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143. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People’s Republic of China
  • Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
  • Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
  • Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Hsu Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC
  • Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
  • Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
  • Chinese Notetakers
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
  • Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
  • W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: Our talks have become compressed and rushed toward the end. However, at the end each side is respecting the views of the other side.

We will need to address the question of the time for the announcement. We must pick an appropriate time, because the 15th appears to be a bit too early for our side. You are going to mention in your announcement that the President has accepted our invitation, and therefore you need time to report to him.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be back in California on the morning of July 13.

PM Chou: So quick?

[Page 440]

Dr. Kissinger: We have proposed to make the announcement on the evening of the 15th for us, which would be the morning of the 16th for you.

PM Chou: Do you think we can postpone the announcement until Friday, or two days more? Today is Sunday. Is it that you don’t make announcements on Saturday?

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t generally do so because the Sunday newspapers are essentially printed on Friday and on Saturday morning.

PM Chou: Perhaps you don’t like the Friday date—

Dr. Kissinger: We could possibly do it on Friday night. A problem which I wanted to explain to the Prime Minister—one which is not decisive— is that the weekly news magazines such as TIME and Newsweek are printed on Friday and Saturday. Therefore, if the announcement is made on Thursday night, they can do a better job of reporting it than if it were on Friday night, which would give them only a half day to write about it. But this is not a decisive matter.

PM Chou: That means it would be more appropriate to make the announcement on the evening of the 16th your time, and the morning of the 17th our time.

Dr. Kissinger: The evening of the 16th gives the news magazines only a half a day to do anything, while the evening of the 15th gives them almost two days. I represent our view to the Prime Minister, but this is not a matter of principle. The evening of the 15th, though, does mean that the news magazines could give fuller treatment and above all the Sunday newspapers, which in America are very big. They are printed on Friday and Saturday, and therefore if the announcement is Friday evening they wouldn’t be able to give any analysis on Sunday.

PM Chou: The morning of the 16th is all right, but we must do some work before that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have to do some work too.

PM Chou: “Before May” in the announcement could also mean this winter. Chairman Mao just called us to expressly speak on this issue. He said he would like to put forward this date formulation for your President.

Dr. Kissinger: We are very grateful for his courtesy.

PM Chou: So if your President finds it necessary he can come in anytime during this period, including this winter. There is another question to consider. We would welcome very much a public visit by either yourself or by Ambassador Bruce during the interval between your departure and President Nixon’s visit. This is because you mentioned it is difficult to find another representative. You could make a short visit when necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: For very selfish reasons I would like to come myself.

[Page 441]

PM Chou: I believe your colleagues would agree to that.

Dr. Kissinger: Since it may be difficult for me to get away, we may send Ambassador Bruce. However, it will be either he or I.

PM Chou: That is agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t have to put this into the communiqué. You have been very agreeable and very helpful in this matter.

PM Chou: There is also the matter of our direct communications. The best thing would be to do this in Paris, because Canada would give rise to too much speculation.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

PM Chou: In Paris we have wider scope and you yourself or your Ambassador could send an oral or written message to Ambassador Huang Chen.

Dr. Kissinger: The only man who will be authorized to contact your Ambassador on the President’s behalf is General Vernon A. Walters. He is our military attaché in Paris and has direct communications to the White House. He used to be the personal interpreter for the President, and we have used him for contacts with the North Vietnamese. He’s completely our man. It is easier for me to come to Paris secretly than to Ottawa, strangely enough.

PM Chou: We understand—that’s why we suggested Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: We will communicate through unsigned letters to your Ambassador which General Walters will hand to him. On matters of great importance I will come personally to talk to him.

PM Chou: That’s all right. Or if you have some confidential letters to hand to us, you can seal them, leaving them unsigned or signed as you prefer, and give them to us. You can talk directly with Ambassador Huang or hand over unsigned messages.

Dr. Kissinger: Which do you prefer?

PM Chou: It’s up to you. A third course would be to hand over data or material which you would like to hand to us in confidence sealed, and give it to our Ambassador. We fully trust him. He is one of the members of our Central Committee.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have information we believe of national interest to you we will put it in a sealed envelope and give it to him. Similarly, we would prefer you to do the same to us.

