I apologize for its length, but the decisions you make on the issues
raised here will have an important effect on how we function in the
field of foreign affairs in the years ahead. I thought, therefore, that
[Page 2]
it would be best for you to
have as full a description as possible of what General Goodpaster and I
have in mind.
We would like a chance to discuss the memo with you after you have gone
over it.
At Tab B are outline summaries, plus action recommendations, covering
each of the subsections of the basic paper.3
Tab A
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon
SUBJECT
- Proposal for a New National Security Council System
This memorandum:
- —examines current procedures for making national security
decisions, and contrasts them with those of the Eisenhower
Administration;
- —recommends new NSC
procedures to insure orderly decision making;
- —makes proposals regarding my own staff;
- —lists the major issues which will require early
consideration by the National Security Council, and suggests
the focus and timing for papers on these.
Current Practice
The Johnson Administration’s
key decision-making body is the so-called “Tuesday Lunch” of the
President and his principal advisers.4 The lunch group meets
without a formal agenda and without any formal followup. Decisions
are conveyed orally to the Departments, with frequent uncertainty
about precisely what was decided.
A National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) is sometimes issued by the President or his
Special Assistant informing the bureaucracy of a Presidential
decision, but the NSAM almost never
provides
[Page 3]
any rationale for the
decision. While the National Security Council meets from time to
time, its principal function is an educational one, i.e., general
review of a major issue. In recent years the NSC has not been used as a decision-making
instrument.
The major strength of the existing system is its flexibility and the
speed with which decisions can be made. The absence of formal
staffing for the Tuesday lunch, for example, permits a free and
frank discussion unencumbered by a large group of second-level
staff, but the discussants are frequently inadequately briefed and
often unfamiliar with the nuances of the issue before them. Because
the principals meet without the benefit of staff or previous staff
study, there is no guarantee that all the relevant alternatives are
considered, or that all the interested parties within the government
have a chance to state their views. Since there is no systematic
follow-up, it is often unclear exactly what has been decided or why.
Nor is there any formal method for assuring that decisions are
adequately implemented.5
Eisenhower Procedures
The NSC met frequently during the
Eisenhower Administration. Participants had the benefit of fully
staffed papers, and a systematic effort was made to give all
interested parties a hearing.
A Planning Board (chaired by the Special Assistant to the President,
and with representatives from the agencies represented on the NSC) met frequently to review all
papers going to the NSC. The Special
Assistant for NSC Affairs prepared
the agenda for the NSC meeting,
summed up the positions taken by the participants, and presented a
decision document to the President for approval after the meeting.
Implementation of NSC based
decisions was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating
Board.
If there is any criticism to make of this system it is that its very
formality tended to demand too much of the principals’ time, while
giving insufficient priority to issues of primary Presidential
concern.
The present task is to combine the best features of the two systems;
to develop a structure, using the NSC, which will provide the President and his top
advisers with:
- —all the realistic alternatives;
- —the costs and benefits of each;
- —the views and recommendations of all interested
agencies.
[Page 4]
The procedures outlined below will, I believe, permit us to reach
these goals, while avoiding the dangers of compromise and indecision
which can result from an excessively formal system.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE
- A.
-
The National Security Council. The
National Security Council should be the principal forum for
issues requiring interagency coordination, especially where
Presidential decisions of a middle and long-range nature are
involved. It should meet regularly, and discussion should be
limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs—at the direction of the
President and in consultation with the Secretary of
State—should be responsible for determining the agenda and
ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared—normally by
the responsible departments. The NSC staff should assist by synthesizing and
sharply defining the options, and occasionally by providing
an independent staff study. To keep the meetings small, only
principals should attend (with the possible exception of the
Under Secretary of State).
The NSC should consider
middle and long-range policy issues as well as current
crises and immediate operational problems. By providing a
forum for high-level discussion of planning papers, the
NSC can insure that
senior officials consider the long-range implications of
policy choices.
NSC agenda papers should
present a wide range of alternative policy options that are
politically and administratively feasible, and should avoid
the all-too-frequent practice of setting up extreme
alternatives as straw men to the one course of action being
urged.
