Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

104. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, January 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between The President, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, Director Helms and Dr. Kissinger (10:55 a.m.–12:00 noon and 12:42 p.m. to 1:36 p.m.)

The meeting was convened at 10:55 a.m. in the President’s Oval Office² so that the President and his principal advisors could hear a personal report from Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer on their trip to Thailand and South Vietnam with stop enroute in Paris.³

After a brief discussion of the professional football championship game (superbowl) which took place the preceding day, the President asked Secretary Laird to provide the group with a report on his trip to Southeast Asia and Paris.

Secretary Laird began his report by stating that he had followed closely the theme of the President’s foreign policy objectives of strength, partnership and willingness to negotiate throughout the trip. The first portion of the trip included a stop in Paris where discussions were held with both the U.S. and South Vietnamese Delegations to the Paris talks.

Secretary Laird indicated that the general consensus was one of no specific hope in the Paris forum. He stated, however, that he agreed generally with the proposition that the talks must continue as a means of posturing both the South Vietnamese and the U.S. Governments for the upcoming elections to be held in both countries. Mr. Laird listed the following considerations:

• —For Thieu the peace issue will be paramount in his coming elections. He will, therefore, need to make some political initiatives.
• —President Thieu is seeking some new political initiative which can be tabled at an early date.
• —Interdepartmentally, this Government should investigate possible initiatives which might be taken by the South Vietnamese in the political area.

Secretary Laird continued that he was concerned that some Administration spokesmen were referring to the end of the war as an objective to be achieved prior to the U.S. November elections. He stated that President Thieu had cautioned him on this and that we must shift the thrust of this statement to encompass direct U.S. participation in the war since the war itself may continue for many years. Secretary Rogers interjected that he had made a careful point of moving to this posture in his recent press conferences.⁴ The President commented that our foreign policy objective by 1972 should involve peace for the U.S., emphasizing that it would be impractical to assume that we could solve all of the world problems.

[Omitted here is discussion of Thailand, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 105.]

The President then commented that he had been encouraged by the recent report on the performance of Thai forces in Laos. Admiral Moorer stated that this was the first SGU battalion that had been formed by the Thais. He noted that the conduct of the battle was well executed by the Thais, who permitted the enemy to get inside their positions and then inflicted great damage on them.

The President then remarked that he had recently read an excellent press story on Cambodia and that these were the kinds of stories which would insure the proper attitude in the U.S. Mr. Helms stated that the Cambodians have certainly demonstrated an outstanding will but that now their requirement was to learn how to operate their forces.

[Omitted here is discussion of Thailand, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 105.]

The President stated that he wanted it clearly understood that the U.S. was on a razors edge with respect to the Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia. While we have made our policy clear, the press has consistently distorted it to our disadvantage. The President stressed that we must retain our presence in Thailand, and in all Southeast Asia, to include the Philippines, South Vietnam and Korea. The idea that the Nixon Doctrine constituted a formula for reducing our presence to zero was neither true nor in our interest. The President emphasized that it was important that we reassure our allies in this respect. Secretary Laird remarked that military assistance was the essential element since our Asian allies have the manpower resources.

In continuing his discourse on our relationships with our allies, the President stated that this same philosophy applied worldwide. That was why Senator Percy had been so much in error. We need a continued presence in Europe and in terms of our worldwide position, we cannot permit ourselves to slip into a weak conventional force posture. We need a strong conventional posture abroad. We should now be thinking about permanent U.S./Asian and European force deployments. Our Soviet and Chinese friends watch this issue intensely and they draw great comfort and attach great significance to reductions in our force levels abroad.

Secretary Laird remarked that we have to sell this issue to the American people. He commented that a 1-1/2 war strategy was not saleable but rather we should sell it on the grounds of a realistic deterrent consisting of adequate conventional, tactical nuclear and nuclear forces.