PM Chou: Approach the U.S. Military Attaché in your Paris Embassy?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: At another site or at our Embassy?

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we ask Walters to work that out? He has no authority to discuss matters of substance, just to transmit messages. But he’s reliable.

[Page 442]

PM Chou: You can discuss with Walters which method of communications you would prefer, instruct him, and he can talk to us.

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll ask him to call your Ambassador. When can he call?

PM Chou: Perhaps Wednesday, the 14th.

Dr. Kissinger: He will call your Ambassador after the announcement.

PM Chou: Maybe next Monday, July 18.

Dr. Kissinger: The 18th then. On the meeting with the President when he comes to the People’s Republic of China, how many days do you think it should take?

PM Chou: I don’t think it should take too long because you are very busy, but five days at least.

Dr. Kissinger: For the President that’s very long.

PM Chou: Of course, the time could be shortened.

Dr. Kissinger: We could say “up to” five days. Maybe it would be a little shorter. Should he visit only Peking?

PM Chou: Any other place would be satisfactory. It is possible that Chairman Mao might not be in Peking, and they therefore could go to some other quiet place.

Dr. Kissinger: You have had many barbarian invasions, but I am not sure that you are prepared for this one. (Laughter on the Chinese side.)

PM Chou: This is not necessarily the case—when Khrushchev came he was most ferocious.

Dr. Kissinger: The President will be very gentle, but his security officers are in a special category. That doesn’t matter. We will bring the minimum number necessary.

PM Chou: If you find that necessary. In reality, if you want to guarantee the safety of a guest, the host must be held responsible first. This time you placed great trust in us, and nothing happened.

Dr. Kissinger: We still have two hours. (Chinese laugh) The President may want to go to one other place, but won’t want to visit too many.

PM Chou: There won’t be too many.

Dr. Kissinger: As for the press, he would prefer a small press delegation, not a large delegation, and we would be very grateful if you could help us by limiting the number whom you admit.

PM Chou: The number shouldn’t exceed ten.

Dr. Kissinger: Something like that. If we change our view, we will let you know. As for the size of our delegation, we propose that it be rather small, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, myself, and maybe one aide for the Secretary and one for me. Is that agreeable?

[Page 443]

PM Chou: There is no question about that. It’s up to the President’s decision.

Dr. Kissinger: On the agenda, Ambassador Bruce or I can come and discuss this before the President’s visit. (Chou nods.) However, we could cover roughly the same subjects you and I have discussed. (Chou nods.)

PM Chou: Please tell President Yahya Khan that when necessary we’ll still use his channel. We have a saying in China that one shouldn’t break the bridge after crossing it.

Dr. Kissinger: We might exchange some communications through him for politeness.

PM Chou: This is because you have confidence in him, and we also respect him.

Dr. Kissinger: There are just some things which we don’t want to say through friends, no matter how trustworthy.

PM Chou: We’ll send nothing substantive. Please convey my regards to him, and those of Chairman Mao also.

I would also like to take the opportunity to say we express thanks for the gifts which the President and you have sent to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and myself. You may say that Chairman Mao and I both send our regards to President Nixon. Since we are short of time now, we won’t return gifts but we will prepare for the next time. This time, hearing you like Chinese tea, we just have some Chinese tea—this is not a gift but a little token.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, and I thank you very much.

Concerning the matter which we discussed yesterday: we think that to enable us to carry out most easily the relationships we have made, and to assure that the issues we have discussed won’t become a political football in the United States, I think it would be best if the President could become the first political leader to initiate our new departure.

PM Chou: You were saying that we were advancing in this direction, and the course will not be too slow. It will accelerate as it goes on.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be best if it did not become an issue, if the President was first and started the process. This is better than a whole group of politicians coming before his visit, each making statements which have to be answered and defended. The China lobby might start up again, etc. (Chou nods.) This doesn’t apply, of course, to the visits of newsmen and to cultural exchanges.

