473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

890. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Will you please deliver the following message to Foreign Minister Erkin from me soonest: Begin Verbatim Text.

I have been following the developments in New York on an hourly basis and I should like to give you my personal assessment of the situation as I see it. I would appreciate it if you would communicate this also to Prime Minister Inonu with my warm regards and admiration:

I promised the Prime Minister and you that the USG would use its best efforts in the Security Council to defeat the attempt of the Government of Cyprus to obtain a resolution undermining the Treaty of Guaranty. I promised also that we would agree to nothing that would derogate from the Treaty rights of your Government.
I am persuaded that the present draft resolution achieves both of these objectives. The Greek Cypriots have been frustrated in their effort to obtain Security Council action that would change the treaty. Not only does the resolution contain nothing which derogates from either of the treaties, but it provides for a peacekeeping force and mediator which were the essence of the original proposal with which your Government was associated.
You will recall that Archbishop Makarios rejected our joint proposals along these lines and refused to admit the possibility of a peacekeeping force until after he had achieved a Security Council repudiation of the rights given your Government under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guaranty.2 If he now acquiesces in the present draft—which seems likely—he will have given up his basic position.
The present draft resolution is, in my view, the best we can obtain from the Security Council. It represents a victory for the principles we set out to establish.
We intend to make sure Turkey’s concerns are taken care of by making it crystal clear in the Council that the second preambular paragraph of the resolution refers to all relevant provisions of the UN Charter, including the Charter Preamble which speaks of “respect to the obligations arising from treaties,” as well as to the provisions of Articles [Page 1008] 55 and 56 relating to human rights. We shall also make clear that the necessary assumption of paragraph 2 is that the Government of Cyprus will act strictly in accordance with constitutional procedures. We shall further interpret the reference in paragraph 7 to “the people of Cyprus as a whole” as meaning “all of the people now living on Cyprus” and as not importing any conclusion as to the form of the ultimate solution.
With these considerations in mind, I urge that your Government—if it cannot obtain the acceptance of the amendments you are proposing-should acquiesce in the draft resolution in its present form. We shall do everything possible to persuade our British friends to join with us in reinforcing the proper meaning of this resolution.
The effect of prompt acquiescence would be to put a peacekeeping force on the Island as quickly as possible and thus bring a stop to bloodshed, and also to arrange for a mediator whom we shall all support in developing an equitable and hopefully permanent solution to this troublesome and dangerous issue.
I recognize the difficulties which this whole situation presents to your Government. We all admire the forbearance and restraint that you have displayed in this matter. We shall continue to work closely with you in order to keep the peace and to find the most equitable and compassionate solution to the problem of Cyprus. End Verbatim Text.

Ambassador Hare should also communicate to Erkin points being sent by Amb. Stevenson in separate telegram. (USUN’s 148 to Ankara).3

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Jernegan, Cleveland, and Moose. Repeated to Athens, New York, Nicosia, and London.
  2. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765–775.
  3. Dated March 1; it reported on Cypriot desires for changes in the draft and commented on their possible impact on Turkey. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP)