233. Memorandum of Conversation1
- Prime Minister Chou En-lai
- Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
- Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (4:40 p.m. to conclusion)
- Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
- Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
- Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
- Two Notetakers
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Winston Lord, NSC Staff
- Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Prime Minister Chou: I read your President’s article which was published recently in the U.S. News and World Report.2 Have you read it?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.[Page 972]
Prime Minister Chou: So you have come for your discussion in accordance with this article of your President. Isn’t that so?
Dr. Kissinger: More or less. Do you read these articles in English, Mr. Prime Minister, or do you get them translated?
Prime Minister Chou: Chinese. We got it in English originally, and then it was translated into Chinese. Also I read the draft of the announcement which you drew up.3
Dr. Kissinger: It is just a tentative proposal.
Prime Minister Chou: I will discuss that with you after we get to the Summer Palace.
Dr. Kissinger: All right.
Prime Minister Chou: There is another question which I originally planned to discuss—the question of the Subcontinent. We will first go into that. We believe we should do this rather quickly because there is still some more about Vietnam we want to discuss.
Dr. Kissinger: All right. Also I want to say a word about Germany to the Prime Minister. Let’s talk about the Subcontinent first.
Our assessment is that India is pursuing at the moment a quite aggressive foreign policy. (Prime Minister questions translator’s translation.)And it is in some respects becoming obviously, whatever its own intentions, an extension of some aspects of Soviet foreign policy.
For example, the Prime Minister no doubt knows that India has offered to both Indonesia and even to Japan treaties which are word for word the same as its own treaties with the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Chou: That is right.
Dr. Kissinger: So that if this came to be, it would be in effect an alliance with India which in turn would be linked to the Soviet Union.
And I believe also that Indian interests extend as well to Southeast Asia.
Prime Minister Chou: That is so. Mrs. Gandhi has taken over the legacy of her father in his work, The Discovery of India.4 That was the ambition of Nehru—the ambition of discovery.
Dr. Kissinger: He did not have the energy to carry it out. He was more theoretical.
Prime Minister Chou: Anyway he showed the direction of his ambitions.[Page 973]
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And when we spoke yesterday of a zone of relaxation in Southeast Asia, I want to say to the Prime Minister as far as we are concerned, we would also look with disfavor on an attempt by India to establish hegemony in that area. The Prime Minister may also be aware that when I was asked in Japan about the various proposals for Asian collective security arrangements I stated—not publicly, but since there is no such thing as a private conversation in Japan, I suppose it became public—that we would join no arrangement which objectively was directed against the PRC. If he is not aware, I am telling him now.
I think we agree in our analysis of the situation. The immediate problem is that the ability of India to pursue these policies depends to some extent on its ability to gain freedom of action on the Indian Subcontinent. We believe that the strategy of India is to do to West Pakistan what it has already done to East Pakistan by disintegrating it, by bringing about the succession of the Northwestern frontier and Baluchistan. Indeed, when Mrs. Gandhi was in Washington in November and talked with the President she stressed that she did not even talk much about East Pakistan any more.5 She talked about the betrayal that was involved in West Pakistan. Therefore the problem is whether it is possible to save West Pakistan and thereby absorb some of India’s energies on the Subcontinent rather than free them all for expansion. I’m saying this cold-bloodedly; it’s our analysis.
To preserve West Pakistan there are two aspects—one is economic; the other is military. On the economic side we have been able to do quite a bit. We have given $150 million in direct aid and about $180 million through international institutions—that is, the U.S. share of it.
Prime Minister Chou: That is recently—after the war.
Dr. Kissinger: I am talking about since the war, and we are somewhat handicapped because we refused to give any economic assistance to India so we have a complicated Congressional problem with which I will not bore the Prime Minister. But we have not given any aid to India. This is not so much of a punishment because India owes us $3.5 billion and it will simply refuse to repay. (Chou and Ch’iao laugh.)
Now the big problem is military assistance to the Pakistanis. We have been prevented by the Democratic Congress from giving aid directly. I wanted to tell the Prime Minister in strictest confidence that when we were in Iran we asked the Shah to organize a consortium of Greece, Iran, Turkey, maybe Jordan, to establish military assistance to Pakistan with American weapons. We did some of this illegally [Page 974]during the war, as the Prime Minister knows. To do it legally we will have to start a small arms program to Pakistan because there is a provision in our law that American weapons can be transferred to third countries only if those countries are eligible to receive American weapons directly. (Chou asks Mr. Chi a question. He answers. Miss Tang also speaks.) We think we can solve that in the next few months.
Prime Minister Chou: I don’t want at all to interfere in internal affairs. However, I want to make a suggestion. I think it would be best that Jordan does not take part in this.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree. That will not happen.
Prime Minister Chou: Because Iran and Turkey are somewhat different; there is the question of CENTO. But Jordan is not quite in the Arab world.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
Prime Minister Chou: In December when you went to give them 12 planes by Jordan it was not easy nor did it give any good influence, impression.
Dr. Kissinger: But at that time we had to do it because the Soviet Union was bringing so much pressure on Iran. There was a complicated arrangement. We flew Iranian planes to Jordan and Jordan planes to Pakistan. It was an emergency. This won’t happen again.
So in this I wanted to tell the Prime Minister our intention, but something depends on what your intentions are, because if you should have come to the conclusion nothing can be done for Pakistan in the military field then it will be very difficult for us to do it all. But we can and we are prepared to give certain types of equipment that you will find it difficult to supply, and to see whether there can be a combination of Iranian and Turkish tanks and modern airplanes. And we have also encouraged France to sell airplanes to Pakistan, and they are doing it now.
Prime Minister Chou: We have not stopped our aid to Pakistan. Our aid to Pakistan is continuing. As for our tanks to Pakistan, they are, of course, light tanks. The planes we supply Pakistan are renovated versions of MIG–19s. In fact, to be very honest with you, the renovated MIG–19s we have been giving Pakistan are greater in numbers than those we have been giving Vietnam. We haven’t been giving so many MIG–19s to Vietnam. So what is there so bad about stopping the war in Indochina? Why must we test our weapons on the Indochina battlefield?
Dr. Kissinger: I agree. We don’t want to continue the war in Indochina.
Prime Minister Chou: We will discuss it later. And once the war in Vietnam comes to a stop then we can supply Pakistan even more quickly with our weaponry. We have already agreed to give so many things to [Page 975]them, but we are not able to complete their orders to us. Because East Pakistan lost two divisions of equipment without even fighting.