PM Chou: With respect to newsmen, we always reiterate the principles we have discussed here. After the announcement is made public, I’ll be in more trouble than I am at present, but I’ll still be better off than you because I don’t see too many newspapermen.

[Page 444]

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to raise the issue of how to handle the press after our announcement. I would like to listen to your views.

PM Chou: Couldn’t you mention only what is in the announcement and nothing else?

Dr. Kissinger: In America it is impossible not to meet the press at all, because this will cause unbelievable speculation and many unauthorized people will speak. Accordingly, I propose to meet on a background basis with a group of newsmen on Friday the 16th on the trip and without discussing any substance, just give them a little flavor of who took part in our conversations and where they took place. I say nothing in a half an hour very effectively, but this gives them a feeling they have heard something. But I will not make substantive comments and will not list the topics we discussed.

PM Chou: You are going to announce on the evening of the 15th? Will this be in the name of your press secretary, Ziegler, who will read it out?

Dr. Kissinger: Either he will read it out, or the President will release it. It is possible that the President will want to read it.

PM Chou: Is the title to be a communiqué or an announcement?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably there should be no title at all.

PM Chou: We use the term “announcement.”

Dr. Kissinger: All right, we’ll use the term “announcement.”

PM Chou: We’ll probably do it through the New China News Agency as a news announcement.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you use the same English text and not make a new translation?

PM Chou: Both the Chinese and English texts will remain as agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: I say this only because when we made the SALT announcement, the Russians used a completely different text in English from our own, saying that this was their translation from the Russian. We had to make them correct it.

PM Chou: We Chinese don’t do things that way. Should we sign a statement about using the same text?

Dr. Kissinger: No. You are men of honor.

PM Chou: We have a gentleman’s agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to learn to trust each other.

PM Chou: That’s very important in international relations.

Dr. Kissinger: We have much more important things to do together.

For your consideration, and you don’t need to settle this now, we are prepared, when the President visits, to discuss and sign an agreement for the mutual renouncing of force between our two countries such as you proposed in 1955.

[Page 445]

PM Chou: You know that this question must be linked to the Taiwan question and the question of China’s internal affairs. Once these questions are brought into shape, then this question (of renunciation of force) will be easier to deal with.

I hope that your trip to Paris will see some development, and we will tell our Vietnamese friends about this part of our discussions after the announcement is made.

Dr. Kissinger: That is of course proper. What I now propose will not be a request, but we will let your Ambassador in Paris know what part of the SALT agreement might be appropriate for negotiating bilaterally between us, for example, preventing accidental war, and if you want to discuss that with us, we will be prepared to do so, but we are not asking. If you want to discuss, we are prepared. But this is not a formal request. It is entirely up to you. We won’t embarass you by a formal request.

PM Chou: Of course, when you feel that the time is appropriate, you can approach us.

Dr. Kissinger: We will inform you of what the content is, and if it is of interest to you, we can discuss it separately.

PM Chou: This is mainly, as you told me yesterday, an agreement between your two countries (the U.S. and the USSR.)

Dr. Kissinger: The SALT talks, yes, but there is one section in the agreement now being negotiated on preventing accidental war through technical accidents. The general agreement would be discriminatory to you if you were to join SALT now when you are at the beginning of your nuclear program. But the accidental war part might be of interest to you.

PM Chou: You can tell us when you feel it is necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to tell you, as I did yesterday, that sometimes there are clauses proposed to us that can be interpreted as applying to other countries, and which until rejected are still on the agenda. I want to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will not accept such clauses and will always tell you first about them, regardless of what any other party tells you, rather than to have you learn about them through other channels.

PM Chou: Thank you. We believe you will first tell us.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure.

PM Chou: Although, as we said, we now have no interest.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

I have one or two final points. One point—I suppose you see no need to resume the Warsaw talks under these conditions? (Chou nods.) I agree.

PM Chou: We better relieve our people there of their burdens.

[Page 446]

Dr. Kissinger: And relieve our bureaucracies from the responsibility of writing instructions.