The President commented that Congressional proponents were the first to complain when we cut bases here in the U.S. if they involved their constituents. Mr. Helms stated it was obvious that the Thais must have continued reassurance from us and that they had already started to refurbish their lines with the Chinese Communists. The President restated that we should bring the Thai King on a visit to the U.S. The President instructed Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and Dr. Kissinger, as appropriate, to bring Senators in and to talk about the importance of Thailand and the need to avoid future hearings such as those conducted by Senator Symington.

Secretary Rogers commented that he was convinced the situation in the Foreign Relations Committee was now a great deal better. Secretary Laird added that the Communists was now obviously split and that the Son Tay operation had been largely responsible for this. Secretary Rogers stated that the Department of State was also breakfasting with members of the Committee and that this had improved communications immeasurably. Secretary Laird remarked that the Department of Defense was also working with the Committee on a regular basis.

Secretary Laird then turned to his trip to South Vietnam, commenting first on his extended two-hour intimate discussion with President Thieu⁵ which was followed by a two-hour luncheon. The meeting included General Abrams, Ambassador Bunker and Secretary Laird, with General Pursley taking notes. President Thieu had only one assistant in the meeting. Secretary Laird summarized his discussions with President Thieu as follows:

• —Thieu is concerned about his election date and is equally concerned about the U.S. Presidential election date.
• —Thieu is concerned that the U.S. is talking too much about the end of the war by 1972. He is convinced that the war will go on for many years and that we should be talking about U.S. participation.
• —Thieu stated he would need information on our force levels, especially specific data on what those levels will be by the time of his election as well as by the time of the U.S. Presidential election. Thieu emphasized that he does not want a repeat of 1968 where U.S. domestic political considerations influenced decisions on troop levels which proved to be most damaging to the conduct of the war. Thieu stated that he was thinking along the following hypothetical lines:
  • —if the United States were planning on withdrawing between 150,000 to 175,000 more troops by June 1972, he could probably handle it with proper economic and military assistance:
  • —he hoped that we would withdraw no more than one-third of this number up to the time of his elections in October and thus proceed with the larger two-thirds increment following his elections.

Secretary Laird told the group he had replied to President Thieu by stating that he had not come to South Vietnam to discuss troop levels but welcomed Thieu’s ideas. Secretary Laird added that interdepartmentally all U.S. documents were still referring to a June 1972 troop level of approximately 200,000 but that, in reality, he had a group of about seven individuals working on this subject with the actual figures. Because of the sensitivity of this issue, he had not included references to specific troop levels in his trip report. Secretary Laird added that General Abrams believed they could handle the troop levels that were actually being considered and emphasized that the decisions on residual forces should be left to General Abrams and General Weyand.

Secretary Rogers asked what Secretary Laird meant by General Abrams’ assessment that he could handle the problem. To what order of magnitude was Secretary Laird specifically referring? Secretary Laird replied that the current thinking would provide for a draw-down of between 100,000/110,000/120,000 residual U.S. forces in Vietnam by mid-summer of 1972. Dr. Kissinger remarked that this would mean we would withdraw between 50,000 and 75,000 over the period May 1 to October 1 of this year.

Dr. Kissinger also asked whether or not it would be possible to get below 100,000 U.S. troops by November 1972. Secretary Laird replied that this depended on the degree of success of this year’s dry season campaign.

The President indicated that, with respect to troop announcements, he wanted the issue to remain somewhat obscure in terms of numbers. The U.S. goal should be to end the United States combat role as soon as South Vietnam was ready. Our program was on schedule and it was as simple as that. When the time came for a withdrawal announcement, we should consider phrasing such an announcement in terms of the American role rather than specific numbers.⁶ Secretary Rogers stated that he agreed fully that we should avoid committing ourselves with respect to a specific timeframe with respect to numbers. The President indicated that when he makes his announcement around April 15, he may cover a long period of time in his announcement rather than continue incremental announcements.