Dr. Kissinger: That was a very stupid deployment.
Prime Minister Chou: But we said nothing. Because we have made it clear that once we have given those weapons to them they have full freedom to make use of them as they like. We have no right to interfere in their affairs. We have not a single adviser there. We don’t want any such prerogatives of interfering in their sovereignty.
Dr. Kissinger: We have no interest in Pakistan except to maintain its independence. We have no other purposes there.
Prime Minister Chou: It is not possible for you not to mind yourself about the Subcontinent because the Soviet Union is attempting to exercise hegemony.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, this is what we are trying to…6
Prime Minister Chou: Britain is already expressing her dissatisfaction.
Dr. Kissinger: But Britain contributed to this in December.
Prime Minister Chou: To Secretary Home we say, why do you come to realize these things afterwards? And also Foreign Minister Schuman.
Dr. Kissinger: It would be very interesting if you would tell the Europeans about your situation because the Vice Foreign Minister knows last December they made our life very difficult.
Prime Minister Chou: Of the 104 votes in the General Assembly Britain and France were not included, and the Vice Minister openly criticized them about that. But only on 20, 21 December at the Security Council meeting they agreed on the rules of ceasefire after Dacca had fallen, but that was too late already. The General Assembly also voted on December 7. Actually if action was taken at that time, then Dacca would have been saved.
Mr. Ch’iao: The greatest procrastinations came about in the Security Council on the 11th and 12th.
Dr. Kissinger: I was just going to say that. The British were particularly bad, as the Vice Foreign Minister knows.
Prime Minister Chou: Then the situation was rather clear to some, but it was already too late.
Dr. Kissinger: The art in foreign policy is to be right before it is self-evident.
Prime Minister Chou: That is right. You need foresight.
Dr. Kissinger: So if I may say so, I think a clear analysis of your point of view to both Schuman, who is less steady, and to the British [Page 976]would be very important when they come here. Because Britain is no better off with India for having tried to curry the favor of India than we for having opposed India (Chou laughs).
Prime Minister Chou: The British think they are still in the days of Lord Mountbatten, but those are days long gone.
Dr. Kissinger: And they try to substitute maneuver for substance. And that can’t be done. But I believe our government, at least this Administration, believes that the Indian extension of Soviet foreign policy can be very grave throughout Southeast Asia. In the last five years India received one billion two hundred million dollars of military equipment from the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Chou: So very expensive.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And produced $1 billion worth of its own. During that same period Pakistan received not quite $500 million, of which most came from you. That includes the domestic production which isn’t great. That explains…
Prime Minister Chou: India gets her military aid in the form of loans from the Soviet Union?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Very low interest loans. I have promised the Vice Chairman to give him some further details, and I will do that if you tell me where I should do it.
Prime Minister Chou: You think it will be all right to have it conveyed through Ambassador Huang Hua?
Dr. Kissinger: I will do that next week. As you know they have given India—they plan to produce MIG–21s in India.
Prime Minister Chou: The characteristics of the MIG–21 actually are not very good. Their maneuverability is even worse than that of the MIG–19 and inferior to planes of the same calibre of your country.
Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We are speeding up giving Iran more modern planes so that some of their planes can be free to go to Pakistan. They will still be very good. But they are producing some F–14s and F–15s. And we are speeding that up so that they can give some of their F–4s to Pakistan. That is what I wanted to tell you about our attitude on the Subcontinent.
Prime Minister Chou: What is the Soviet attitude towards Iran?
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union is trying to surround Iran, partly with the pressures on Baluchistan—if India succeeds in creating a Baluchistan insurrection then this will bring pressures on the eastern front of Iran. You will remember, Mr. Prime Minister, that there are Soviet moves towards Iraq so that they are attempting to bring the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq under their influence so that the Kurds can begin organizing the Kurds in Iran. So they are beginning to bring pressure on Iran from three sides.[Page 977]
The Shah—I don’t know whether the Prime Minister had an opportunity to deal with the Shah—the Shah is a very far-sighted leader. Very energetic.
Interpreter (Mr. Chi): No, the Premier hasn’t seen him before.
Prime Minister Chou: No, I haven’t seen the Shah himself. I have seen his two sisters and the Queen, and the Prime Minister is coming to China this year.
Dr. Kissinger: The Empress.
Interpreter: The Empress.
Dr. Kissinger: He is attempting to gain a much greater degree of popular support by major reforms, especially the distribution of land to the peasants. On the military side he has a very effective army and a very substantial air force. And none of his neighbors would be capable of defeating him except the Soviet Union. He would easily defeat the Iraqi army, even with Soviet equipment. And the Soviet Union could not attack him without a major fight. And, of course, he has an alliance with us which we would honor in such a case. Iran is an essential pivot for this area.
Prime Minister Chou: How about Turkey?
Dr. Kissinger: Turkey is also important, but it has some significant domestic difficulties right now.
Prime Minister Chou: And the Soviet Union has some influence in Turkey?
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has attempted to gain some influence in Turkey but there is an historical distrust so that when Podgorny was in Ankara he proposed a treaty of consultation, and the Turks refused him. The Turks are prepared to pursue the same policy as the Iranians, but they do not have the same freedom of maneuver.
Prime Minister Chou: Well, Turkey has a dual relationship of alliance with you.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.
Prime Minister Chou: They are in NATO also.
Dr. Kissinger: In case of attack there is no question that we would support Turkey, but their capacity to influence other countries and bring pressure on other countries that may not come under Soviet influence is less than that of the Shah. But after the election it will be our strategy to link these two closer together.
Prime Minister Chou: You mean Turkey and Iran?
Dr. Kissinger: Turkey and Iran.
Prime Minister Chou: And Pakistan is still remaining a member of CENTO?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is still technically a member of CENTO. But the major strategy is to give Pakistan enough strength so that India will [Page 978]not be able to attack it; or that it turns itself into a vassal of India and therefore frees India to move into Southeast Asia or other parts.
Prime Minister Chou: Has your diplomatic representative gone to East Pakistan?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: The situation in East Pakistan is not good.
Dr. Kissinger: The situation in East Pakistan is very bad. In the long term I think this will be a cancer for India.
Prime Minister Chou: I think so.
Dr. Kissinger: Because if the situation remains chaotic, it will absorb Indian resources and if the situation improves it will be a magnet for West Bengal (Chou laughs). But our impression is that the government in Dacca is so incompetent that the effective administration is in the hands of the Indians.