PM Chou: It would be another matter if our representatives met at diplomatic functions.

Dr. Kissinger: Should we send instructions to our Ambassadors to speak to one another at diplomatic receptions? I was just joking.

PM Chou: I believe that they know each other.

Dr. Kissinger: One final point. The President asked me to raise this as a matter of personal kindness. We are aware of four Americans sentenced to prison in China. While we are not disputing the circumstances, we would consider it an act of mercy if the People’s Republic of China could pardon all or some of them whenever, in its judgment, it felt that conditions were right. This is not a request. I’m asking it as a favor.

PM Chou: There is a point in our law that if they themselves have behaved well, we can shorten the period of their sentence. We shall continue to study this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be very grateful. We recognize that this is entirely within the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, but it would be a voluntary act of mercy. That’s all.

PM Chou: I have a few points, too.

First, is the Taiwan question. As you have said, it will need time and we agree. Of course, once the direction is decided upon we should gradually advance in that direction. We believe the President’s visit will accelerate the pace. I believe that as we gradually come to understand each other, by the time we have established diplomatic relations the treaty between the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek should not have any effect. We don’t recognize the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand that you don’t recognize it, and maybe history can take care of events.

PM Chou: By that time, when all your armed forces have withdrawn from Taiwan and we ourselves have solved the matter, it should no longer be a problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.

PM Chou: We are doing our best to do so. You will also need to undertake not to let the Japanese armed forces into Taiwan before you have left. Because this would be a great danger not only to us but you and peace in Asia and the world.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: And the Taiwan Independence Movement should not be allowed to prepare activities in Taiwan. This would also set Chiang Kai-shek at ease.

[Page 447]

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister must understand that where both conditions are within the power of the U.S., we will not encourage the Taiwan Independence Movement and indeed have asked the Prime Minister to give us any information to the contrary; we will also oppose the establishment of a Japanese military force on Taiwan. But if the Taiwan Independence Movement develops without us, that is not in our control. However, we will do nothing to encourage, support, finance, or give any other encouragement.

PM Chou: That should include not agreeing to Japan’s engaging in such activities.

Dr. Kissinger: We will oppose this to the extent that we can control Japan.

PM Chou: Your attitude should be as it has just been. We have heard that Secretary Laird’s words (about Japanese rearmament)2 have been denied in Washington, and also that he himself has denied them under instructions from Washington. As you mentioned yesterday, he was prohibited from departing from White House policy.

We have also heard that Agnew was indignant over Park Chonghee’s discourtesies to him. Recently, the attitude of small men such as these has been such—there is an old Chinese saying that if you are close to someone like this, he will become mischievious and act in a spoiled way, but if you are far away from him, he will complain about you. Rhee was such a person, Diem was such a person, Park is such a person, and so are Thieu and Sirik Matak.

But if friends are equals, they will respect one another. For example, today it suddenly occurred to Chairman Mao that it might be convenient to your needs if maybe the President’s visit was earlier and not necessarily in the spring. And so we came up with “before May.” Once the announcement is made it will shake the world, which won’t be able to sleep.

Dr. Kissinger: It will first of all shake our bureaucracy.

PM Chou: And Chiang Kai-shek, according to his temperament, might collude with Japan or the Soviets, and you must beware. He will demonstrate against your President. I am most familiar with him— I believe that you know my history. I was Political Commissar under him in the Whampoa Military Academy when he was Director of Training.

However, even though in the past he has massacred and slaughtered innumerable amounts of our people, if he could restore Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland, that will be a good thing. And it [Page 448]would relieve you of a burden. That place is no great use for you, but a great wound for us.

Dr. Kissinger: How should we establish the date for the meeting?

PM Chou: Haven’t you just mentioned a special channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We should make suggestions to you. I understand anytime winter–spring, from December to April.

PM Chou: November would also be all right. According to your needs, you can put forward a date, and we will answer.

Dr. Kissinger: But you would in any case want Ambassador Bruce or me to come openly before?