Secretary Laird stated that Thieu’s problem was that he wanted to insure he could explain to his people at the time of his election that there were still at least 200,000 U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Thieu will probably start to take the credit on the subject of U.S. troop levels and will talk about the ability to reduce our levels so that he can be out in front of us on the issue.

Secretary Laird concluded that on balance South Vietnamese competence was especially high—that in 1968 at the time of Tet, the South Vietnamese were in a difficult position. This year, they were looking intensively at all of their problems—political, military and economic. General Thinh, Commanding General of the ARVN 25th Division, was now talking like American Generals spoke just a year ago. He was referring to the need for the South Vietnamese doing the job rather than allowing the Cambodians to do it. Two years ago, our Commanders were saying the same thing about the South Vietnamese. Secretary Laird stated that the competence was high in the aftermath of the successful Cambodian incursion which had drastically improved the situation.

The President then commented that it might be of some value to have President Thieu talk about additional U.S. withdrawals prior to the President’s announcement in mid-April.

Secretary Laird next turned to the dry season operations, utilizing maps for the discussion. The Secretary discussed first the Route 4 clearing operation, mentioning that we had moved two helicopter platforms, the Iwo Jima and the Cleveland, to a position off the southern coast of Cambodia and that these vessels were providing helicopter and logistical support to the ARVN marines and Cambodians who were attempting to open Route 4 from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. Secretary Laird said that this operation could be justified in terms of preventing the re-establishment of the enemy sanctuaries. The President affirmed that we should make the point that, of course, we were going to use our air assets against the enemy who was now trying to reestablish sanctuaries and thus was threatening our remaining forces.

Secretary Laird suggested that we slip away from the term “interdiction.” The President remarked that this term seemed all right to him. Secretary Laird replied that he meant the term “interdiction” in contrast to “close air support.” The President reiterated that we should describe our air support in terms of the prevention of re-establishment of enemy sanctuaries.

The President asked Secretary Rogers for his view on this issue. Secretary Rogers stated that we should emphasize that there were no U.S. ground forces or advisors involved, but that we would continue to use air and logistical support to prevent the re-establishment of sanctuaries. The Secretary stated, however, that he was somewhat concerned about the length of time we would be utilizing our carriers off the coast of southern Cambodia. Secretary Laird replied that we should be able to conclude the Route 4 operation in about three weeks and that we should take the public line that we were providing assistance only when the ARVN was unable to do the job. The President confirmed that Secretary Rogers had a good point, and we should also emphasize that the operation is temporary and that it would be terminated within three weeks.

Admiral Moorer commented that the South Vietnamese forces were getting better all the time.

The President then stated that he wanted to be sure that all understood that this operation on Route 4, with the kind of U.S. support involved, would not go on indefinitely and that a new decision would be required for the extension of U.S. support. In other words, the President expected the military to come back and request new authority. Secretary Rogers remarked that he believed that there might be too many ARVN forces involved, since he could not understand why it was necessary to have 4,000 ARVN forces when there were only about 1,000 enemy interdicting Route 4.

The President reiterated that our public line on the Route 4 operation would be that we were providing air and logistical support to the South Vietnamese and Cambodians to prevent the re-establishment of sanctuaries by the enemy. The President made the point that he did not like to use the term “the other side” when we were actually referring to the enemy.

Secretary Laird then turned to the Chup Plantation operation. He pointed out that probing operations were already under way opposite III Corps and along Route 7 in Cambodia. He stated that the original plan provided for a jump-off date of January 18, but that ARVN commanders had cautioned Thieu that the Tet holidays (January 26–28) might intervene and that they had therefore decided to hold off on the main operation until about February 4.

Secretary Laird pointed out that General Tri had conducted a raid operation in a village which was reported to contain four U.S. POW’s—that the operation had been very successful but no prisoners were found. Thirty VC prisoners were taken. Secretary Rogers asked whether or not any U.S. forces were involved. Secretary Laird answered that only U.S. helicopters were involved. The President commented that obviously the helicopters were employed to help the South Vietnamese help the Cambodians.