The NSC should not be
considered the sole forum for Presidential discussion in the
National Security field. The President will reserve the
option of constituting subcommittees for the expeditious
handling of operational matters (with membership especially
adapted to the particular issue).
- B.
-
National Security Council Review
Group. An NSC
Review Group would examine papers prior to their
consideration by the NSC,
unless the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the
President deem it unnecessary. Its role would be to frame
the issues to be decided by the NSC, not to achieve a compromise or consensus
which hides alternatives. The Group will also assign action
to Regional or Ad Hoc groups, as appropriate.
Membership in the Group would vary depending on the issue,
but would include:
- —the Assistant to the President (Chairman);
- —the senior State Department and Defense
Department official below the Secretary actively
concerned with NSC
matters;
- —the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his
representative;
- —the Director of the CIA or his representative;
- —the Directors (or their representatives) of other
agencies such as AID, USIA
or ACDA when
appropriate.
The Review Group would examine papers prepared for the NSC to be sure that: (1) they
are worthy of NSC attention;
(2) all the relevant alternatives are included; (3) the
facts are accurately presented.
Issues that do not require Cabinet level discussion or
Presidential decision will be referred by the NSC Review Committee to the
NSC Under Secretary’s
Committee.
- C.
-
NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary’s
Committee. This Committee would be composed of the
Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Director of
Central Intelligence (and other agencies where appropriate). It
would deal with matters referred to it by the NSC Review Group, including matters
on which the IRG’s have not been
able to agree but which do not involve issues requiring
Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion.
- D.
-
Inter-Agency Regional Groups. The
currently existing inter-agency regional groups (IRG’s), chaired by the relevant
Assistant Secretary of State, should be reconstituted as
sub-organs of the NSC.
Membership should generally include the agencies represented
on the Review Group, depending on the subject being
considered. The IRG’s should
perform three functions: (1) discussion and decision on
issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary
level, including issues arising out of the implementation of
NSC decisions; (2)
preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC, stating alternatives,
their costs, and consequences; (3) preparation of potential
crises contingency papers for review by the NSC. These papers should
discuss what steps can be taken to avoid the crisis, as well
as actions planned during the crisis.
Note: The elaborated NSC machinery makes the
continued functioning of the existing Senior
Inter-Departmental Group unnecessary.
- E.
-
Ad Hoc Working Groups. Where the problem
is not geographic— or is too important to be dealt with from a
regional perspective—ad hoc working groups should be used to
develop policy alternatives for consideration by the NSC. The make-up of the working
group would depend on the subject being studied. In cases where
implementation of policy is complicated or controversial, and
inter-agency cooperation is required, ad hoc groups might be
charged with coordinating operations in support of
policy.
- F.
-
Outside Consultants. The Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs should establish a
roster of consultants who are experts on major issues. When
appropriate, these consultants should participate in groups
preparing papers for NSC
consideration.
[Page 6]
II. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE
- A.
-
NSC Memoranda. Two
memoranda series should be established to inform the
departments and agencies of Presidential actions. In order
to avoid confusion, the current series of National Security
Action Memoranda (NSAMs)
should be abolished and replaced by:
- —National Security Decision
Memoranda (NSDMs).
NSDMs would be used
to report Presidential decisions (whether or not the
result of NSC
meetings) when the President wants the agencies
concerned clearly to understand what he desires, and
the reasons for his decisions.
- —National Security Study
Memoranda (NSSMs). This series would be used to
direct that studies be undertaken of particular
problems (normally for NSC consideration).
Existing NSAMs should be
examined prior to January 20 and divided into three
categories: (1) those which are out of date and should be
rescinded; (2) those which should continue in force; (3)
those which should be re-examined to determine whether they
should be continued. NSAMs
in the second category would be primarily annual decision
documents which the President would review as a matter of
course during his first year. Those in the third category
should continue in effect pending completion of the review.
A NSDM should be issued on
January 21 indicating the status of all existing NSAMs.
- B.
-
Annual Review of the International
Situation. The National Security Council Staff,
together with the relevant agencies, should prepare for the
President an annual review of the international situation
similar to the annual economic message. This report, which would
be submitted to the Congress, would permit a more extended
discussion of the President’s view of the international
situation than is possible in the State of the Union Message.
