Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

95. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Secretary of Defense Laird, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer and Henry A. Kissinger

Purpose of the Meeting

As a followup of our meeting yesterday afternoon,² you are scheduled to meet with Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and myself at 9:15 a.m. this morning.³

During his trip to Saigon and Phnom Penh, General Haig discussed with General Abrams, Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Godley and President Thieu ARVN’s dry season campaign plan for operations in Cambodia.⁴ Admiral Moorer is aware of the details of this planning which has been proceeding without the full knowledge of Secretary Laird especially with respect to the plan for Southern Laos. Therefore, it is important that at this morning’s meeting your decision to proceed with the planning for these operations be conveyed as having resulted from General Haig’s trip report to you and not as a result of any prior liaison with the Chairman or the military.

The second issue to be discussed at the meeting is the provision of authorities for the nature and scope of U.S. support of South Vietnamese forces during the execution of these plans. It is important that Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer understand completely the nature of U.S. support so that General Abrams will be able to initiate his planning with the South Vietnamese within the parameters which you have approved.

Conduct of the Meeting

I recommend that you tell the group that you have called them together to discuss some conceptual plans for the dry season in Southeast Asia which General Haig has learned of as a result of his discussions with the U.S. and South Vietnamese leaders. You should then ask me to brief these plans for the group. I would then proceed to do so raising the issue of necessary authorities which you must grant for U.S. support.

Talking Points

• —Inform the group that you have convened this meeting to discuss your concept for dry season offensive by ARVN and U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.
• —You are convinced that the enemy will make every effort to inflict a military and psychological setback on the ARVN prior to the South Vietnamese elections in October. If possible, they will also attempt to inflict higher casualties on U.S. forces with the view towards eroding U.S. domestic support for our Vietnam policies. For this reason it is important that we maintain the momentum achieved by the Vietnamization program and the Cambodian operations last spring.
• —You consider that the past performance of the enemy confirms that he is vulnerable to unpredictable action by us and is characteristically unable to react flexibly when we seize the initiative. For this reason you are determined to adopt the strategy of pre-emptive offensive action designed to disrupt the enemy to the maximum effort during the coming dry season.
• —You are aware that a number of contingency plans have been considered in the Washington Special Actions Group for possible adoption during the coming dry season. In addition, General Haig has obtained for you the best thinking of General Abrams and President Thieu with respect to bold offensive action by Allied forces.
• —Ask Dr. Kissinger to outline for the group the menu of offensive plans on which you wish detailed planning to commence immediately. (Dr. Kissinger will cover the points outlined at Tab A.)⁵
• —At the conclusion of Dr. Kissinger’s briefing and your approval of specific authorities listed by Dr. Kissinger, you may wish to caution Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer that for the time being you want the planning to be conducted on the closest hold basis. You do not wish it discussed with any other officials except those with the absolute need-to-know. You anticipate that access lists will be maintained both within the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff.
• —Finally, you do not anticipate that it will be necessary to share this information with the Secretary of State till somewhat later during the planning process and at a time of your choice.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 226, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. X. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.”
2. In his December 22 diary entry, Haldeman noted that Kissinger and Nixon met to discuss the Laos operation. Kissinger proposed that Nixon meet that day with Haig to discuss the plan and then the next day with Laird and Moorer “to force Laird and the military to go ahead with the P’s plans, which they won’t carry out without direct orders.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) Kissinger noted in Ending the Vietnam War (p. 193) that he and Haig met with Nixon to discuss Haig’s report (see Document 92), and the President’s Daily Diary of December 22 lists the meeting at 4:30–5:32 p.m. in the Oval Office. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No other record of the meeting has been found.
3. See Document 96.
4. See Document 91.
5. Attached but not printed.