongyang and Seoul. I mentioned to Yi Hu-Rak that information had already leaked out within the ROK about his own visit to Pyongyang and I reminded him that, almost inevitably, there would be a major leak sooner or later. I reassured him that the U.S. Government would avoid giving any impression of reducing our presence or commitments here at this time. I expressed the opinion that the ROK population would welcome positively these initiatives and that President Park and Yi Hu-Rak would receive overwhelming support from the ROK public in contrast to the situation that existed even a year or two ago. Yi Hu-Rak answered that he thought “99 pct” of the ROK population would welcome these developments but public disclosure of the recent secret meetings had to be timed with great care.³

6. During his talks with Yi Hu-Rak, Pak Song-Ch’ol invited Yi to visit Pyongyang in June and said he would send him an official invitation after his return to Pyongyang. Yi thanked him for the informal invitation but did not advise Pak Song-Ch’ol whether he would accept. Both President Pak and Yi feel that it would tend to downgrade the value of these meetings for Yi to make an early return visit to Pyongyang. Personally, Yi is not inclined to further meetings with Pak Song-Ch’ol, who, he feels, lacks the personal qualities and sufficient authority to make such meetings very productive. His own thinking is that the next step will wait on an official invitation to Pyongyang, which has not yet arrived but which he expects will be forthcoming. After a suitable interval, assuming that an invitation is received, Yi’s view is to counter-propose a meeting in a third country with Kim Yong-Chu (Premier Kim Il-Song’s younger brother) to take place possibly in July or August. He thought that Paris or Geneva might provide a suitable meeting place. After their meeting, Yi and Kim Yong-Chu could issue a joint communiqué or separate identical statements announcing the establishment of the coordinating committee. The text of the communiqué or separate statements would have been prepared in advance at the working level and agreed on before proceeding to whichever third country was selected for the meeting. The text would be limited in content and would be shaped along the lines that the North Korean and South Korean representatives were working to reduce tensions on the Peninsula and that they would exercise influence toward persuading their respective governments to move toward policies and programs promoting this objective. Yi said he had made no reference to a third country meeting in his discussions with Pak Song-Ch’ol.

7. I asked Yi Hu-Rak whether any progress had been made during these discussions on expediting the Red Cross talks. Yi answered that he agreed with my impression that North Korea may be engaged in a certain amount of foot dragging. He thought that the North Koreans had not yet completed physical and other preparations for the plenary sessions and he could not predict when the first plenary session would be held. He expects that the preliminary meeting on 16 June will result in an agreed agenda. There would then be another preliminary meeting after which it should be possible to predict a date for the plenaries to begin. I said I thought it important to maintain the momentum of the Red Cross talks and mentioned that President Park had referred during our discussion to the usefulness of these talks in testing North Korean intentions. Yi did not expect that momentum in the Red Cross talks would be lost.

8. After the North Korean delegation’s departure for Pyongyang, Yi made a complete report on their visit to President Park. Both President Park and Yi concluded that the visit had been a very successful one from the ROK point of view. They believed that agreement on a coordinating committee was a useful accomplishment. Park thought that it was good that the North Korean representatives had been able to see Seoul and its environs for themselves. Yi said the North Koreans were “amazed” and impressed with Seoul and with what they had seen during their visit to the ROK. They seemed impressed with the meticulous preparations which the South Koreans had made for their visit and for the future reception of their Red Cross delegation. Yi thought they were impressed also with the nature and freedom of relationships between President Park and Yi Hu-Rak in the give and take of discussions and courtesies. He said the North Korean representatives conducted themselves like “robots” and were unwilling to hazard anything that looked like personal or independent thinking. He commented that Pak Song-Ch’ol, during his meetings with Yi Hu-Rak and even with President Park, confined himself to reading a prepared text from a notebook he carried in his pocket. His conclusion was that Kim Il-Song is the only North Korean leader who can talk freely and Pak Song-Ch’ol had even less authority than Kim Yong-Chu.

9. During this discussion, Yi said that the “hot line” telephone between him and Kim Yong-Chu has been used only twice by the North Koreans. About 15 December, Pyongyang had called to report that ROK troops at the DMZ had fired more than 500 rounds of machine gun ammunition and the North Korean troops intended to retaliate. Yi asked for delay and was able to report back to Pyongyang that the troops had been firing only at phosphorescent lights coming from dead tree trunks, lights which the troops had thought were carried by hostile soldiers. Pyongyang accepted this explanation and avoided retaliation. On the second occasion, Pyongyang had called to explain that North Korean troops had fired several machine gun rounds at three or four ROK soldiers who had wandered north of the demarcation line.

10. Yi seemed pleased with all developments to date and with his personal role in them. He gave the impression that future developments in private negotiations depend to a considerable degree on the next step he is waiting for, namely the receipt of an official invitation to visit Pyongyang.

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec. 1972. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. Document 145.
3. In telegram 3769 from Seoul, June 29, Habib reported that Lee Hu Rak informed him that day that President Park had decided to “make public the North-South secret meetings involving Yi in Pyongyang” and Pak Song-Ch’ol’s visit to Seoul. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972) Telegram 3770 from Seoul, June 29, provided the unofficial translation of the proposed South-North joint communiqué, which was almost identical to the final version. (Ibid.) In telegram 3809 from Seoul, July 1, Habib informed the Department of his receipt of the joint communiqué from Foreign Minister Kim, who said that it would be released on July 4. (Ibid.) See Document 151.