The Review would:
- —provide a regular framework for defining U.S.
security interests and programs to meet those
interests;
- —give the agencies an opportunity to assure high-level
attention to fundamental issues within an overall
framework.
The Review would focus on world events over the past year and set
forth the President’s view of these events and our future goals. The
statement would include some of the material which over the past
eight years the Secretary of Defense has presented in his Annual
Posture Statement to the Congress, but it would not give the details
of Defense or other foreign policy budgets. The statement should
normally be issued in January.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
The NSC Staff of the Assistant to the
President would be divided into three categories: (1) Assistants for
Programs; (2) Operations Staff;
[Page 7]
(3) Planning Staff. The role of the Staff would be to provide a
Presidential perspective in programs, planning and operations. The
Staff’s job would be to see that the agencies do the initial work,
using existing inter-agency mechanisms. Only in exceptional
circumstances would the NSC Staff
prepare its own papers. The functions of each part of the NSC Staff are described below.
- A.
-
Assistants for Programs would be
responsible for the preparation of studies on the long-range
implications of major policy issues (e.g., Vietnam, Middle
East settlements, and alternative NATO strategies). They would work with the
appropriate Departments to provide the President and the
NSC with the relevant
information and policy options. After it has been decided
that a problem will require one or a series of Presidential
decisions, responsibility would be assigned to one of the
Assistants for Programs. They would develop a strategy for
getting the necessary staff work done, and for bringing the
issue to the National Security Council in a timely and
orderly fashion.
The Assistants for Programs would be charged with developing
a five-year perspective by helping the agencies to: (1)
define middle-range goals; (2) propose specific measures to
achieve these goals. The responsible Assistant would work
with the group considering the issue to insure that all
relevant options were kept open. They would also need to
work closely with the NSC
Operations Staff and Planning Staff if the link between
planning and operations is to be maintained.
- B.
-
The Operations Staff would consist of
approximately five Senior Members and a small number of Staff
Assistants. Each Senior Staff Member would be responsible for
certain geographic regions and/or functional activities. They
would follow the day-to-day business of the Departments, and
would be responsible for bringing to the attention of the
Assistant to the President those matters which are of
Presidential concern.
- C.
-
The Planning Staff would prepare the
NSC agenda papers,
synthesizing agency papers and necessary back-up and
follow-up papers. It would undertake specific studies only
when inter-agency studies were unsatisfactory or
undesirable. Consultants would be drawn upon to work with
the Planning Staff in developing options beyond those
developed in the Departments. The Planning Staff would also
provide back-up expertise for the Assistants for
Programs.
Members of the Planning Staff would also be available to
serve as members of inter-agency study groups. Some of the
members of the Staff should be experts with particular
skills; others should be generalists.
The existence of this Staff and its access to consultants
would enable the Assistant to the President and the
President to receive preliminary studies on complicated and
controversial subjects without
[Page 8]
arousing concern within the Departments
before the President had decided what options he wanted to
explore seriously.
- D.
-
The Military Assistant would help the
Assistant to the President in the development of Staff papers on
the full range of military issues, and would be available to
provide him with judgments on military questions. He would also
assist in monitoring and assembling intelligence
materials.
IV. MAJOR POLICY ISSUES
This section lists issues which will require early attention by the
NSC, and suggests procedures to
be used in developing alternatives.
A. High Priority Major Policy Issues. (These
are the subjects which will require early, high-level attention and
for which alternative policy papers should be available for prompt
consideration by the NSC.)
- 1.
-
Vietnam. The NSC Staff should prepare a paper (prior to January
20) listing alternative strategies, both in Vietnam and at
Paris. The alternatives should include diplomatic moves and
military actions which are mutually supporting. The paper should
be sent to the relevant Departments for their examination within
two weeks after January 20 to insure that all the relevant
alternatives are listed and that the factual assertions are
correct.
- 2.
-
Middle East. An ad hoc working group
should be asked to develop a paper examining alternative
approaches to the Arab-Israeli problem. It should complete its
report within one month.
- 3.