Secretary Laird continued his presentation on the Chup operation, commenting that the operation could commence on or about the first of February with the first phase lasting about two weeks. The President asked how many ARVN forces would be involved in the first phase and Secretary Laird replied, “about 7,000.” The President commented that if the enemy does not fight, it might not be a good operation. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was not a crucial issue, for whether or not the enemy fought, it would be disrupted in its efforts to reestablish the sanctuaries, to put pressure on the Cambodians or to launch subsequent attacks into III Corps. Secretary Laird stated that, ultimately, the Chup plan called for about 20,000 ARVN troops. They would attack west along Route 7 to Kompong Cham and then north into the Chup Plantation as far as the elbow of the Mekong. Then, in the final phase they would move to the south to link up with other ARVN forces attacking northwest along Route 1.

Admiral Moorer commented that this was an important operation because it would set back enemy efforts to re-establish base areas adjacent to III Corps. Intelligence now suggested that the regiments of the 9th VC Division were in this area awaiting supplies and there was also evidence that several NVA elements had crossed the border in III Corps and were already approaching the Tay Ninh area. The President stated that the plan made great sense. Secretary Laird commented that the plan could be justified on the same basis as last year’s operation. The President asked whether the entire ARVN force would be lifted in by air. Secretary Laird stated that this was not the case, the bulk of them would move overland along Route 7.

The President then called an intermission in the meeting for 15 minutes. The group reconvened at 12:45 p.m. Secretary Laird began this phase of the meeting by continuing to describe the Chup operation. He stated that the operation would be under the command of the ARVN Third Corps Commander, General Tri and it would serve the dual purposes of buying time for the Cambodians to rebuild and minimizing the threat to South Vietnam’s Third Corps. Admiral Moorer stated that the operation would extend through the entire dry season.

Secretary Laird then turned to an explanation of the Tchepone operation in southern Laos. He stated that the operation was scheduled to start in early February, although phase one, which included establishing a departure base at Khe Sanh air base, setting up blocking positions south of the DMZ, and emplacing U.S. heavy artillery along the Laotian border, would commence as early as January 29. The plan was designed to provide for the capture of the logistics control center at Tchepone through a combined air mobile operation to seize the field and a ground linkup along Route 9. The ARVN airborne division would execute the air mobile operation and the 1st ARVN Division would be in overall command of the ground linkup. U.S. air and heavy artillery support would be extensive. Helicopter troop and logistics lift, gunship support and B–52 operations in Laos would also be involved.

Secretary Laird stated that he had asked General Abrams to delete two facets of the plan which involved the use of B–52’s in the southern area of North Vietnam and provided for the establishment of U.S. logistical bases along Route 9. Director Helms commented that this operation has long been under consideration but was considered one that could not be safely accomplished. Secretary Laird stated that President Thieu felt Souvanna might have political problems and demand withdrawal of South Vietnamese forces after the operation got underway. He felt that his initial reaction might not be negative. Secretary Laird added that President Thieu was concerned about the manner in which the operation would be justified. Thieu had speculated that perhaps it could be justified as a “hot pursuit” operation. In any event, it was probable that we would have some problems with Souvanna and the Laotians. Director Helms stated that the Laotians would probably complain just as a pro forma action.

The President then asked whether or not Ambassador Godley had commented on this issue. Admiral Moorer answered that he had discussed it in general terms. The President stated he would hope that Souvanna would take the position that all foreign forces should be removed from Laos. In any event, the U.S. position would not be too critical since we were limiting our efforts to bombing and airlifts. Secretary Laird added that we would also be involved in medical evacuation and would provide heavy artillery support from South Vietnam.