Prime Minister Chou: It really has the flavor of a colonial regime.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: And actually some Indian forces are still remaining in Pakistan.
Dr. Kissinger: As police.
Prime Minister Chou: And officers.
Dr. Kissinger: And also it is surrounded by Indian forces.
(At this point, 4:40 p.m., Chang enters.)
Prime Minister Chou: And so that is about the Subcontinent. As for the Subcontinent we will continue to support the independence of West Pakistan. That is a responsibility that we will continue to carry out. At the same time we shall say West Pakistan is a friendly country to us. And in fact the period of friendship is longer than that with India. But the Pakistanis are rather worried because Mrs. Gandhi has been over the past three months saying everywhere she wants to improve relations with China. Naturally, we haven’t paid any attention to her. As for exchange of Ambassadors with India, we think even that we can wait somewhat. In fact up till now that is the only country with which we have relations but have no Ambassadors. Just petty maneuvers on the part of the Indians.
Dr. Kissinger: Their freedom of action is circumscribed by their dependence on Soviet military aid.
Prime Minister Chou: The Indians also have tremendous domestic difficulties. As President Nixon said on his visit here, all the loans to India, including those by the World Bank, amount to $10 billion. So India adopts the policy of not repaying.
Dr. Kissinger: Not yet, but I am sure that is what she is going to do. (Chou laughs.) So far they have only made difficulty about repaying $100 million. (Chou laughs.)[Page 979]
Prime Minister Chou: But don’t you have in your hands some of the rupees—the Indian rupees?
Dr. Kissinger: In counterpart funds.
Prime Minister Chou: They buy grains from you with Indian rupees.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they do. But we can’t take them out of the country. We can spend them only in India.
Prime Minister Chou: I have probably told you about the history of the story about the situation of my visit to India in 1960 for talks with Nehru, my final visit and my last talk with Nehru. Did I tell you that?
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t remember. Perhaps the Prime Minister can tell me again.
Prime Minister Chou: That is, in 1960 for the last time I went to New Delhi to have negotiations with Nehru on the Sino-Indian border question. After a week of negotiations, towards the end, I just copied principles cited by Nehru at various periods in the past and said, “let’s agree on those principles.” And even this Nehru refused to agree to. Not a single word of agreement was reached.
And then after the breakdown of the negotiations I went to Nepal the next day. On the eve of my departure from Delhi I received some foreign correspondents. At that press conference an American correspondent reminded me, “do you not know the Indian Minister of Food is now in Washington.” I said, “Now I know. Thank you for reminding me of that fact.” And then on the next day in Nepal I saw in the papers that an agreement of a loan on food grains to India, in the amount of 15 million tons of food grains, was signed in Washington to supply India two or three times a year, which was to be repayed in rupees. That was the encouragement on your side to Nehru.
And on the other side was encouragement given to him by Khrushchev. That is, Khrushchev in order to obtain the so-called Spirit of Camp David—a spirit which you never recognized—Khrushchev tore up in 1959 a treaty he entered into with us on cooperation in the economic field.
At that time, in October 1959, the Indians made a military provocation against us at the Natula Pass on the border with India. The Pass is on the top of the plateau. The Indians when they went up to the Pass they had more casualties, and because the Indians suffered more casualties they [the Russians] said it was China which launched the attack against India. And from that time the Indians believed what Khrushchev told them. Afterwards Neville, the British correspondent, made that clear.7[Page 980]
Dr. Kissinger: I read that. I must say from my experience of Soviet leaders I don’t think they need our encouragement to be anti-Chinese.(Chou laughs.) It comes naturally.
Prime Minister Chou: But at least at that time it was something, because at that time they wanted to curry favor with you. You know the atmosphere at that time was quite different.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: For instance, at the banquet that night, you said that Chancellor Adenauer told President Kennedy that Dr. Kissinger agreed with him, and President Kennedy was quite surprised. That was in 1961.
Dr. Kissinger: 1961.
Prime Minister Chou: The situation at that time was different.
Dr. Kissinger: Totally different.
Prime Minister Chou: So from this we can see that you have a point when you praise Adenauer. I remember you said in 1957 Adenauer told you the U.S. was going to improve relations with China, but at that time you couldn’t agree.
Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe that the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union would ever split. I was wrong.
Prime Minister Chou: I told what you told me to Chairman Mao, and he immediately recalled it and said that Adenauer had a point there; he had grounds for thinking so. Because it was in 1955 when the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with West Germany and Khrushchev told Adenauer the Chinese are very fearful people—the Yellow Horde is about to come again.
Dr. Kissinger: That is right. That is why Adenauer believed it.
Prime Minister Chou: The Chairman immediately recalled that. At that time I was Foreign Minister. So Chairman Mao, who remembers very accurately every crucial moment in history…
Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe it in 1957, but by 1961 I did believe it.
Prime Minister Chou: But it shows Adenauer had his grounds for saying that in 1957.
Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe that two communist countries could split so completely.
Prime Minister Chou: Because at that time you were still a professor and not a Presidential Adviser. If you did not take part in Presidential affairs it is not easy to understand this.
There is not so much difference between us on the question of Pakistan. But there is one thing. On the one hand, we do consider it is necessary that we should help them, but on the other hand, they should [Page 981]be able to solve their own problems by themselves. Only then can they be tempered.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think it would be helpful, Mr. Prime Minister, if we kept each other informed if one of us had a radical change of policy so that neither of us would be too exposed there.
Prime Minister Chou: Looking at it from now over quite a long period from now to the future, I don’t think we will change our policy of helping Pakistan unless something changes in Pakistan itself; for instance, they come out openly to oppose China. But I don’t think that is foreseeable in the future because the friendship between the peoples of Pakistan and China is quite deep. All of our Pakistani friends blame us for not giving them more advice with regard to their domestic and political affairs, but that is our principle not to interfere in the internal affairs, and that is the principle which Chairman Mao has taught us and which we are persisting in.
Dr. Kissinger: We will not change our policy as long as President Nixon is in office.
Prime Minister Chou: That I understand.
Dr. Kissinger: There may be tactical moves towards India, but we will always keep you informed and get your opinion. But we do not plan any now.
Prime Minister Chou: Nepal appears to be also in some difficulties now. Isn’t that so?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: And Sri Lanka too.
Dr. Kissinger: If the Indians make use of the Tamirs to make trouble, just like the Bengals. And the Prime Minister made several overtures towards us, and we are very sympathetic toward her to maintain her independence, and we will support her as much as we can.
