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Office of the Historian

China, 1969


4. National Security Study Memorandum 14

U.S.-–PRC discussions, 162


7. National Intelligence Estimate


8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

less than 1 line of source text not declassified


9. Special National Intelligence Estimate


10. Memorandum to Members of the 303 Committee

During the first Nixon administration, the value of direct U.S. support of 1,800 Tibetan refugee guerrillas was examined and a consensus was reached that the force was generally ineffective and that intelligence and potential stay-behind functions of the Tibetan exile paramilitary forces could be accomplished by a much smaller number of men. Therefore, in 1971, the 40 Committee accepted the recommendation of the CIA that the paramilitary forces be reduced from around 1,800 men to 300. This was accomplished by a reduction in financial support. The total cost of the Tibetan program until this decision was approximately $2.5 million per year with $500,000 of that figure for non-guerrilla political, propaganda, and intelligence operations. Under the revised plan, after a resettlement payment of $2.5 million spread over a number of years, the costs of maintaining 300 guerrillas would be $100,000 per year and non-guerrilla operations would be reduced from $500,000 in FY 1970 to $363,000 in FY 1971 and $263,000 in FY 1972.


13. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting


15. National Security Study Memorandum 63


18. National Security Study Memorandum 69

November 24, 1972


21. Memorandum of Conversation

Kissinger


24. National Intelligence Estimate


28. Memorandum of Conversation

Documents 133


30. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee

Ambassador Huang: Do you have any concrete ideas of that mission?