Admiral Moorer continued the discussion of the operation by indicating that the 5th Mechanized Brigade would be the U.S. force involved along the Laotian border. He added that since we have frequently opened Route 9 westward to the Laotian border and the A Shau Valley, the preliminary measures would not provide too definitive a signal to the enemy. Khe Sanh Airfield would be reopened to provide the logistical airhead and old U.S. code names characteristic of A Shau Valley operations would be used in conjunction with phase one of the plan. Secretary Laird stated that, nevertheless, we should anticipate that the enemy expected us to launch the operation into Laos since they have obviously held the bulk of their forces there for some reason. Dr. Kissinger stated that if the enemy stood and fought, it would be to our advantage, adding that the enemy might be set back in its timetable as much as a year. Secretary Laird agreed, adding that this was the crucial supply hub for the North Vietnamese.

The President then commented that there was no question but that we would get some real heat. He added, however, that if the operation blunted the enemy’s capacity to hurt us as we draw down to less than 100,000 by November 1972, then our risks would be reduced. Should we fail to undertake the operation, we might be able to continue with our deployments, but there was a chance that without the operation we could get a rap in 1972. Furthermore, the operation was a strong deterrent to the enemy for subsequent operations on their part and it might, in fact, prove decisive in the overall conduct of the war.

Secretary Laird agreed with the President’s assessment stating that this was our last opportunity to free the ARVN forces from major operations in Cambodia. By May 1, the U.S. forces would be depleted to 45,000 first-line combat units. Therefore, this was the time to move. Dr. Kissinger said that when the rains start in May or June, the enemy has normally shut down the trail until the next October or November. Therefore, this operation will buy us at least six months and maybe more. Secretary Laird stated that all of these considerations convinced him that we must move as soon as possible. Secretary Rogers asked when this would be. Secretary Laird answered that phase two should begin on the 8th or 9th of February, with phase one beginning at the end of January or at least by the 2nd of February.

The President stated that both the Chup and Tchepone operations will be conducted at the same time and that this should be advantageous. Admiral Moorer commented that the Vietnamese would move the airborne division north from III to I Corps. The airborne division which normally serves as the strategic reserve would be replaced by the Vietnamese marines who were now involved in the Highway 4 operation.

The President then remarked that from the military standpoint, the operation made great sense. Domestically, it would pose a problem since the charge would be made that the U.S. was expanding the war into Laos. The President asked if there were any known legislative inhibitions to the U.S. support visualized. Secretary Laird responded negatively. The President continued that it was probable that we should accept the heat this spring. If it goes in February, then perhaps by April 15 we could make a terminal statement.

The President then asked Secretary Rogers for his view. The Secretary stated that he was aware of no legislative inhibitions since they only involved the use of U.S. ground forces. Also, the new legislation made great emphasis on providing authorities to prevent rebuilding of the sanctuaries. Director Helms added that even Senator Fulbright agreed with the need to prevent that. Secretary Rogers continued that, in his view, the real problem involved U.S. casualties and whether or not they might go up, either because of the air operations in Laos or as a result of the thinning of ARVN forces in I Corps.

Admiral Moorer estimated that our casualties would not increase measurably. The President noted that the artillery bases along the border might pose some tempting targets. Admiral Moorer agreed and said there would also possibly be some helicopter casualties but that it would be nothing like those suffered last spring in Cambodia by our ground forces. Secretary Rogers stated that if U.S. casualties did not escalate, the political problem should be manageable. The President noted that if casualties remained at the 40/60/70 level, this should be acceptable.

Mr. Helms then commented that it was probable that the ARVN would run into a very tough fight in Laos. Admiral Moorer agreed that this was so, but added that it would probably be the enemy’s last gasp. Dr. Kissinger stated that, most importantly, it would take the enemy a long time to recover. Secretary Rogers said the whole concept was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. The main difficulty would be whether or not it fails or succeeds. The U.S. attitude had to be one of confidence and assurance once the operation got under way.

The President stated that we should come out frankly and say what we were doing now on Route 4 and treat the Chup operation the same way, similar to the manner in which he described the air strikes in North Vietnam. The enemy has been warned and we are merely doing what we said we would do. Secretary Rogers agreed. He said that we should be proud of the ARVN’s capability to conduct such an operation, for it would raise doubts in the enemy’s mind as to whether or not the ARVN would attack north.

