Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

122. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ¹

Seoul, December 23, 1971, 0214Z.

7707. Subj: Emergency Presidential Powers: Preliminary Comments. Ref: Seoul 7661.² Summary: In the face of President Park’s determination to have emergency powers we see policy alternatives of either direct confrontation or continuing pressure to prevent abuse. We favor latter course.

1. All the available evidence confirms Prime Minister’s statement to me (see Seoul 7701)³ that President Park is determined to have the powers set forth in new proposed law and will use any measures necessary to obtain them. Only local element which we can expect to oppose the President publicly at this time is NDP which is not capable of obstructing bill’s passage by extra-parliamentary procedures in face of President’s determination and does not have the votes to prevent passage on Assembly floor.

2. Why does President Park feel the need to push through a law giving him extraordinary emergency powers and must he have this enacted by the Assembly by December 29? We believe Park was motivated by the same considerations which prompted the December 6 declaration of emergency (see Seoul 7527).⁴ He has been disturbed by situation in UN which led to expulsion ROC, by U.S. Senate action on aid, by U.S. drawdown of forces in Korea, by indications United Nations would be unable to act in Korea (reinforced by Pakistan case)⁵ and by his belief internal attitudes in Korea too permissive. He feels that small powers like Korea must be prepared to look after themselves if at the time of crisis their interests and the interests of the great powers do not happen to coincide. He appears also to feel a need for a legal framework below the level of martial law through which he could exercise “legitimately” the powers which he already has.

3. What role should the U.S. play? One course of action would be to intervene positively and attempt to persuade Park to withdraw the proposed legislation. This would require a direct confrontation with the President himself. Both he and the Prime Minister know from my conversations with them that there are aspects of the emergency decree and the related actions following it which create problems for the U.S. They know that significant elements in the government, press and Congress regard the steps as politically retrogressive, and that the business community is concerned. I have been as frank and direct as I can be in stating and re-stating these reactions, and we must assume they have been weighed in the President’s decision and that he has decided to proceed nonetheless. To stop him in his tracks, I would need much more. Not a mere warning of the possibility of declining American support, (which he already expects) but a flat statement of some specific, unavoidable consequence or series of consequences would be required, plus the determination to put them into effect if he persisted.

4. An alternative course would be to continue what we are now doing: responding to requests for our views coming to us from figures in government, the legislature and the community in general; being sure that the Korean Government has a complete feedback on reaction from the U.S.; refraining from direct intervention and allowing the counter forces in Korean society to develop, to resist and correct possible government excesses.

5. We are inclined towards the second alternative. President Park knows he cannot take us for granted, and we can hope to moderate his actions although not altering his basic conception. He is perceptive enough to see that we can accelerate the American disengagement that he fears, and we can play on that fear. We would let Park and key officials know that while we will not interfere in ROK domestic affairs, he is making continued support of ROK by U.S. administration difficult. He should therefore understand if he uses powers granted to him under other than clearest evidence of serious emergency, no assurance can be given that U.S. people, Congress, and administration will continue to provide him with moral and material support they have given in the past.⁶

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
2. Not found.
3. Document 121.
4. Dated December 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S)
5. Reference is to UN efforts to end the Indo-Pakistan war.
6. In telegram 230831 to Seoul, December 24, the Department noted, “Park may see the world and problems facing Korea he may, as you note, place U.S. support in jeopardy if he is viewed as an autocrat who is throttling Korean democratic life for his own ends.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S)