Prime Minister Chou: Good.
Dr. Kissinger: She has wanted units of our fleet to visit in Ceylon, and we will do that from time to time.
Prime Minister Chou: Has your fleet already visited Sri Lanka?
Dr. Kissinger: Once. We will increase our fleet in that area in any event, especially after the war in Indochina is over.
But Germany—I wanted to make a comment about the observation of the Prime Minister yesterday. I believe that the recollection of the Prime Minister and of his two colleagues of Germany is of a Germany which no longer exists. I believe that Japan remained, emerged psychologically unimpaired from the Second World War and only physically destroyed. And therefore I have tended to agree with the Prime Minister that certain tendencies in Japan are quite possible, even though they are not now visible.[Page 982]
I told the Chancellor the other day about the observations which Chancellor Adenauer made to me about one of his colleagues when he deplored the fact there were no strong men left in Germany, and I said, what about Mr. so-and-so, and he said, “my dear Professor, you are confusing energy with strength.” I think this is true of many of the current German leaders and of Germany, and when I say that Finlandization is one of three possibilities, it is particularly so if the Socialist Party remains in office for an extended period of time. The policy of the Social Democratic Party is so dependent on the good will of Moscow that after some time Moscow may achieve a considerable veto over its actions. Even today the Soviet Union could bring about the destruction of Brandt by adopting a policy of coolness towards him. Therefore for domestic German reasons, if this party continues for a long time, which I don’t happen to believe, then I believe Finlandization is a possibility, even though the German people are economically in good shape.
Prime Minister Chou: But even Finland herself is not so pro-Soviet— I mean the people.
Dr. Kissinger: The people are anti-Soviet. But my definition of Finlandization is if the Soviet Union has a veto over major elements of domestic and foreign policy and that is, I believe, the case in Finland, even though it is a very brave people.
I must say the possibility is reduced to the degree that German leaders feel they have others for freedom of maneuver in the world, and therefore I believe the visit which the Prime Minister mentioned to me [Scheel] is a very positive step. That party in any event is in a more independent position.
Prime Minister Chou: But the so-called vetos which the Soviet Union may exercise with regard to actions taken by the Social Democratic Party are not taken to bring pressure on the Social Democratic Party but to make concessions to the SDP. For instance, the fact that the West Berlin question was resolved so quickly was because of China and the U.S. coming closer. Immediately after the announcement of July 16 last year—immediately after the announcement was made public— Gromyko went to East Berlin to talk about the negotiations and made such quick concessions, which even you did not expect.
Dr. Kissinger: There were two treaties—the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and also the treaty on relations between Germany and Poland, and then the treaty about Berlin. In the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union all the concessions came from the German side, and it is very difficult to find quid pro quos from the Russian side. On the other treaty they, the Soviet Union, made many concessions because we made it a condition for the summit, and therefore it was a symptom of our strength and perhaps [Page 983]our discussions, although the negotiations had started before. But the German government had nothing to do with it.
Prime Minister Chou: The treaty with the FRG was before the treaty with West Berlin?
Dr. Kissinger: That is right.
Prime Minister Chou: But it couldn’t have been put in that way. Because one effect of the Berlin Agreement is that henceforth it will be easier for West and East Germans to make contact with each other, and that is a tremendous change because the Soviet Union had made it hard. And which Germany will have the greater influence—West Germany or East Germany? That is one aspect.
The second thing is about the ratification of the treaty this year. If the opposition party in West Germany wanted to veto that treaty they could have done it, but as you said yourself, it would not have been approved by the mass of the people because the people of West Europe want to see a relaxation. East Europeans, too, would like to see a ratification of this treaty because they feel quite terrorized about the possibility of another big war. So it would not be to the benefit of the opposition party to veto that treaty. But in the very end it was still proclaimed a common declaration, and that common declaration was the result of the proposition of the opposition party. When Brandt signed the treaty with the Soviet Union in Moscow it was before that memorandum, but they had to agree to a memorandum too. So that gives the Germans the consideration that there will really come the time in the future when Germany will be unified even if the two Germanys would both join the UN. Do you approve or not of the two Germanys joining the UN?
Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you directly. As a government, we have no objections to the two Germanys joining the UN. As a tactical question, we will not express an opinion until the Federal Republic has indicated that it is willing to do so. As soon as they say they are prepared to have both Germanys join, we will support it, and we believe this will happen in the next six months. But that is a tactical question.
Prime Minister Chou: You mean the Socialist Democratic Government in Germany?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think so.
Prime Minister Chou: When Schroeder comes do you think he will express to me true views?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think so. He is very vain, and he thinks he is excessively intelligent, but eventually he will express to you his true views, yes.
Prime Minister Chou: As you see it at the present state, what is the thinking in Germany? They must think about their future.[Page 984]
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, you will find that clarity of thinking is not the outstanding attribute of present German political leaders, and that what they say is not necessarily what they will do.
The great strength of Adenauer was that he had a great concept and he did not deviate or maneuver, and he kept steadily on his course. Almost all of the present German political leaders have the tendency to believe there is some magic trick by which they can solve all their problems. The one with the clearest views—not necessarily that I agree with him—but the one with the clearest views is Strauss. But he has an inadequate political base, and he would not have been the best man for you to talk to. So after him, Schroeder in terms of political views, but Schroeder is better because he has a better base.
Prime Minister Chou: Is Strauss representative of Prussian thought?
Dr. Kissinger: No, Strauss is a Bavarian and he has more of the South German. He is less nationalistic in the sense he can live with a divided Germany, and he is more pro-European. But he is more nationalistic in the sense that whatever country he represents, even if it is only half a Germany, he wants to be very powerful and influential. Schroeder wants to unify Germany.
Prime Minister Chou: And Schroeder is from what part of Germany?
Dr. Kissinger: Schroeder is from the Rhineland, the old Prussian part of the Rhineland. You asked me what does Germany want. Their national disease is that even when they were unified they did not know exactly what they wanted except that it was big.
Mr. Ch’iao: Deutschland Uber Alles.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Schroeder would like Germany unified.
Prime Minister Chou: In history Germany has not remained a unified nation for a long period except the Bismarck state.
Dr. Kissinger: That is right.
Prime Minister Chou: So there is probably a historical reason. During the Thirty Years War Germany was divided up into many states.