PM Chou: Yes. We expect that if you have anything especially urgent, and would like to tell us personally, it would of course be best if you come here to discuss the matter, because we can do things in better detail.

I must raise this point to your attention. You should know that if you put forward a formula in the U.N. such as you describe, it will raise great difficulties for you, and not for us.3 We will oppose because that means two Chinas. Taiwan will also oppose.

Dr. Kissinger: This is temporarily one China, one Taiwan.

PM Chou: I understand that this is only a temporary phenomenon. The President’s visit will also manifest the phenomenon. On the one hand you recognize Taiwan and on the other you come here. You could say that this phenomenon began on the 9th. I must tell you that.

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize this. We may not propose this resolution ourselves, but might support it if someone else puts it forward. We recognize that you will oppose it, but if we can moderate our rhetoric about each other that will be progress.

PM Chou: Taiwan will also oppose that (the resolution) and there will be opposition from all quarters.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be a good way to end the issue.

PM Chou: It should be ended.

The second question I have concerns Indochina. I believe that you are quite clear as to our stand. We support Madam Binh’s seven point proposal.4 We hope that your withdrawal will be most complete, thorough, and also honorable. Sentiments there will change. I know you say that you still have internal difficulties, but also you say that the President is the only one who can solve these issues. Therefore, I hope that your negotiations in Paris will be good for you.

[Page 449]

Dr. Kissinger: Thanks.

PM Chou: And that you won’t leave a tail behind.

Dr. Kissinger: There’s no danger of misunderstanding the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: My third question concerns Korea. You now have mixed army units with the South Korean forces, which also include a Thai unit.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: This was reported in the news, which said that an American commands the army, with a South Korean as a vice commander.

Dr. Kissinger: In Korea or Thailand?

PM Chou: Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: I know of no Thai units but I will check on this. The joint command is not a new policy; its purpose is to make our withdrawal easier, and not to increase our commitment.

PM Chou: However, North Korean opposition will increase, and we will also oppose that. The second point is that the Japanese defense forces every month send personnel in civilian clothes to South Korea to look into the South Korean military situation; and Japanese military men will never forget Korea or Taiwan, though these territories did not belong to them. You should pay attention to that. You oppose revived Japanese militarism going abroad and now it’s beginning?

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I was not aware of these things. I am not disputing them, and will look into them. I repeat, it is not our policy to support Japanese military expansion outside their home islands.

PM Chou: But I must bring to your attention the fact that Japan has now grown big. Even your President has also said that either this year or next Japan’s steel production will meet or exceed that of the U.S. Japan is already so big that it cannot contain itself. We are rather familiar with Japan, and you also have a history of relations with Japan dating back 100 years. The Japanese people are industrious and intelligent, and should have their independence and rightful status. However, recently the minority of the ambitious militarists in Japan have been expanding also, and their war-lord mentality has been expanding as well. I am mentioning this to you so that you can also bring it to the attention of your President. The Emperor of Japan is the basis of this system that maintains the militarism of Japan. This year or the next he will go to your country. He is in a different situation than the British Queen who travels all over the world.

Dr. Kissinger: One point about Korea: we oppose military aggression by South Korea against North Korea. But I also must tell you that sometimes North Korea has been very harsh in its military measures both against South Korea and against the U.S. We believe that it would [Page 450]help maintain Asian peace if you could use your influence with North Korea to not use force against the U.S. and against South Korea.

PM Chou: The Military Demarcation Line still exists, and every week we meet there with you and South Korea on one side, and ourselves and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the other. This is a powder-keg left over from Dulles. At that time I suggested that you at least allow the Geneva Conference to apply to Korea. Many Foreign Ministers of other countries were persuaded by me, especially Spaak of Belgium. At the time of the Geneva Conference, Eden, who was in the chair at the time, almost agreed. My only request was to let the meeting continue. However, the U.S. representative, Smith,5 who was not very fierce, all he could do was wave his hands in opposition toward Mr. Eden, after which he changed and dropped the whole thing.

As for John Foster Dulles not wanting to shake hands with me, I wouldn’t want to shake hands with him, either. This was the first time we engaged in such international activities.

