Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

215. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM–514–70

Washington, November 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Responsibilities for Intelligence in the Department of Defense (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to:

a. Your memorandum, dated 1 August 1969, subject as above, wherein additional responsibilities for intelligence management were assigned.²

b. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) (ASD(Admin)), dated 14 October 1970, subject: “Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Intelligence Recommendations (U),” which requested comments on alternate plans for Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence reorganization.³

c. CM–4450–69, dated 26 July 1969, in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forwarded on the “Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence” to the ASD(Admin).⁴

d. JCS M–355–69, dated 6 June 1969, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on DOD intelligence program management.

e. JCSM–582–69, dated 18 November 1969, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting.

2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that considerable divergence exists between the responsibilities assigned in reference 1a for intelligence in the Department of Defense and the proposed alternate plans for DOD intelligence reorganization referred to in reference 1b. As indicated in reference 1c, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in broad agreement with the study which led to additional intelligence responsibilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the management of DOD intelligence as expressed in references 1c and 1d, in that they consider that operational direction of intelligence is not an appropriate function for management at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level but should be left to the operating agencies. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with the removal of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), from a position in the chain of command from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the associated removal of the Director, DIA, from performance of the function of Director for Intelligence (J–2), Joint Staff. A close relationship is essential to enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff properly to perform their role as the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The DIA is providing effective intelligence staff support in a dual role which makes the best use of intelligence personnel resources. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the major effect of the implementation of any one of the alternatives contained in reference 1b would be substantially increased centralization of intelligence responsibilities and direction in the Office of the Secretary of Defense which is contrary to the present policy of “decentralized management.” Implementation of any of the proposed plans would require additional personnel to staff the Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). For the above reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations about the advisability of a reorganization of DOD intelligence functions at this time.

4. (TS) Major changes have been made to improve the management of intelligence within the Department of Defense in the 14 months which commenced with the assignment of intelligence responsibilities to the ASD(Admin) on 1 August 1969 (reference 1a). These changes include the following:

a. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (DASD(I)) was formed and staffed within the OASD (Admin). The DASD(I) has taken important actions to discharge his responsibilities which include the establishment of an intelligence resource review and decisionmaking process, the improvement of intelligence communication between internal and external DOD agencies, evaluation of intelligence organizational relationships, roles and missions, and the review of security policies.

b. A Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) has been developed which includes the National Security Agency (NSA) program (the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)); the programs of DIA and the Services (the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)); and national programs. This new programming process, which was derived from and is generally compatible with the Planning Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), was developed during the first half of 1970 and has not been in use sufficiently long for an assessment of effectiveness to be made.

c. New responsibilities and authorities were assigned to the Director, DIA, and the Director, NSA, as program managers for the GDIP and the CCP portions of the CDIP.

d. A Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) was built and integrated with the PPBS procedures. The CIRIS, a target-oriented display of intelligence resource allocation, is used to evaluate intelligence resources. The CIRIS is intended to be a management tool in the CDIP and PPBS reviews. The DODCIRIS data bank was not constituted until mid-July 1970; therefore, it has not had sufficient time to influence or contribute to the programming process of the FY 1972 PPBS cycle as intended.

e. Incorporation within the PPBS of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning intelligence requirements and intelligence resources through the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). In addition, intelligence programs have been established as a major mission category under Program III of the Five-Year Defense Program. The FY 1972–1979 PPBS cycle, which commenced in December 1969, rather than its planned inception of July 1969, was the first under a revised directive, and has not run its full course. Experience has not been gained with a full PPBS cycle with these new procedures.

5. (S) The report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel on Command and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence⁵ was in preparation and supporting information was gathered during the time period when these significant changes were being made. For that reason, the report describes many faults and shortcomings which these very changes were designed to correct.

6. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the recent major functional changes made to improve the management of intelligence in the Department of Defense have not been in effect sufficiently long for the results to be realized. Reorganization prior to a full evaluation of the effects of already implemented changes is not advisable. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no change should be made in the DOD intelligence organization. If, after passage of sufficient time to assess the new arrangements it is determined that management deficiencies exist in the DOD intelligence community, then reconsideration of possible restructuring may be in order.

7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that any future review be pursued within the concept that broad principles of policy guidance in management (including resource and fiscal management and cross-program integration) are the proper functions for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that line functions of directing operational intelligence matters should not be considered within the purview of any agency in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76, 350.09. Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it. Written by hand at the bottom of page 1 is: “M—Argues against any changes now!”
2. Document 193.
3. Not found, but see Document 213.
4. References c, d, and e were not found.
5. See Document 211.