Dr. Kissinger: And it has lost a great deal of what really should be part of Germany: Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria should be theirs. So there is really no separate Italian-speaking state or French-speaking state, but Germany is at a cross-roads because it has to make up its mind between its national ambitions and its European interests.
Prime Minister Chou: When the Rhineland area was being developed, East Prussia was still economically undeveloped. In the 18 and 19th centuries. So the development of different parts of Germany was uneven.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it also proves that the economically successful part does not necessarily take over the poorer part. It is a matter of discipline and direction.[Page 985]
Prime Minister Chou: That is a question of policy, the question of direction and line. But during their period of Bismarck, and Germany was divided under Adenauer. Of course, it is unfortunate that after the First World War there appeared Hitler. But if there appeared a Bismarck, if there appeared an Adenauer, why is it not possible for some talented Germans to appear in the arena? How can you estimate them so low? And I don’t believe that when a nation has developed an economy to such an extent that a person who can represent his people will not emerge—it is a matter of possibility.
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t exclude the possibility, Mr. Prime Minister. I know all the German leaders very well, not because I was born there but because I had many activities there. I don’t see anybody of such stature now, not among the present leaders or in the next generation. And speaking as a philosopher, if I may, it may be true as the Prime Minister pointed out to me, unless you have had some experience of suffering and of hardship you cannot produce great men.
Prime Minister Chou: That is true.
Dr. Kissinger: Precisely because the Germany economy is so advanced they can no longer produce great men. All the great men in Europe since the war, DeGaulle and Adenauer, had their formative experiences before the war.
Prime Minister Chou: You have a point there. I am not against that way of thinking. Germany, being close to you, is quite far from us, while Japan is a country with whom both of us have concern. And the Japanese nation wants to maintain their unity and that is decided by their geographical position. And it is true that in Japan’s history they were never fully occupied by an outsider. Japan was a defensive power too. After the war her economy developed very rapidly. It was you who flattened them. But what great men are emerging in Japan?
Dr. Kissinger: Japan is a different phenomena. Japan does not produce great men. You look at their leaders. It is like asking whether an ant is impressive by looking at one ant.
Prime Minister Chou: But if you look at the ants as a collective, that is quite formidable.
Dr. Kissinger: The strength of Japan is in its social cohesion.
PM Chou: The ants in southern China are formidable. They create even mountains. They make their homes in the root of a tree. I don’t know whether you have such ants in your country. They are called white ants. They eat their way into trees and they also dig their hills. That is where they store their food.
Dr. Kissinger: I am saying the Japanese are very impressive, but not because their leaders are impressive. Any one Japanese I talk to I [Page 986]find quite unimpressive. I don’t know what your experience is. But it is an impressive people as a group.
PM Chou: You know ants have queens (Chou laughs). But any nation must have its leaders.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they change their queens quite frequently (laughter).
PM Chou: I wonder whether your feeling towards the Germans is maybe because you yourself had a period of persecution there.
Dr. Kissinger: I did, but I look at things cold-bloodedly.
PM Chou: Maybe that is why you look upon the Germans as you do now.
Dr. Kissinger: No.
PM Chou: Karl Marx discovered scientific socialism but his teachings are not in German.
Dr. Kissinger: I can’t afford sentimentality in one direction or another. But I think the Germans are well worth your attention, Mr. Prime Minister, because they will be one of the key factors, and I believe they are the most dynamic people in Europe despite what I have said.
PM Chou: (Nods) But are there still some differences—or do you look upon the whole of Germany as a Finland? East Germany is not a Finland. It is more than that, a dependency. But look on the whole of Germany. East Germany is actually a Czechoslovakia—a vassal. But for the whole of Germany to be a Finland—I doubt it.
Dr. Kissinger: I said there are three possibilities.
I don’t say a Finland is their most likely outcome. It depends. If the U.S. were to withdraw from Europe; if the McGovern policies were carried out, if European unity would not work; if we withdraw from Germany—then the two Germanys feeling abandoned, could move in the direction of Finland. If we remain in Europe, if European unity continues— then I think Finlandization is unlikely, and it will be either nationalism or European community.
PM Chou: That is what I was about to say—is the U.S. planning to abandon Europe?
Dr. Kissinger: In this Administration, as long as President Nixon is President, it is inconceivable.
Mansfield says they will not withdraw from Europe.
Dr. Kissinger: They may withdraw from Europe and think this is not abandoning it.
PM Chou: How is that possible? And once they really—if they are really to take office—I don’t think they can do that. We won’t go too much into that.[Page 987]
Dr. Kissinger: I know all the leading Democrats, and my own political position has been that of an Independent rather than as a Republican. I did not know President Nixon when he appointed me. I had never met him. My assessment is that any Democratic candidate would say the same thing, but that only McGovern would try to do it because he has a professorial nature. He is somewhat doctrinaire. (Chou laughs).
Ch’iao: Woodrow Wilson was also professorial, wasn’t he?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
PM Chou: But in the Senate his 14 points fell through.
Dr. Kissinger: It required Congressional action. But withdrawing forces from Europe requires no Congressional action. That can be done by a Presidential decision.
PM Chou: The President has such great power?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he can determine the deployment of troops. He may not be able to send them to Europe…he can even send them if he can get the money. But he can certainly withdraw them.
But as I said to the Prime Minister, it is a very improbable event that this will come to pass. So for the next five years there is no possibility of withdrawal of forces from Europe.
PM Chou: That is also my view. I also look at it this way.
Let’s come back to the East. Because our knowledge of Western Europe cannot be compared to your knowledge.
Dr. Kissinger: I am very impressed by the Prime Minister’s knowledge and insight into the European situation.
PM Chou: Please do not commend me. What are your own views toward the trend in Korea?
Dr. Kissinger: I believe the talks which have started between the two sides of Korea are very positive. We are encouraging the South Koreans to continue them.
As I told the Assistant Minister in the car this morning informally, some of the tactics of the North Koreans are sometimes self-defeating. They made a rather bad impression on the American journalists over there. I tell you this in confidence because I think to some extent we have similar objectives there. I spoke to some Japanese leaders who had visited both Peking and Pyongyang who had been very impressed by being in Peking and who before they went to North Korea were in favor of withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. After they went to North Korea, they changed their minds and were in favor of keeping our forces in South Korea.
I say this for your information. This is not an Administration view. The Administration view is that we will encourage political contacts [Page 988]between North and South Korea and that we will go along with any agreement that the two Koreas make with each other.