Another point I mentioned for the cause of peace in the Far East, is that it would be best for you to withdraw all foreign troops from the Far East, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indochina. There is no need to discuss Taiwan anymore. I put this forward as a principle; this would be a popular move.

You know that Japan wants to recover certain islands to the north…6

Dr. Kissinger: From the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: … and members of the opposition party asked us what they should do. I said that they must prove that Japan will not restore militarism, and because the Japanese people oppose the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, they must do away with it. If they acted in this way, the Soviets would be forced to talk to them. However, if they told the Soviets that I said this, they would run up against a stone wall.

This shows that it is not easy to arrange peace in the Far East, and if things continue there could be even greater violence in the Far East. I must point this out to you.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have said, the danger from Japan of which you speak does not come from us, and withdrawal of our forces from Japan may increase the danger that worries you.

[Page 451]

PM Chou: You know we are not afraid of that, as I told you yesterday. No matter how large Japan grows it has had experience with us. If they want to create great trouble, let them come. Changes have also occurred among the Japanese people over the last 25 years since the war. You have an expert on Japan—I believe his name is Reischauer7—isn’t he rather clear about this?

Dr. Kissinger: He is a friend of mine.

PM Chou: How much knowledge does he have of Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: Quite a lot of knowledge.

PM Chou: Does he believe that the evil roots of Japanese militarism still exist?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that he sees some tendencies.

PM Chou: More than that, their present defense means exceed their necessities.

There are two pieces of news that I would like to tell you. On July 9, the day you came, Indian and Pakistan artillery shelling occurred for the first time in an area near the borders of East Pakistan, India, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The Indian side sent more than 300 shells and the Pakistani forces in that area returned more than 300 rounds themselves. In the evening, the firing ceased.

Dr. Kissinger: On the 9th?

PM Chou: Yes. You will learn about this when you get to Pakistan.

The second item is that on the 10th, a coup d’état was attempted in Morocco staged by some people in the military, who broke into the Palace, killed the Air Commander and the Defense Minister, and also the Belgian Ambassador who was in the palace to see the King. Hassan the Second was not killed because that day he was celebrating his birthday.

Dr. Kissinger: He was not overthrown?

PM Chou: I don’t know the results—perhaps he escaped.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate this information very much.

PM Chou: This shows that the turmoil is continuing. The world is in a great upheaval.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I think we have done some historic work here. I hope that we have laid the basis for a new relationship of cooperation and friendship between the American people and the Chinese people.

PM Chou: We have gone the first step.

[Page 452]

Dr. Kissinger: And we hope this will help reduce the turmoil under the heavens about which you spoke yesterday.

PM Chou: Our subjective efforts are in this direction, but the objective trend of affairs may not develop along the lines of our subjective ways.

Dr. Kissinger: We must try to do it. I came aware of the achievements of the People’s Republic of China and its people, so I was not surprised by that. I have been especially moved though by the idealism and spiritual qualities of yourself and your colleagues.

PM Chou: I suggest that we have a quick lunch.

Even though our achievements are still small, we have a large population and country. It is not an easy task to organize a large country of 700 million people and still maintain and elevate the revolutionary vitality of these people and build up a socialist country. Perhaps the world expects too much from us, and I hope that you are not disappointed. We don’t want to spread our hands all over the world. You and the Soviet Union have learned that lesson, and we don’t want to follow in your paths.

Dr. Kissinger: My colleagues and I want to thank you for your grace and courtesy with which you have received us. In my subjective, and personal view, I came with hope and leave in friendship.

PM Chou: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I have also gotten to know new friends.

PM Chou: Shall we end here?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Please tell President Yahya Khan that if India commits aggression, we will support Pakistan. You are also against that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will oppose that, but we cannot take military measures.

PM Chou: You are too far away. But you have strength to persuade India. You can speak to both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do our best.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.
  2. See footnote 14, Document 140.
  3. See Document 167.
  4. See footnote 10, Document 139.
  5. All ellipses in the source text.