146. Memorandum from John A. Froebe, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- State Analysis of Recent Political Probings Between North and South Korea
At Tab A is a State memorandum to you setting out their analysis of South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak’s early May discussions in Pyongyang with Kim Il-song and others.2 State’s principal conclusions are:
- —As we have long assumed, Kim Il-song is indeed of the Stalinist mold. [But this should not be construed to mean that factionalism is not a problem for him. He told Yi Hu-rak that “extreme leftists” were responsible for the North Korean assassination attempt against President Park in early 1968. While this may be a self-serving comment, [Page 361] we have had evidence of factional conflict in North Korea over the years.]3
- —Contrary to previous notions that Kim has a capacity for irrational behavior, Yi concluded that Kim is decidedly in touch with reality, is perceptive, and is aware of the weaknesses of the sycophants who surround him. [Incidentally, as you may have noted, Harrison Salisbury and John Lee of the New York Times came away from their recent visit to Pyongyang impressed by the oppressive atmosphere resulting from the extreme lengths to which the adulation of Kim Il-song has been pushed. This is the same impression gained by Yi Hu-rak.]
- —Kim is intent on persuading the South Korean leadership that he has given up military force as a means of reunifying the Peninsula.
- —Vice Premier Kim Yong-chu (Kim Il-song’s younger brother), who has risen rapidly in recent years to his present sixth notch in the hierarchy, is not the near certain successor to Kim Il-song that some analysts have thought him to be.
- —State concludes that it is a healthy development that Yi Hu-rak recognizes that the North Korean leadership does not have the high degree of strength and vigor that the South Korean leadership previously has attributed to it. This should contribute to a greater degree of self-confidence among ROK leaders.
State suggests that it is time to take another look at North Korean intentions. I am somewhat skeptical that another analysis of available evidence at this time would measurably clarify Pyongyang’s current intentions.
The evident questions, it seems to me, are what Kim Il-song hopes to gain from his switch in tactics that began late last summer; to what extent he feels constrained by Peking’s altered approach—and by Soviet policy as well; and to what extent Peking and Moscow are willing to use what influence they have in Pyongyang to restrain Kim should this be necessary. Tentative answers to these questions should become more evident as a result of North Korea’s political discussions with the South, from Pyongyang’s approach to the Korean question in next fall’s U.N. General Assembly, from the conduct of their current diplomatic campaign to improve the DPRK’s international position, and from the level at which they keep their continuing harassment of the South through infiltration and subversion.
Related to this, I find State a bit overly hopeful as to Kim’s current purposes, and a bit too insensitive as regards the risks of exploring the possibilities of expanded U.S. contacts with Pyongyang. These risks include loosening the political and social cohesion of South Korea, increasing friction between ourself, Seoul, and Tokyo, and possibly leading Pyongyang to miscalculate our intentions toward the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2. Top Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.↩
- Attached but not printed is a May 24 memorandum, “Some Light on North Korea—Yi Hu Rak’s Visit,” prepared in INR.↩
- All brackets are in the original.↩