PM Chou: In the end North and South Korea should have a peace- ful reunification, but this is not the time. The time is not yet ripe.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
PM Chou: What should be done now is that it should be that the relations between North and South Korea should not be saber rattling but there should be somewhat more conciliatory contacts between the two.
Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to use our influence in this direction.
PM Chou: With regard to these three divided states: East and West Germany; North and South Korea; and North and South Vietnam, we must not treat them as if out of the same mold. That would not be fair nor in accordance with developments of history.
And the most split is Germany. Even Berlin itself is split. So, so far as Germany is concerned, under present circumstances, we don’t think it is possible for you to withdraw from West Germany. So the question of the proportionate reduction of forces in East and West Europe is a matter for negotiations now.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I can tell the Prime Minister for his information in our thinking, this will be a very small proportion of our forces. We are not thinking of any large withdrawal.
PM Chou: I believe that. As you said, the Soviet Union is very close to East Germany. And now Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
Dr. Kissinger: Our studies show the maximum we can do on both sides is something like ten percent in that area. It could be 15 percent but it is not going to be very more than a small fraction of the forces.
PM Chou: As for the situation in Korea, that was something produced by another set of events through the Korean War. That was something after the Second World War. There was an armistice agreement, but there was no peace treaty, and that was most disadvantageous. And that is so in this respect we support the proposal put forward by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea that a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea should take the place of the present armistice agreement. The two sides are meeting two times a month just for the sake of quarreling. The inevitable consequence is that there is a constant quarrel. So far as our side is concerned, our People’s Volunteers withdrew in 1958.
You have read again the note of the proceedings of the discussions between Chairman Mao and President Nixon.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.[Page 989]
PM Chou: After Chairman Mao said neither China nor the U.S. should engage in a war with each other and threaten each other, then Chairman Mao said nor will China threaten Japan, nor South Korea. The actual situation was the Chairman first said China and the U.S. should not engage in a war with each other. President Nixon said the two countries should not threaten each other. Then Chairman Mao said China will not threaten Japan nor Korea.
Dr. Kissinger: I remember that.
PM Chou: So it is very clear we will not encourage a military reunification of Korea. So we say to you, as a matter of principle, your armed forces should be withdrawn from Korea. By withdrawing you should also guarantee that after you withdraw from South Korea you should not let the Japanese go into South Korea soon. A period of time is required. On this point alone it is similar to that of Taiwan.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Ch’iao: But according to reports from the Japanese press, it is said that on the Joint Communiqué between Nixon and Sato stipulating that the situation of Korea involves Japan’s security, after President Nixon’s visit to China the Taiwan clause should no longer be valid. That was when you were visiting Japan. But the Japanese paper said Dr. Kissinger—it did not directly quote from you but it had something to do with you… indirectly—said that the South Korean clause remained in effect.
Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese said that to me. I did not say it to them. They said to me, almost every faction I spoke to, the view that while on Taiwan they are confused, on Korea they expressed the view to me that their security was very closely bound up with the security of Korea and that therefore this was a very special case. I expressed no view to them. And as I told the Prime Minister, we will not encourage the Japanese to play a military role in Korea. Indeed, we will oppose it. For that reason it is also important that, while we can accept the principle of an ultimate withdrawal from Korea, the Prime Minister’s formulation is understood, that there should be a period of time, because otherwise the Japanese will almost certainly move in.
But we will keep our understandings. We will not encourage the Japanese into a military role outside their territory.
PM Chou: And at the same time you should not encourage the South Korean authorities to make military provocations against North Korea but encourage the peaceful contacts.
Dr. Kissinger: We will discourage military provocations and encourage peaceful contacts.
PM Chou: So far as we know, South Korea is quite strong militar- ily now. And they are tempered in battle. You have withdrawn 20,000 forces but leave your weapons behind; thus they are becoming further [Page 990]strengthened. And so is it not possible for you not to give them too much arms? Because if you were to do so the result would be we would also have to give more weapons to the Democratic Republic of Korea and wouldn’t that result in arms competition then?
Dr. Kissinger: I will look into that question. We have a current program which is difficult to change. There is two more years to go. But we can avoid making new commitments, particularly if we have an informal understanding of mutual restraint in giving arms.
PM Chou: Yes, and in that way we could encourage them in their peaceful contacts. And then about—we discussed the question of the UNCURK. That Commission could be abolished because every time it appears in the General Assembly we have a quarrel, and if it appears in the Security Council we veto it.
Dr. Kissinger: What is the Prime Minister’s idea with respect to Korea in the UN this year?
PM Chou: I think it would be best if the UNCURK could be abolished this year. Because otherwise the Republic of Korea observer comes.
Dr. Kissinger: What is your position if the Korea question would appear this year on the agenda?
PM Chou: It is on the agenda every year?
Dr. Kissinger: Last year it was postponed, and we believe actually it would be useful to postpone it for another year because it would work counter to encouraging a peaceful contact if the two Koreas engage in a tremendous brawl at the UN, as well as if you and we did. And we could look after the election into the question of abolishing UNCURK.
PM Chou: Our tendency is to abolish the UNCURK this year. Is that possible?
Dr. Kissinger: It would be very difficult especially if the debate is …I think it would be very difficult.
PM Chou: Because with that UNCURK existing it is an object of hostility toward one side. And countries who sympathize with the Democratic Republic of Korea will put forth resolutions to oppose it.
Dr. Kissinger: If it appears before our election, we will have no choice except to make a major opposition.
PM Chou: We will stand on opposite sides.
Dr. Kissinger: The Assembly goes until Christmas so the item could be postponed until November. (laughter) Or it could be after November 10 (Chou laughs). I suspect he [Ch’iao] is going to fire a lot of empty cannons (laughter).
PM Chou: It is good to know about your intentions. But it does prove that from last year until now it is beneficial to see to it that the atmosphere of Korea is not so tense.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is one of the good results of our encounter.[Page 991]
PM Chou: So you shouldn’t give too much encouragement to Taiwan to be so arrogant.
Dr. Kissinger: Where?
PM Chou: The authorities on Taiwan.
Dr. Kissinger: How are we giving them encouragement?
PM Chou: Because in your various pronouncements when you mention the so-called Republic of China.
Dr. Kissinger: I personally?
