Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ¹

Seoul, June 10, 1972, 1119Z.

3376. Subj: Meeting With President Park Chung Hee.

1. I called on President Park for an hour’s talk June 10. This was our first meeting since my return to Seoul. After assessing my health and his for a few minutes (he is now recovered from effects of a fall and looks well) the discussion developed as follows.

2. I thanked him on behalf of President Nixon for the decision to keep Korean troops in Vietnam until the end of 1972. I noted that military situation seemed better there although enemy was persistent and we could expect some difficult periods ahead. I emphasized President Nixon’s determination as shown by recent US actions taken in air and on sea in Vietnam and spoke briefly of necessity to assure achievement of our objectives in Vietnam which are related to general credibility of our commitments elsewhere. Park nodded vigorous agreement and was pleased to receive President Nixon’s recognition of ROK decision on troops.

3. I then spoke of widespread interest in contacts between North and South Korea. This was general as far as Red Cross talks were concerned, but also applied to those who were aware of the secret talks. I noted the general admiration in the US for the initiatives taken by ROK and the skillful manner in which discussions had been pursued, and thanked him for instructing his subordinates to keep us fully informed. I asked him for his assessment of the contacts with North Koreans, what he considered to be North Korean objectives, how he saw the talks evolving, and what time-frame did he foresee as ruling in pursuit of his own purposes.

4. Park asked if I had been briefed on the latest meeting.² I replied that CIA Director Yi Hu-rak had been out of town the past few days but I expected to meet him early next week. He said Yi was away resting but he would ask him to give me the details. Meanwhile his Secretary General Kim Chong-Yom would give me a quick run-down when he had finished our meeting. (See below)

5. Park said he would have another talk with me about this question at a later date. He was pursuing the matter of contact with the North carefully and with an eye to what was practical. At this point he wished to see some progress on the issues involved in the Red Cross talks, such as the beginning of plenary meetings, the movement of people back and forth, and the opening of communication. He believes in making some progress on the smaller, easier issues and working toward the solution of more difficult issues. Unfortunately the North Koreans have tried to move immediately to generalized political discussion of the major issues and wanted such things as early summit meetings between himself and Kim Il-sung. This was impractical and the Communist proposals seemed to be directed more to impressing third parties with North Korean desire for solutions rather than to achieving practical results.

6. Park thought that talks would take time to get anywhere. He considered it possible that North Koreans would back away when it came to some practical results, such as mutual visits, communication between people on both sides of DMZ, and other realistic actions. The Red Cross talks were a good test of North Korean readiness to move ahead and only time would tell how far this could go. He, like all Koreans, was suspicious of the North Koreans on the basis of the past record and he would move to test their sincerity.

7. He then discussed situation in North Korea briefly mentioning recent articles in Japanese press, and the series by Salisbury and Lee in The New York Times. (He was critical of biased nature Japanese reporting but thought Times articles were quite good.) He noted evidence of garrison state mentality, personality cult and tightness of controls. The nature of life in the North made him wonder if Kim Il-sung really was prepared to expose his people to outside influence. He agreed that it will be very interesting to see the effect of the first non-official contacts, if and when the Red Cross talks open the way.

8. We parted, agreeing to meet again for further discussion, and I went off with Kim Chong-yom.

9. Kim said President Park had asked him to give me a summary of last meeting with North Koreans pending Yi Hu-rak’s fuller report. North Korean Vice Premier Pak Sang-chol had come down to Seoul on May 29th, met three times with Yi Hu-rak, and then for two hours with President Park on May 31. Pak Sang-chol had proposed establishment of a North-South coordinating committee, a meeting between President Park and Kim Il-sung, and public disclosure of the secret meetings held in Pyongyang and Seoul.

10. President Park had agreed to the formation of a “so-called” coordinating committee, charging Yi Hu-rak to remain in contact with Kim Yong-chu (younger brother of Kim Il-sung) for this purpose. I asked how formal was the arrangement and what were the terms of reference. Kim Chong-yom replied that the arrangement was not formal, and that the terms of references were vague. As of now they viewed the arrangement as a channel for communication which could permit discussion of such things as ways to facilitate the Red Cross talks, or clearing up misunderstandings that could arise over incidents along the DMZ.

11. Public disclosure of secret meetings had been turned down by President Park as had the idea of a meeting with Kim Il-sung at this time. Park had spoken of distrust of Northern intentions on part of Southerners and desire not to cause uneasiness or unwarranted expectations on Park of people who have reason to fear North Korea which had once launched invasion and carried out terrorist actions. Contacts should therefore be implemented on a gradual basis, with such actions as family visits, communication between North and South, and cultural exchanges. Park had also told Pak Sang-chol that now was not the time for a summit meeting which needed a great deal more preparation if it was to be useful.

12. Kim Chong-yom then said that President Park is ready to move ahead with political talks if North Korean sincerity is demonstrated by step-by-step progress, particularly in Red Cross talks. Park is concerned that North Korea is more interested in “dividing South Korea’s national consensus” and creating confusion in the South than it is in solving differences. He was also concerned that North is trying to mislead the American public through a false peace offensive, thus promoting demand for early withdrawal of US forces from Korea and an end to the military modernization program.

13. I asked when next political meeting was scheduled. Kim said North Koreans proposed that Yi Hu-rak go to Pyongyang for a meeting in June. No response was made then, but President Park did not plan to send Yi at this time. Generally speaking the ROKG was not interested at this moment in political meetings at a senior level in Pyongyang and Seoul. If they become desirable, it may be preferable to have them in a third country. As for the coordinating committee, it could communicate at a lower level. The ROK strategy at this point is to see what progress can be made at the Red Cross talks, keep all channels open, but remain cautious.

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR S–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See Document 147.