-
Europe. European policy will require
early consideration for several reasons:
- —A number of West European heads of government are
almost certain to request early meetings with the
President (basic policy should not be made by
preparing talking papers for such meetings);
- —Negotiations with the Germans on an arrangement
to offset the balance of payments costs of our
troops in Germany are currently underway. A decision
will have to be made at an early date on whether the
talks should be continued, and, if so, on what
position we should take (these decisions should be
taken in the context of an overall policy toward
NATO);
- —The French have been dropping hints of an
interest in improving relations (our reaction to
these probes should also be in the context of an
overall European policy).
A paper examining these and other problems of European policy
should be prepared by the NSC Staff, or by an Ad Hoc Working Group.
- 4.
-
International Monetary Policy. An Ad Hoc
Working Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of the Treasury
for Monetary Policy, and including the Under Secretary or
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, a
representative of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the
responsible Assistant for Programs, should be asked to
[Page 9]
report to the NSC within two months on the basic
issues and alternatives of international monetary reform. The
Group should also be charged with overseeing on-going
operational matters relating to international monetary
affairs.
- 5.
-
Strategic Forces. As discussed with
Secretary-designate Laird, the NSC Staff
will prepare—prior to January 20—a paper outlining issues and
alternative policies regarding strategic forces. The paper
should be sent to the relevant agencies for comment prior to
review by the NSC.
- 6.
-
Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Security
Policy. A high-level interagency group should examine
the entire range of U.S. security policy. (Since this issue
relates intimately to our worldwide posture, it is too crucial
to be handled entirely as a Defense Department matter.) The
examination should consider U.S. interests, threats to those
interests, and alternative security policies. The Working Group
should be staffed by the NSC
staff, augmented by personnel from relevant agencies. The Group
should report to the NSC within
six months following the inauguration.
- 7.
-
Contingency Planning. An Ad Hoc Working
Group should be established after January 20 to review existing
inter-agency plans and procedures for contingency planning on
possible major trouble spots (Berlin and the Middle East are
especially crucial). The Group should pay particular attention
to the political impact of proposed military moves, and the
orchestration of political and military measures.
- 8.
-
Japan. A number of issues in
U.S.-Japanese relations will arise during the next twelve
months, and the Japanese Prime Minister is likely to request a
meeting in the fall. Therefore, an Ad Hoc Working Group should
be set up to examine the full range of U.S.-Japanese relations
(including the issue of the reversion of Okinawa, the future of
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. bases in Japan, and
U.S.-Japanese economic relations).
- 9.
-
AID Review. What is
needed at this time is not a major research effort,6 but
rather a concise, hard-headed consideration of issues
(particularly the relationship between economic and political
development) and options. The task could be assigned to a small
nongovernmental group, or to an interagency Ad Hoc Working
Group.
V. PROGRAM BUDGETING
Today, decisions on U.S. economic assistance, military assistance,
and U.S. troop levels in a given country are made separately—often
in
[Page 10]
ignorance of what other
agencies are doing in the country, and without regard to their
impact on our political and diplomatic posture. This makes it
impossible to relate budget choices to policy issues.
A series of program budgeting studies should be prepared on major
countries where important policy differences exist and we have
programs involving large resource transfers. These studies will
permit the NSC to examine at one
time our overall policy objectives and our budget choices as they
relate to key countries or regions.
A small, permanent inter-agency staff, manned by personnel seconded
from the relevant agencies but under the NSC, should be created to do these studies. The staff
should have overall responsibility for their preparation and should
provide technical advice on each. The studies should be performed by
Ad Hoc Groups made up of program budgeting experts from the
permanent staff and country specialists from the relevant agencies.
The results of the studies should provide a basis for policy
judgments, as well as for possible reallocation of funds within the
proposed FY-70 Budget and/or requests
for supplemental funds.
(A country program budget study on Korea is currently being produced
by an inter-agency committee. The NSC should consider this study at an early date as a
pilot project. Program budgeting studies might be requested, in
addition, for Taiwan, Thailand, Greece, Brazil and Ethiopia. This
will get at least one study underway in each geographic region.
Other countries can be added to the list at a later date.)