The President then remarked that we should also conduct commando operations in North Vietnam concurrently. Secretary Laird stated we had better look at that after these operations since our plate was already full.

Secretary Rogers commented that an ARVN defeat would be very costly to us. The President replied that the operation cannot come out as a defeat. Therefore, we must set very limited goals such as interdicting the trail—keep our claims modest. It should be packaged as a raid on the sanctuaries. Further, however, even though this was a difficult operation, the ARVN should be able to do it. If they were not able to do it, then we must know that also. Admiral Moorer stated that we were forcing the enemy to fight on our terms. They will have to react.

Secretary Rogers then stated that this was known as a very difficult area. Admiral Moorer replied that the main problem has always been political restraints, the Geneva Convention, and the neutrality of Laos. Secretary Laird commented that President Thieu was well aware of the difficulties and that was why he had chosen his two best units for the task. The President said the situation had changed somewhat also. Therefore, we should keep all the numbers we need of ARVN forces. It was obvious that the enemy was weak in Cambodia and current reports indicated that they were getting weaker. Certainly the 500,000 dead they have suffered so far must have had an impact. Admiral Moorer stated that this was precisely what Japanese Prime Minister Sato had told him his report suggested.

The President said another rationale was the need to prepare the way for further U.S. reductions and the early arrival at a residual U.S. force posture. In this regard, a residual force would be necessary as long as the enemy held our prisoners. Secretary Laird said that he agreed fully and that we could not get into a situation of piecemeal exchanges on the prisoner issue. Secretary Rogers stated that he visualized no problem on the residual force issue—that it had been discussed on the Hill and had caused no problem.

The President commented that the best way to proceed was to be open on the whole thing. Secretary Laird asserted that he was convinced the plan would work. He again noted that General Abrams had wanted to use B–52’s in North Vietnam but that he had overruled this. The President stated we would hold up on a decision on that and see how things developed. In the meantime, authorization was granted to proceed with the Laotian operation. It should be conveyed in the context of a raid on an enemy base area—as consistent with the Nixon Doctrine—with limited goals and we should avoid all exaggerated claims. Following the operation, we could crow about accomplishments.

Secretary Rogers said it was urgent now that we decide on when and how to approach Souvanna. Dr. Kissinger said that we should not do this too early because he may prefer not to know. Secretary Laird said that he was thinking in terms of 24- or 48-hours notice. Dr. Kissinger noted that we only gave Lon Nol 24-hours notice last spring. Secretary Rogers said whether or not we do it late or early, we must be sure to bring him abroad.

At that point the President thanked Secretary Laird for his report and the meeting adjourned.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

⁷
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 83, Memoranda for the President, Beginning January 17. 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2. In a January 18 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger noted that one of the meeting’s key purposes was to inform Rogers and Helms about the dry season campaign operations and that it was important that no decisions be made on troop withdrawals until after the campaign. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 226, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. X)
3. The two men traveled to Paris, Bangkok, South Vietnam, and Japan January 5–15. Laird forwarded a copy of his trip report to Rogers under a covering memorandum, January 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DEF 7 US) Moore’s trip report, CM–525–71, January 21, was distributed within the Department of Defense. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–207, Box 14, Viet 333 Moorer)
4. Rogers made this point in his news conference on December 23. The text is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1971, pp. 37–48.
5. Pursley forwarded a memorandum of conversation of this January 11 meeting to Eliot under a covering memorandum, January 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–VIET S)
6. In his dairy, Haldeman noted that he, Kissinger, and Nixon also discussed the troop withdrawal rate on January 18. He noted that Nixon expected to withdraw about 12,000 a month up until the South Vietnamese elections in October and would announce a “massive withdrawal” thereafter. (The Haldeman Diaries, p. 235)
7. Printed from a copy that bears Haig’s typed signature.