121. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 1

7701. Summary: According to Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil emergency declaration and extraordinary powers sought by President Park are direct outcome of desire to prepare nation for the uncertainties of the general international situation over the next few years. In particular Park is determined to increase ROK self-reliance and ability to deal on its own with North Korea over the longer run. The government intends to secure passage of law granting extraordinary powers over any opposition in the National Assembly even if it requires exceptional measures. End summary.

1.
I had a two-hour conversation with Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil December 22 almost exclusively devoted to the current situation centered about President Park’s emergency declaration and request for extraordinary powers. Kim led into the discussion by saying he had come to the “personal” conclusion that Park had not embarked upon his present course by reason of any “hidden motives” involving either the establishment of a generalissimo-type government or perpetuation of himself as president for life. Kim believed Park was sincerely concerned about the course of events in the world as they affected Korea and by immediate situation facing his nation. Park was concerned his people and his country were not prepared to meet the tests to which they will be put over the period of the next few years which he conceives as the most dangerous time.
2.
Kim said the Korean people were not pragmatic but acted in accordance with their conceptual understanding. For twenty-five years they had placed their reliance upon big power protection, namely, the United States. This had served them well and they had prospered. However, the world was changing and big power interests were such that smaller nations were now uncertain. Although still dependent for ultimate deterrent upon their friends and allies they needed to develop a greater degree of self-reliance. A big power had not been able to prevent the Republic of China from losing its seat in the United Nations. The big powers could not prevent local wars from developing. In the event of such local wars countries involved needed to depend upon their own resources to a greater extent than before. If a country were not sufficiently prepared, it could find itself at a disadvantage.
3.
In the past, Korea had looked to the United Nations for its protection. At one stage the United Nations had responded and saved them. But Korea could no longer look to the United Nations which would probably be unable to act in a new emergency. As for the United States upon which their life had depended for so long and still depended, Park felt that they could no longer be assured of an American military presence. They knew there would be no further withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in 1972. Beyond that, however, they could not be sure of what would happen.
4.
President Park believed ROK needed to be prepared for any contingency. If it turned out that they had been overly cautious then it would have cost them some resources that might better be used elsewhere and that they would have paid some price in internal restrictions. But this was better than the price that would be paid if they had not been sufficiently prepared.
5.
Kim said North Korea was at a peak in terms of its strength and preparations for war. It was not known when these preparations would be used but ROK had to be alert to the danger. It was better to be prepared for the worst than to run the risks involved in assuming no immediate threat. Kim ended his explanation by saying that for all these reasons President Park was determined to get the legislation he was seeking giving him a wide range of emergency powers.
6.
I asked Kim to what limits Park was moving. How did he intend to apply the emergency powers he was seeking? How far would he go in terms of individual restrictions or the use of the wide powers of control over the society? To what extent would be apply the economic powers on wages and prices that he was asking? How did he intend to deal with the National Assembly in this situation? Why were these extraordinary powers necessary when by and large the government already had sufficient authority to do what was necessary? Kim replied that only Park Chung Hee knew how far he would go. In effect the President would go as far as he felt was necessary to enable the country to meet possible challenges. Kim did not know the precise answers to the questions I had asked with regard to the use of the powers being sought. The general rule was that the powers would be applied only if they were needed and President Park would make that determination.
7.
I told Kim I assumed Park did not operate on his own without advice and opinion of others. What advice and opinions was he being given as to limits to which he should go and the consequences of surpassing these limits? Kim replied there were a few people counseling moderation but Park had made it clear that he was determined to have the authority and then use it if it becomes necessary. The desire for the authority was on a contingency basis and no one could deny the contingency. The President believed his present authority was geared to [Page 309] deal with extraordinary situations after they arise, but was not sufficient to prevent them from happening.
8.
I asked why emergency declaration was now being supplemented by request for extraordinary powers. Kim said Park had told him at time of emergency declaration that it would be wise to allow some time to pass to see how public would react. Instead, Park now wanted to push ahead with new law. Kim did not know the reason, but believed Park was strongly influenced by events in East Pakistan where neither big powers nor UN were able to prevail. Instead, the country that was better prepared won out. He was not going to see ROK in that position. I replied that ROK was not in that position, and that it seemed they were discounting U.S. presence and treaty with U.S. much too readily. Kim replied they knew their dependence on U.S. was great and they believed greatest deterrent to North Korean attack was U.S. presence. For this reason they wished U.S. division to remain in Korea for indefinite period. But meanwhile they needed to do all necessary to prepare themselves for any contingency.
9.
I told Kim I wanted to make sure he understood some of the reactions that could be expected abroad and particularly in the United States. Certainly people would find it difficult to understand the reasons for these latest actions which would appear retrogressive. Korea had an extraordinarly good reputation abroad as a progressive nation. There would be concern expressed at the course of events. I recounted for him what we had already seen on this in the press, in the Congress and among business firms interested in Korea. It was inevitable that the concern expressed after the declaration of emergency would now be increased in the face of the new legislation and the circumstances surrounding its passage. I told him that any action contemplated which would seriously affect the National Assembly would arouse immediate and fundamental concern.
10.
He said the government majority expected to secure passage of the bill in this session. At this very moment the rostrum of the Assembly was being occupied by a group of opposition Assemblymen. He did not believe all members of the opposition were so adamantly opposed to the bill but one faction led by Kim Tae Chung appeared determined to disrupt the Assembly and prevent passage of the bill. It might become necessary for the government to take abnormal measures to pass the bill. I remarked that I hoped this wasn’t a warning of a meeting at 2:30 in the morning. He caught the implication and replied that he hoped they would not do anything more extra-legal than the sort of thing done in the Japanese Diet to pass the Okinawa Reversion bill.
11.
He then went on to express concern as to extent President Park would go if the opposition persisted in interfering in the passage of the bill through the methods it was currently applying. I told him again in quite positive terms that action against the National Assembly would [Page 310] be detrimental and would not be understood. He replied that in general he believed Korean people would understand measures taken within the Assembly in such circumstances. The public was not that concerned over what they saw as political in-fighting. The public would be more concerned if the government were to misuse its authority in the administration of the country.
12.
I asked him what the general public reaction would be toward the President’s request for extraordinary powers. He said he believed the public would accept the wisdom of these things provided they were assured of one thing—that Park was not taking these measures for any hidden motive connected with his perpetuation in power. I asked how the public could receive that assurance. He said only Park’s actions would be the test and the people would know.
13.
I asked if he did not foresee the possibility the North Koreans would view the recent spate of actions in the South as provocative and, in turn, escalate their own actions to a point where tensions would be increased substantially with all the dangers that would imply. He said the North Koreans were already at a maximum state of readiness and all they would do would be to redeploy some of their forces in a more aggressive stance. On the other hand South Korea had absolutely no intention of provoking an attack on the North at any time. If anyone were to even make such a suggestion he would resist to the utmost.
14.
Kim said he would be busy trying to persuade opposition to be reasonable in the Assembly in order to permit government to be reasonable in its actions in return. However, President Park was absolutely determined to get the authority he believed necessary to carry out his responsibilities. The use of emergency powers was normal in extraordinary circumstances, and Korea was in such a position.
Habib
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.