Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

123. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 1, 1972.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Korea

PARTICIPANTS

• Koreans
• Kim Tae-chung, National Assemblyman
• Om Yong-dal, New Democratic Party
• Dr. Yu Ki-hong, Kim’s associate in Washington
• United States
• Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• Donald L. Ranard, Director for Korean Affairs
• Robert F. Dorr, Country Officer for Korea

Accompanied by former ROK diplomat Om and by Dr. Yu, his associate in Washington, Kim called on Assistant Secretary Green February 1 and expressed apprehension over the ROK state of national emergency.

Kim questioned the motives of President Park in declaring the emergency and suggested that Park is harming US–ROK relations. Kim also pointed out that North Korean Premier Kim Il-song has seized the initiative in his propaganda campaign against the ROK and questioned ROK sincerity in Red Cross meetings at Panmunjom.

During his call, Kim did most of the talking and concentrated on the following points:

(a) North Korean Threat: Kim noted the contradiction between the public statements of the ROKG and of the U.S. State Department. As member of National Assembly’s Defense Committee, he had been thoroughly briefed and did not believe there is a danger of imminent North Korean attack. He also doubted that President Park believes an attack is imminent.

(b) ROK “Emergency”: Kim believes Park is using North Korean threat as a pretext for actions motivated by both internal and international developments. On the international side, admission of the PRC to the United Nations was one of the many factors that had motivated Park. But Park’s main motive was internal: 5.4 million people had voted for Kim, thus showing desire for a leader other than Park. After the April 1971 presidential election, Koreans had wanted democratic processes to continue, but Park had not been responsive to the wishes of the electorate and had acted harshly, for example, in the case of student dissenters. Kim said the ROK President should not excite and “stir up people” with talk of the North Korean threat, nor should he muzzle dissent.

(c) Red Cross Talks: Mr. Green was particularly interested in Kim’s views on the Red Cross talks. Kim said he had urged in the National Assembly and in his presidential campaign that there be dialogue and postal exchanges between North and South Korea. He could not understand why the ROKG was now pursuing a “difficult” matter (divided families) while taking no steps to solve an “easy” problem (i.e., postal exchanges). Kim said the Red Cross talks will not succeed if the ROKG continues to publicize the North Korean threat. Kim feels Park has a “changed attitude” since the election and now does not wish the Red Cross talks to make progress. While North Korea’s Kim Il-song will have to abandon his intention of exploiting the Red Cross for political reasons, it will also be necessary for the ROKG to confine its role to the humanitarian purpose of the talks.

(d) Kim Il-song Peace Pact Proposal: Referring to Kim Il-song’s January 11 interview with the Yomiuri, Mr. Kim believed it indicated that the North Korean Premier was prepared to meet with Park and the DRP, and that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is not a condition for the peace pact which Kim proposed. Subsequently, however, Kim Tae-chung said he thought that Kim Il-song was trying for a more flexible image and that Park was the more militaristic of the two. He acknowledged that Kim’s statements were propaganda, but that he should not be allowed to get away with it.

Mr. Green told Kim that North Korea seems to be intent on improving its propaganda image and its diplomatic position in the world.² The North Koreans have become well known for events such as the 1950 invasion, the Blue House Raid, the Pueblo seizure, the EC–121 incident, and the insurgency in Ceylon. They now seem anxious to project a different and more reasonable image. With respect to the ROK emergency, Mr. Green said we of course are very interested in following this matter but it is essentially a domestic development within the ROKG. On the Red Cross talks, the USG naturally welcomes dialogue of this type and feels that it is always useful to talk with adversaries, even when views on important issues are widely divergent. It was in this same spirit of tough-minded dialogue that the U.S. had sought to open communications with China.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Dorr on February 14 and approved in draft by Ranard and in final by Green on February 14. The meeting was held in Green’s office at the Department of State.
2. An INR analysis of the North Korean initiative is in Intelligence Note REAN–6, “North Korea’s Peace Offensive,” dated January 18. The Intelligence Note concluded: “This offensive is designed to seize the diplomatic and propaganda initiative from the ROK, create difficulties between the ROK and its US and Japanese allies, and foment dissension in the South. Kim’s efforts may be having some success.” (Ibid., POL KOR N–KOR S)