Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations

474. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State ¹

New York, March 2, 1964, 8 p.m.

3256. Cyprus. International Force and SC Res. Ref: USUN 3246, USUN 3255.²

1. Bitsios told Yost Mar 2 that it now important peace force be formed quickly and, if necessary, begin to show some clear outlines as to composition in next 24 hours. This important, he said, in making it more difficult for Sovs block res³ and making it easier for Cypriots “convince” them not veto. (He may also have had in mind thought that peace force should get on island before further sentiment grows in GOC in favor avoiding peace force altogether.)

2. From Cypriot and Sov viewpoint, adjournment SC connected mainly this problem (although Turks also asked Bernardes (Brazil) to request adjournment SC mtg presumably so they could get Ankara reaction to revised preamble of res). Cypriots uncertain if terms of reference for force (op para 5, reftel 3246) acceptable to GOC. Clearly they not pleasing to Sovs. Federenko (USSR) asked Bernardes seek adjournment Mar 2 SC mtg (and when this done, he only one urge mtg be afternoon Mar 3 not morning). According Algard (Norway) Sovs also requested Nielsen and Bernardes permit para by para vote so they could abstain on op paras 4, 5, and 7 and then vote for res. Bernardes and Nielsen have told us they firm on no para by para voting and no amendments. Hajek (Czechs) told newsmen he did not believe amendments would be moved. Riha (Czechs) indicated he expected no negative votes on res which he said had clear majority. Indicated Czechs would abstain with clarifying statement on para 4 being in contravention Charter provisions for SC.

3. SYG, aware of need for shaping up peace force rapidly called in Finnish, Irish, Swedish, and UK reps afternoon Mar 2. Rikhye had staff mtg his Comite. Scandinavian permreps had heads together in lounge after SC mtg., Hedin (Sweden) said his govt reluctant but Astrom planning give it arguments in favor, principal one being that other participation would be importantly influenced by Swedish role. Algard (Norway) said Nielsen gave Astrom “third degree” in favor Swedish participation. Also said now that force in UN, not NATO context, Norwegian contribution, if asked, less likely if Swedes refused. Danish MisOff said same thing although less certain of this since Danish had unit ready go in “ten hours.” All agreed Finns, who Rolz Bennett told Yost had legislative restrictions consider (as well as Sov pressures), would not go if Swedes refused and Algard (Norway) noted Irish and even Canadians would be unlikely contribute if Swedes not in. Bitsios (Greece) told Yost Cypriots no longer pressing for Yugos. Indians still appear to be negative in spite Kyprianou’s reported contrary impression.

Comment: Clear that rapid composition of Cyprus PKF desirable both for purpose SC res and to avoid obstacles its creation. Swedish contribution appears be key to formulation international force. Recommend Dept instruct Emb Stockholm make this situation clear to Swedish FonMin and that Embs Copenhagen and Oslo do likewise with view of coordinating pressure on Swedish Govt act rapidly and favorably this matter.

Stevenson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.
2. Telegram 3246 from New York, March 1, transmitted a draft resolution on Cyprus. Telegram 3255 from New York, March 2, contained Stevenson’s report on a meeting with Greek Cypriot representatives. (Both ibid.)
3. The Soviets had expressed reservations regarding the text being circulated and subsequently announced that they would not vote for the fourth (operative) paragraph.