PM Chou: No, not you personally. For instance, when Chiang Kai-shek was re-elected so-called President and your President sent a message of congratulations. We have no objection to that. We do not mind your President sending a cable of congratulations. That is not the same as in the Soviet and Hungarian press with the publication of that election and having photos and press. That is utterly absurd. But in pronouncements by your President or in reports by your Administration you mention the Republic of China in one breath and the People’s Republic of China in the other. Then the state of two Chinas appear. Maybe we can ignore it on one occasion, but if it constantly appears, then we cannot.
Dr. Kissinger: Can you point out one specific occasion to me?
PM Chou: You knew that I was going to cite this example. You have it.
Dr. Kissinger: That is what I suspected.
PM Chou: You knew that I was going to cite this example. You have it.
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t actually have the text.
PM Chou: The part on the summit conferences, President Nixon said this is even more important because this part is under the subtitle Summit Conferences. President Nixon said it was most important that we obtain common views on the basic principles of national conduct. These principles will reduce the danger of confrontation or war in Asia and the Pacific. We are opposed to hegemony in the Pacific region. We agree that international disputes should not be solved by the use or the threat of armed forces. “In obtaining such understandings between our two sides we did not give up any obligations which we had undertaken before with regard to the Republic of China or our other friends.”8
Dr. Kissinger: I understand.[Page 992]
PM Chou: In Shanghai you said that to the press as well, but in a more diplomatic way.
Dr. Kissinger: I told you that in advance and we have to say this, Mr. Prime Minister, and we have said it with great restraint in documents which I control closely. This was more public relations.
In any event, I understand your point and it will be taken very seriously, Mr. Prime Minister. We understand what we have agreed upon, and one of them is that we will not encourage in any way the two-China solution, and we will take special care on this.
We cannot avoid these particular statements on occasion, but we can avoid speaking of you and the Republic of China in closely approximate sentences and in the same general context, and that we will do.
PM Chou: But you know in this, this reference was made under the general heading of our summit meeting.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point and this document was prepared at a time when there were many other pressures on us, and I must be quite honest with you, it did not have the detailed attention from me that a normal Presidential statement receives. (Chou nods) But I understand your point very well, and there is no disagreement. It is also important for you to know that in many ways that are not apparent to you, such as in deliveries of arms, we have shown very great restraint and resisted many pressures.
PM Chou: And those are points on which they complain to you?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and publicly too. Their supporters also.
PM Chou: (laughs) Well, they can well try to come to the Mainland and test it for themselves. But they don’t want to. So they, too, are only firing empty cannons. They just want you to give them more things.
Dr. Kissinger: Couldn’t you keep him [Ch’iao] home until November 15? There will be nothing but trouble during our election campaign. (Laughter)
PM Chou: I am not so clear about Taiwan. After the Taiwan authorities get weapons from you, do they engage in some smuggling?
Dr. Kissinger: On the Mainland?
PM Chou: On the Mainland or some other place. We do have information to the effect that in arms supplies you give to other countries they engage in smuggling.
Dr. Kissinger: Which countries?
PM Chou: That is most frequently in Indochina, the arms smuggling; not only in Indochina.
Dr. Kissinger: They are not smuggling arms with our permission. (Chou laughs)[Page 993]
PM Chou: Certainly not with your permission.
Dr. Kissinger: It could be they are doing something for some intelligence reasons with our permission that would look like smuggling to you. But that is not the case. Let me check what we know about this, and I will tell your Ambassador in New York. It has never come to my attention, but that doesn’t prove anything because unless it was very large, it wouldn’t come to my attention.
PM Chou: What I mean is that under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule the arms smuggling there might be even less than in some other places.
Dr. Kissinger: I think much less. That is my impression.
PM Chou: That is so.
Here I would like to say that in the UN just recently there was a good result of our mutual consultations, that is on the mutual position on hijacking of planes. Your Ambassador consulted on this matter with ours.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
PM Chou: And it has already been passed in the Security Council, yesterday. That is a good result. And I would like to take this opportunity to say something related to this matter. Because you just inferred that on some occasions the CIA might be engaged in some arms transactions which might look like smuggling, which might look like intelligence work. But there is some matter that you must not do, that is the hijacking of planes.
Dr. Kissinger: We don’t.
PM Chou: Particularly with relation to our country.
Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you that we have never hijacked a plane, and I can give you total assurance that this cannot happen with any authority of the U.S. Government, official or secret. I can give you a flat assurance.
PM Chou: But still I would like to have you check on this when you get back. And also for you to make this formal announcement to us here.
Dr. Kissinger: I can make that now. I don’t have to check this in Washington. I will reaffirm it to your Ambassador, but I know I speak for the President.
PM Chou: Because you know Sihanouk is on a state tour of various countries riding our special plane.
Dr. Kissinger: I can give you a flat assurance we will make absolutely no effort to interfere with the movements of Prince Sihanouk.
PM Chou: Because that is a matter of mutual confidence.
Dr. Kissinger: I can absolutely guarantee this.
PM Chou: Prince Sihanouk is just going to five countries: Romania, Albania, Algeria, Mauritania, Yugoslavia…[Page 994]
Dr. Kissinger: I will go further than this. When I go back I will instruct our intelligence agents in each place he visits to collect any information they may be able to get about any attempt at interference with Prince Sihanouk, and I will pass it on to your Ambassador.
PM Chou: Thank you. I mentioned the five countries, Romania, Albania, Algeria…
Dr. Kissinger: Our capabilities in Algeria are very limited.
PM Chou: Mauritania, and then finally Yugoslavia. And then the Prince will come back to China via various countries from Yugoslavia to Romania to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and then China. Just the route you took during your first visit.
Dr. Kissinger: We can be particularly helpful in places like Iran and Turkey.
PM Chou: Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger: But we will in every country instruct our people to let us know what information they have, which probably will be none.
PM Chou: Thank you. And then about the charts showing the American plane intrusions. We have it drawn and we would like to show it to you. The purpose of us doing that is to enable you to see that it indeed happened.
Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate it. These are our charts.9 This is our chart for the 9th of June (shows chart). This is our chart for the 10th of June. This is the boundary line. (Chinese look at map and interpreter points out boundary and highway to Chou.)
Dr. Kissinger (to Howe): What is the red?
Cmdr. Howe: This indicates the target area they were hitting along the route. And this indicates the northernmost delivery point.
Dr. Kissinger: They claim this was the northernmost delivery point.
PM Chou: But that was bombed very heavily. That is Long Son. Let’s show you our map.
Dr. Kissinger: I tell you honestly I believe you because if you wanted to provoke us you would do it publicly.10
PM Chou: That is right.
