Attached is a memorandum I have received from Turner Shelton with whom
you are acquainted. Shelton makes the following comments about State
Department and Foreign Service personnel:
Shelton recommends a measured review of key State Department posts with
the objective of replacing those personnel who do not support your
policies. This would offer the additional benefit of encouraging less
influential Foreign Service officers who already share your views.2
Attachment
Washington, April 6, 1970.
Memorandum From Turner Shelton to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)3
In response to your request, I am submitting a few thoughts and
comments regarding certain personnel of the Department of State.
These comments include both Departmental and Foreign Service
personnel.
From my discussions with ranking officials of the Department of
State, I gather the impression that the philosophical approach
toward a change of personnel is to believe that Departmental and
Foreign Service Officers can be “converted” to the Nixon philosophy
of Foreign Affairs and that employees should, therefore, be “brought
along,” hopefully to a new way of thinking rather than being removed
or shifted.
While this may well be true in the case of those who have no
particular emotional or political loyalty to former administrations,
I seriously doubt that it is a valid concept in connection with a
considerable number of employees who have strong emotional ties to
former Presidents and former Administrations. There is evidence of
disloyalty to President Nixon by some who resent both his policies
as a President and as an individual. I do not believe that these
particular people can be either “converted” or “brought along.”
In addition to their active dislike of the President, certain
individuals strongly believe that both the formulation and
implementation of foreign policy should be carried out solely by a
“professional elite” and since they are the “professional elite,”
they tend to seriously resent the role of the President and his
principal personal advisors in the formulation of foreign policy.
While this is obviously an attitude which can, at least to a degree,
be expected among a group of professional practitioners, it becomes
particularly difficult to manage when their personal loyalties lie
in the direction of other administrations. What I
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am attempting to say is that the
professional Foreign Service tends to be directed too much toward
the carrying out of its own concept of “valid” foreign policy
objectives and protecting its own vested interests rather than
devoting its energies to implementing in a professional manner
foreign policy objectives formulated by the President.
There is, in my opinion, a lack of responsiveness to the wishes of
the President and a continuing effort on the part of some to delay
and indeed to alter, however subtly, the directives and instructions
of the White House. This negative attitude toward the President and
his policy becomes more fully understandable if one considers actual
examples of those who are in positions of authority. A number of the
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State have no particular
political ties of any kind, however, the fact that they have reached
their positions of prestige and status in the Foreign Service
hierarchy under former Administrations tends to make them have a
sense of nostalgic regard for these former Presidents and other
officials which undoubtedly affects their general attitude. They
feel that they have reached their present positions as Assistant
Secretaries not as a result of the personal recognition of their
abilities by President Nixon but merely as a deserved move up the
ladder of the “system.” Since they constitute the “system” they
obviously do not feel a degree of personal loyalty to the President,
which in my opinion, would be highly desirable.
There is a tendency on the part of many members of the department to
tend to personalize their loyalties and obligations to former
Presidents, Secretaries of State and ranking officials of the
Foreign Service who have been identified over the past years with
their successful rise within the “system” which they represent
rather than be responsive to the present President.
One of the principal criticisms of the Department of State including
the Foreign Service, is that it suffers from a lack of originality
and tends to be timid. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the
“system” rewards conformity and hesitates to accept those who have
the courage to break new ground. While it is obvious that decision
making must be approached with caution, the result of the
“institutionalized” pressures of the “system” goes beyond caution
and results in a Department which is too often lacking in courage
and forcefulness.
Like all elite groups, the Foreign Service is in-bred and possesses a
built-in opposition to those who do not belong to “the group.” It
should be noted that lateral entrants to the Foreign Service are
viewed with a considerable degree of nonacceptance whereas the
infusion of individuals with new ideas, approaches and attitudes
would undoubtedly contribute greatly to an increased flexibility and
improved vitality of the entire Foreign Service.
More important perhaps than even the Assistant Secretaries themselves
are their Deputies and Country Directors who carry out the
day-to-day
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functions of
the Department and who are privy to the highly sensitive information
which flows into the Department of State. Some examples of these
Deputy Assistant Secretaries might be useful to illustrate some of
the problems of the Department. One Deputy Assistant Secretary was
personally sponsored by a former well known official whose
approaches to foreign policy are extremely inconsistent with those
of President Nixon. Another Deputy Assistant Secretary was for
years, in effect, the “hatchet man” for a high ranking departmental
official who is an avowed adversary of the President. In the
ambassadorial category, a present Chief of Mission to a sensitive
East European post is a former departmental official, said to be an
avowed liberal Democrat and very closely associated with one of the
Department’s former officials who openly and publicly opposed
President Nixon. Another Ambassador, recently appointed to a key
Near Eastern country was a well known protege and confidante of
members of a former President’s immediate staff. Another Ambassador,
who has remained on in the Far East, was also closely allied with
the same Administration and rose rapidly from a Public Affairs
Officer of the U.S. Information Agency to Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State to Deputy Chief of Mission and then to Ambassador.
These illustrations are given for the sole purpose of showing how key
positions are retained by those who may find it difficult to
transfer their allegiance to a President whose approach to foreign
policies is very considerably different from a President or
Secretary of State to whom they had a very strong emotional
attachment. It is important to remember that this type of individual
has undoubtedly developed a set of attitudes toward both domestic
and foreign policies which are basically incompatible with those of
President Nixon.
This letter is not intended to be a blanket condemnation of the
Foreign Service or of Departmental officers. The Department, both in
its domestic and Foreign Service possesses some very knowledgable
and indeed brilliant individuals—men and women who deeply interested
in foreign affairs and dedicated to the welfare of the United
States. This type of individual can be depended upon to faithfully
execute the foreign policy of the President of the United States and
is completely loyal to the person and office of the President.
These men and women are a significant national asset. Unfortunately,
however, there are a number of persons who are emotionally involved
with other political personalities and who basically and
fundamentally disagree with the President in both foreign and
domestic matters. It would seem advisable to reappraise the
positions presently occupied by these individuals and to possibly
utilize their talents elsewhere.
The necessary changes in personnel to achieve a department responsive
to the President would not have to include actions which would
embarrass the President with charges of “dismantling the State
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Department” nor would
these changes have to be carried out in a way calculated to alienate
the foreign affairs structure. They can be achieved with finesse but
the changes must be approached in a practical manner which
demonstrates firmness and a willingness to act in the interests of
the President rather than engaging in philosophical hand-wringing
which recognizes the problem but which hesitates to confront the
problem and deal with it expeditiously. Effective action would
encourage those who support the President and his policies, tend to
revitalize the foreign affairs community and will, at least to a
degree, create an atmosphere which would be uncongenial to those who
thrive on the “system” for the “system’s sake,” instead of devoting
their time and energy to implementing the foreign policy objectives
of the United States.
