Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

96. Memorandum for the Record¹

CJCS Memo M–218–70

Washington, December 23, 1970.

Subj: Conference with President Nixon, this date

1. Present: The President, SecDef, Kissinger, CJCS, BG Haig.²

2. The President opened the discussion by stating that he wanted to talk to SecDef and CJCS prior to our trip to SEA.³ The President stated that Haig had talked to Gen Abrams concerning some plans for operations in the Spring, and then asked whether Ambassador Bunker had passed plans to State and was told “negative.” The President said that he would personally discuss with SecState after we returned. The discussion was then turned over to Haig.

3. Haig opened the discussion by stating that the Attachés are held too tightly; that intelligence in Cambodia is no good and that it is derived secondhand and, in many cases, from the press. He said that Ambassador Swank is doing well but he needs different guidance.

4. The President directed that we open up the guidance. Specifically: “We must have intelligence and pay the price to get it.”

5. The discussion then revolved around the concept of the military equipment delivery teams. I pointed out to the PresUS that we had a plan for the use of these teams which would involve shuttling back and forth from Vietnam to Phnom Penh. The PresUS said these teams should be used to augment our intelligence collection and that in our press guidance we should say that they are delivering equipment contained in the approved MAP Program and that we have a legal responsibility to determine its disposition and use and that this activity does not constitute, in any way, a MAAG.

6. The PresUS then made the flat statement, “The military equipment delivery teams are approved as of right now.” SecDef told the PresUS that he had testified in Congress that they were required but that State had resisted introduction of additional personnel into Phnom Penh. When queried about numbers, I said that we have been looking at numbers all the way up to 100 and after some discussion it was agreed that, as a starter, we could put about 20 in Phnom Penh and retain 30 or 40 in Vietnam which would shuttle back and forth.

Note: Prepare a plan for presentation to SecDef—check with the White House as to how and when State will receive the Presidential Directive on this matter.

7. The PresUS then said that it is clear that the Cambodians need assistance from the ARVN and that Haig had discussed some plans with Abrams similar to those previously reviewed by the WSAG. The PresUS then said that, in his view, at the present time we can continue Vietnamization on schedule, although he recognizes that the Cambodians will receive some punishment during the next several months. He said now that we have come this far we must find a way for SVN to survive in the long term. He said we are talking about victory in one sense, although we do not mention this publicly. Certainly we cannot go out with a whimper. Therefore, we need some preemptive action during the next few months which the PresUS considers to be critical to our overall effort. He stated that if we had taken bold action three years ago that we would not be in the serious position we are in today (I agree).

8. Haig then stated that we were looking at four plans:

a. An operation by the 9th ARVN Division to clear out Route 4.

b. An excursion into the Chup Plantation area commencing 15 Jan.

c. An attack up Highway #9 to Tchepone (this latter plan has been recommended before but this time there is a difference—it will be conducted by ARVN rather than US troops).

d. Covert operations against NVN.

Haig stated that in the above plans it is envisioned that we will give full air support but no US ground forces will be used.

9. I then brought up the subject of airlift, stating that in the Kompong Cham Operation the full capability of the SVN had been used and, therefore, in the operation of the size which we were discussing it would be necessary to provide helicopter lift support in addition to all other kinds of air support to the SVN. At this time the PresUS did not come out with straight approval but suggested that this airlift would be correct as long as it was directed towards the airlift of supplies and could be used to support the Cambodians also. I stated that in the Chup Plantation Operation it was invisioned that we would open Highway #7 and then turn over to the Cambodians the task of maintaining security of the road; however, I still thought that a significant amount of helicopter airlift would be necessary in order for the operation to succeed.

10. The conversation then diverted to a statement by the PresUS that he understands that during the Kompong Cham Operation that Gen Abrams thought that he did not have authority to use helicopter gunships and it was reported to them that such use would have resulted in major casualties to the NVN. He went on to say “whenever they are authorized to use air of any kind then the use of the helicopter gunships is also authorized.” (I will have to check on Haig’s report⁴ that they could have “killed hundreds of NVN at Kompong Cham if they had helicopter gunships.” It is my view that they did have authority from the outset).

