June 10, 2004
The Department of State released today
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,
Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United
Nations. The chapters on administration and organization are a departure for the
series. For the first time, documents on how U.S. foreign policy and
intelligence establishments were supposed to be run in theory, and how they
performed in practice, are presented. Similar volumes are planned for each
Presidential administration in the future. Chapters on the Department of State,
the National Security Council (NSC) system, and
the Central Intelligence Agency are included. A section on the United Nations
focuses on the perennial problem of financing UN
peacekeeping efforts, Chinese representation, and the creation of a United
Nations Peacekeeping Force for Cyprus.
From the beginning of his administration, President Lyndon B. Johnson searched for a few good women and African Americans to appoint to high-profile positions in the Department of State. He ultimately appointed four female ambassadors, a small percentage, but more than any administration up to that point. With African Americans, he had less success. When he tried to nominate an African American for Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural and Educational Affairs, he met opposition from Senator J. William Fulbright, who saw that appointment as his personal prerogative. The naming of Ambassador Carl T. Rowan, a Kennedy appointee, to head the United States Information Agency, was Johnson’s most prominent success in this area.
The Department of State’s top leadership was not particularly strong on management skills-Secretary of State Dean Rusk was not a manager and Under Secretary of State George Ball was known as a “lone wolf.” On the advice of his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, the President appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Thomas Mann as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and asked him to essentially serve as the chief operations officer for the Department. There were also changes in interagency organization, which were intended to make the Department of State the agency in charge of coordinating and supervising foreign policy and activities abroad; however, these met with only limited success.
As the volume demonstrates, informality became the trademark of the Johnson administration National Security Council system as the Council itself atrophied and was replaced by an informal Tuesday luncheon group that comprised Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and a few other members of the inner circle. When Walt Rostow replaced Bundy, the Tuesday group and a strong NSC staff continued to dominate foreign policy decisionmaking.
The volume also documents organizational problems at the Central Intelligence Agency. Johnson did not want Director of Central Intelligence John McCone to brief him personally, as was McCone’s practice with President Kennedy, and the President’s Daily Brief was introduced in late 1964 to fill that void. When McCone resigned in April 1965, Admiral William Raborn was appointed Director of Central Intelligence to hold the position until long-time CIA employee and Deputy Director Richard Helms was fully trained to take over. Within a year, Helms succeeded Raborn. Key organizational issues faced by CIA Directors were wresting control of the National Reconnaissance Office from the Air Force, coordination of CIA activities abroad, and better approval mechanisms for covert operations.
At the United Nations, long-time liberal Adlai Stevenson wrangled with the President, the White House, and the Department of State over the Soviet Union’s refusal to pay for peacekeeping operations under Article 19 of the UN Charter. Following Stevenson’s death, the appointment of Johnson’s close friend, Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, as UN Ambassador, brought UN policy in line with Johnson’s views. Goldberg convinced U Thant to remain as Secretary General and defused the Article 19 issue with the Soviets. Johnson’s Vietnam policy, however, strained relations with Goldberg, and he resigned in June 1968. He was replaced by Vietnam dove George Ball, who only served until September 1968, when he resigned to direct the Hubert H. Humphrey Presidential campaign. These problems at the United Nations overshadowed the major Johnson administration success-creation of a peacekeeping force for Cyprus.
The text of the volume, the summary, and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website ( http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii). Copies can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at http://bookstore.gpo.gov/index.html or use the order form below. For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series at (202) 663-1131; fax (202)663-1289; e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.