Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

92. Conclusions and Recommendations From a Report by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, undated.

Major Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

1. We have serious shortcomings in our intelligence outside Phnom Penh in Cambodia and do not have a good feel for military or political developments.

2. The Cambodians continue to show national unity and high morale among the people and government and their army is much larger and somewhat better equipped. However, in order to prevent the fall of the country and the reestablishment of base areas that could threaten III and IV Corps in Vietnam, substantial outside assistance from South Vietnam, the United States and others will be required over the near term.

3. There is a need for greater coordination of military efforts by Cambodia, South Vietnam and the United States.

4. Tales of ARVN misbehavior and GVN condescension are rampant in Phnom Penh. Khmer-Vietnamese animosity is a major problem and could threaten the political base of the Lon Nol Government which must continue to rely on the ARVN for assistance.

5. The major problem for Cambodia’s economy is the military situation, in particular the transportation difficulties caused by the enemy’s cutoff of major roads. In this context freeing access to Phnom Penh, as well as curbing inflation, is more crucial than greater US aid levels.

6. In South Vietnam the security and pacification situation shows marked improvement, although the VCI remains a stubborn problem which only years of effort can solve.

7. Thieu is receptive to proposed ARVN operations in Cambodia and Southern Laos² but insists on US air and logistical support as conditions.

He also emphasized the risk of conducting these operations while US troop levels are going down and asked that there be modest US withdrawals between May and July 1971 and no US withdrawals between July and the October Presidential election. (The present MACV plan provided for a troop level of 284,000 by May 1 and 255,000 by July 1.) President Thieu suggested that US might wish to make a long term troop withdrawal announcement this spring which would permit it to maintain its 1 July levels through the South Vietnamese October election and initiate drawdowns subsequent to that date.

8. The constitutional system has taken hold in Vietnam and there is much political activity looking toward the October elections, where Thieu and Minh are likely to be the two major candidates. The former will have the advantages of incumbency, stability and a generally good record, while the latter commands much popularity and could exploit the issues of corruption and desire for peace.

9. Thieu wants to consider carefully any political proposals without benefit of this consideration, he favors delay in making any initiative until after the Chup operation in mid-January.

10. There has been some improvement in the short term economic situation, but the long term outlook remains very serious. Almost all Vietnamese cite economic problems as the most difficult ones now facing the GVN.

11. The drug problem among our forces in Vietnam is pervasive. It has received serious attention only since July; we have merely identified the magnitude of the problem and taken the first few corrective actions. The problem should be susceptible to positive command actions and not become a factor in troop level decisions.

Recommendations

1. Modify our ground rules for collecting intelligence in Cambodia, to include much more extensive travel in the countryside by Defense Attachés and others.

2. Provide more technical military advice in Cambodia and in Vietnam. Establish a greater dialogue with the Cambodians while stopping short of military advisors.

3. Effect high level coordination of military efforts through the triumvirate of General Weyand for the US, General Mahn for the Vietnamese, and an appropriate Cambodian counterpart. Our Ambassador should be kept fully informed and be an active participant in the coordination effort, including the acceptance of regular visits by General Weyand to Phnom Penh in civilian clothes.

4. Fulfill to the extent feasible Lon Nol’s specific material requests made during the visit many of which have already been covered by MACV.

5. Continue US air support in Cambodia but make every effort to insure that it avoids non-combatants and sticks to the enemy and his supplies.

6. Emphasize greatly to both Governments the need to reduce Khmer-Vietnamese frictions and promote cooperation.

7. Do not raise our economic assistance above present levels which is all the economy can absorb and insulate our aid from inflation.

8. Proceed with plans for operations in southern Cambodia from IV Corps and central Cambodia from III Corps. Also proceed on a restricted basis with plans for operations in southern Laos. Plans should include US tactical air including helicopter gun ship support, logistic airlift and logistic and artillery support based in South Vietnam. Raids into Northern Vietnam should be primarily coastal rather than against overly ambitious and costly inland targets, and should be coordinated with the Laotion operation rather than taking place before it.

9. Work out a political scenario to accompany these military moves. Ambassador Bunker should coordinate with Thieu on a political initiative, with the timing left to Thieu. This initiative should be within the framework of the constitutional system and should be implemented in part unilaterally.

10. Aim for US troop levels of 284,000 by May 1 and 255,000 by July 1. Hold off further withdrawal decisions until assessments are made of the results of the up-coming Cambodian and Southern Laos operations.

11. Continue to emphasize to the GVN the need to move against corruption.

12. Begin to draw up a long range economic assistance plan for South Vietnam.

13. In coordination with the South Vietnamese, mount a much more extensive campaign against the drug problem in South Vietnam.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 511, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the report. A note on another copy indicates that it was typed on December 21. (Ibid., Box 1011, Haig Special File, Haig Southeast Asia Trip [1 of 4]) A draft of the full trip report, including the major conclusions and recommendations, is ibid., December 1970 Haig’s Southeast Asia Trip [1 of 2]. A final version of the trip report was not found.
2. As for the northernmost military operation, US and Vietnamese officials favor the Route 9 Tchepone plan. They believe it would be more remunerative than either the Route 19 plan in Northern Cambodia (which could leave an exposed flank to enemy forces in Southern Laos) or the Bolovens Plan (where enemy forces are more dispersed). They say that it would be easier to resupply and protect friendly forces from Vietnamese bases; there would be a greater concentration of enemy supplies; and there would be greater physical and psychological damage inflicted on the enemy. [Footnote in the original.]