11. The PresUS stated again that he would bring SecState in on the plans after SecDef returned from SVN. He then went on to say that our overall objective during the months of February, March and April is to take the heat and take the risks and then, when the heat is at its highest level we will announce additional withdrawals (below the 284,000) if warranted.

12. The PresUS then quoted Haig as stating there had been a real change—that SecDef and I would be amazed at the change in the attitude of the SVN—even the Kompong Cham Operation had added to their confidence.

13. The PresUS then stated that our plans of operation next spring should have as their objective an enduring Vietnam, namely, one that can stand up in the future; therefore, we must give the NVN a bang. He stated that the Chup Plantation Operation is approved and that we will study the move against Tchepone later. He stated that Godley and others will state that this will draw in the Chinese and Russians but that Godley has been saying things like this for a long time. I noted that this is not an invasion or an occupation effort but, namely, an operation designed to block the flow of supplies and destroy those in the area.

14. I stated that the operation must succeed and, therefore, we should take such risks as are necessary. The President then said, “Let it succeed with a minimum low-key operation so far as US forces are concerned.” He then turned to SecDef and asked his opinion of the Laotion Operation. SecDef: “Let’s take a crack at it.”

15. The PresUS then turned to the authority that we had sought to strike at missile sites, which he had turned down. He said he wanted to get his philosophy across to all so far as NVN is concerned. He is not going to follow a “tit-for-tat” policy; what he has in mind is to make a significant strike on choke points the same time we conduct the Chup Operation. We will not justify this on the basis of “protective reaction” but, rather, on the basis that while we are cutting down the enemy is building up and, consequently, cannot tolerate this.

16. We then turned to the covert raid on NVN by SVN. The President stated that these have the psychological purpose and that he asked SecDef whether he had looked at the proposals, particularly the one directed at the dredge operations in Haiphong Harbor. SecDef said that he had been looking at this for six years. The PresUS said don’t turn it down and then restated that from January 1 to April we can break the back of the enemy. He went on to say that any feasible moves designed for this purpose will be authorized and we must “use forces necessary to make operations succeed.”

17. At this point I again brought up the question of helicopter lift. I stated that if we are going to go ahead with the Chup Plantation Operation we must give Gen Abrams his guidance now; that in my view he would find it necessary to use US helicopters to lift SVN troops. SecDef said that we could use the language used in the last message⁵ and work this out. I repeated once again that this operation as well as the Tchepone Operation was quite different from the Kompong Cham Operation, and that if the operation was to succeed and if planning was to be completed by 15 January we needed to give Abrams some latitude. (This is a key point with respect to the conduct of both of these operations. I did not press all the way at this time since I was concerned about the possibility of reducing the scope of the operations. I do not think we should do them at all if we can’t do them right.)

18. Note: During the course of the conversation I brought up the subject to SecDef who, in turn, took it up with the PresUS, of my invitation to visit Godley. It was agreed that such a visit prior to the Tchepone Operations might cause us difficulties and, consequently, it was thought best that I not accept this invitation. I will pass my regrets to Ambassador Godley.

T. H. Moorer ⁶

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Sensitive; Hold Close Original and Only Copy. Prepared by Moorer.
2. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that this meeting took place from 9:20 to 10:15 a.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Kissinger recalled that in proposing dry season operations in Laos and Cambodia “Nixon was determined not to stand naked in front of his opponents, as he had the year before over Cambodia,” and “conceived of the idea of first inducing Laird to propose what Nixon preferred” so that Laird would become his advocate in the NSC. Kissinger assumed that Laird knew about the plan and supported it, believing it would buy at least a year and prove the success of Vietnamization. Nixon, he noted, was vastly relieved by Laird’s receptivity. (Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, pp. 193–195)
3. Laird and Moorer were scheduled to travel to Saigon on January 5, 1971. See Document 104.
4. See Document 92.
5. See footnote 2, Document 89.
6. Moorer initialed “TM” above his typed signature.