Dr. Kissinger: I see no point in your making a private protest about your being bombed.
PM Chou: And you bombed there, but also over here.[Page 995]
Miss Tang: You have one spot left on the map. You should have another red spot over there.
Dr. Kissinger: This is the 9th. (to Howe): What is this green?
Cmdr. Howe: This indicates an unidentified aircraft which was seen twice on radar close to the time of the incident. (Miss Tang explains to PM Chou.)
PM Chou: That is the 9th?
Dr. Kissinger: This is the 9th. These are the MIG planes, and these indicate all the planes that were opposite ours.
PM Chou: That is the bombed area.
Cmdr. Howe: This is the bombed area.
Dr. Kissinger: And that is how they flew.
PM Chou: They were further south then. But Long Son and ——11 (another town near North Vietnamese border) were indeed heavily bombed. Not only the 9th or 10th—but other times as well. Constantly bombed. It was not bombed after the 12th, but now maybe they are back there now.
Dr. Kissinger: Certainly not since the 12th. Has there been any bombing that close to China since the 12th?
Dr. Kissinger: Certainly not since the 12th. Has there been any bombing that close to China since the 12th?
Dr. Kissinger: After we sent the message we established procedures which make it absolutely impossible to bomb that close to China. Has there been any bombing?
Interpreter: We have no information up to this point.
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t believe there has been because we have established new procedures.
(Party adjourns to nearby room where charts are.)
Dr. Kissinger: Can I take these back to America with me?
PM Chou: They were drawn up for you. Because the former one did not have coordinates or latitudes. It has them now.
Dr. Kissinger: Let’s wait for Howe. Take a look at these, Jon.
PM Chou: That was June 4. You saw last time we had a bad map. It was very badly bombed. The bridge there was also bombed. Of course it was repaired. This is where the two main areas of the bombing were.
Dr. Kissinger: Once, Mr. Prime Minister, when General Haig first worked for me, he was a Colonel, and when he was promoted to General, I told him I have known very many intelligent colonels and very [Page 996]few intelligent generals and I was going to watch for his deterioration. (Chou laughs) He is not responsible for this.
PM Chou: You see how close this is to the border. That is how the planes went on the 4th. On the 9th there were two different ones: that is one; and that is the other.
Dr. Kissinger: We don’t have any tracks near that one.
PM Chou: and this was the bombing on the 10th. One plane went that way. The other went that way.
Dr. Kissinger: We don’t show it. This was where they bombed Aikou.
PM Chou: Yes. This is Aikou. This was the different times at which the two planes came in on the 10th. They bombed Aikou, and there was also the incursion on the 11th. Because we had already received the telephone call from General Haig, we did not mention the intrusion on the 11th. These are where the bombs dropped on Aikou.
(Showing bomb cannisters.) This is what it looked like in the morning. We recovered the shell—the container. A fragment of the container. Half of it. You know it split open. This was where the smaller bombs inside the others fell. That was what it looked like. One small bomb did not explode and sunk into the ground. This is the small one with its tail on it. That was the writing outside the container. This was the name.
Dr. Kissinger: Show Howe.
PM Chou: This was one of the small bombs. That was the writing on the small bomb.
Dr. Kissinger: We will take this back. I think we have new procedures that make this impossible.
PM Chou: The large view that shows the smaller one, this is the largest one of Aikou.
Dr. Kissinger: Where were the bombs dropped?
PM Chou: There were about 400 small ones. This is the state boundary.
Dr. Kissinger: And this is the road?
PM Chou: Yes. And that is the railway.
Dr. Kissinger: All I can say, Mr. Prime Minister, it was totally against orders and not intentional. I think we have taken…
PM Chou: This is the bomb. Commander Howe probably has seen this thing certainly before. Dr. Kissinger probably has not seen such things before.
Dr. Kissinger: Would it do any good to take these?
PM Chou: You could.
Dr. Kissinger: I was wondering if it had any marks that would enable us to trace it. (to Howe): Why don’t you take some of these?[Page 997]
Cmdr. Howe: The stock number would be the same.
[Following are markings taken off the bombs:
|MK 20 MOD 2 ANTI-TANK||MER 7|
|Bomb Cluster DL 2603379 Rev. D||TER 4|
|FSN 1325–133–9266–E173||TER 7|
|P.O. 1–2044 NADC||AERO 3A|
|LOT NO 34–C–71||MK 51|
|INSP. DATE 3/71||AERO 20A|
|AERO 14||AERO 7A|
|MER 4||MAU 9A|
Second bomb was same as first until Lot #
|LOT NO 48–C–71|
|INSP DATE 5/71|
|AERO 14||MER 4||MK 51||AERO 20A|
|MER 7||AERO 7A|
|TER 4||MAU 9A|
|MK 339 Mod O Ser 36731|
|LD 549439 Lot 23|
|General Tire Corporation|
|Space and Systems Division|
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger’s Visit June 1972 Memcons(Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at a “Guest House (near Villa #5).” Kissinger and Chou also met from 7:10 to 7:35 p.m. on a boat near the Summer Palace. They discussed the first Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the history of imperialism, and the Communist Party in China. A final meeting was held from 11:03 p.m. on June 22 to 12:55 a.m., June 23. During this meeting, Kissinger and Chou largely reiterated the points made in their earlier meetings. These memoranda of conversation are ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 145 and 146.↩
- Reference is to Richard M. Nixon, “The Real Road to Peace,” U.S. News and World Report, June 26, 1972, pp. 32–41.↩
- Apparent reference to a draft statement on Kissinger’s visit to the People’s Republic of China. The memorandum of conversation for the short meeting between Kissinger and Chou En-lai on the evening of June 22 (see footnote 1 above) contains no reference to an “announcement.”↩
- See footnote 6, Document 197.↩
- Memorandum of conversation printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, Document 179.↩
- All ellipses are in the source text.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 197. All brackets are in the source text.↩
- See footnote 2 above. The actual text on page 33 of Nixon’s article reads: “We agreed that international disputes should be settled without the use or the threat of force, and we agreed to apply this principle to our relations with one another. And we reached these understandings without giving up any of our previous commitments to the Republic of China or to our other friends.”↩
- Not found.↩
- The PRC publicly criticized U.S. bombing of North Vietnam near its border but did not directly address the alleged intrusions. See “China Calls Raids Threat to Border,” The New York Times, June 13, 1972, pp. A–1, 9. See also Document 230.↩
- As on the source text.↩