Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

180. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, September 7, 1966, 1958Z.

549. Gronouski-Wang Talks, 131st meeting.²

1. Wang offered no new themes, proposals, positions. Both formal presentation and rebuttal comments restricted to reiteration past public ChiCom attacks on U.S. aggression and provocation against CPR and DRV, and repudiation of U.S. indications of desire improve U.S.-CPR relations and wish for peace in Vietnam as “fraud.” Indication of intention make his prepared statement public given at very end of meeting was only surprise (Warsaw 548).³ Wang proposed January 11 for next meeting and after fruitless efforts to move date up to December or November I agreed.

2. I opened with guidance provided by State 38572,⁴ as supplemented by paragraph on August 29 Tonkin Gulf incident provided by State 40808 [41808].⁵ Wang’s opening statement focused on following themes:

3. U.S.-CPR relations. Wang cited U.S. hostility toward CPR since 1949. He said ChiComs refused be “hoodwinked” by U.S. official talk of “building bridges” and improvement of CPR-U.S. relations. He attacked continued U.S. occupation of Taiwan and turning Taiwan into U.S. colony and military base (Secretary’s visit to Taipei this summer seen as effort to “hatch criminal plots” against CPR) and reiterated determination of Peking to “liberate” Taiwan, and demand for total U.S. withdrawal from Straits area. He called recent Seoul conference of Asian States a U.S. attempt to organize a “new military alliance” against CPR and charged U.S.-Soviet-Japanese collusion in plotting against Peking. ChiComs and Asian people would never be duped by U.S. and it clear, Wang said, there no sincerity in U.S. talk of easing relations with Peking.

4. Vietnam. Wang referred to U.S. expansion of bombing of North Vietnam, increase in force level in South, and provocations against Cambodia but concluded we “foredoomed to failure.” He charged U.S.-Soviet collaboration on peace initiatives and denounced U.S. “peace swindles” and talks of “de-escalation.” He demanded an “immediate and complete” U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and reiterated references to the U.S. having “torn to shreds” the Geneva Accords. Wang cited Ho Chi Minh’s July 17 appeal at length and pledged ChiCom support for DRV. He stated that China “reliable rear area” for Vietnamese people, that “aggression against Vietnam is aggression against China” and that U.S. would be “committing grave historical blunder and will find it too late to repent” if it “underestimates actions” which CPR will take to support Vietnamese people. (Wang reiterated this last statement verbatim again during rebuttal.)

5. In rebuttal I told Wang I would not trade threats with him on Vietnam but emphasized our determination meet challenges which might be presented. I emphasized U.S. willingness withdraw from Vietnam when aggression halted and urged CPR to test U.S. On U.S.-CPR incidents on high seas (Wang had raised both May 28 and August 29 charges of U.S. attacks on ChiCom ships), I reiterated our proposal for joint investigations, denied May 29 charge and offered further investigation of August incident if ChiComs provided more information. I rebutted remaining Wang points briefly, noting we would not discuss U.S.-Soviet relations in these talks but that differing U.S.-Soviet positions on Vietnam plain for all to see. Used very helpful Dept and Hong Kong messages on Ch’en Yi-Kosaka conversation (Wang clearly taken aback and unaware of reported Ch’en Yi remarks). I noted Ch’en appeared be making same points we had made in talks here and told Wang I hoped ChiComs might be willing open door to more fruitful exchanges of views and relaxation of tensions. I said I was surprised at contrast between Ch’en Yi’s remarks and hard tone of Wang’s presentation. (Wang did not respond immediately but at end of meeting repeated ChiCom determination on Vietnam and, noting this in reply to my reference to Ch’en Yi, said his statement represented view of Chinese people.)

6. In response Wang once more went through much of his opening statement argument, in abbreviated form but with few variations. He asked why U.S. “haggled” over scholars and newsmen when key issues such as Taiwan unresolved. He raised specific charge U.S. using poison gas, claiming Secy. McNamara had made Sept 1965 speech justifying use of such gas, and charged U.S. atrocities in SVN, bombing of civilians in NVN. He cited growing U.S. military strength despite “over 1000” arms control discussions to argue that U.S. talked of disarmament to cover up arms expansion. He then said Peking would not participate in WDC or any exploratory group on WDC but made no reference to our exchange of letters⁶ (exchange thus remains completely private since I believe we have not mentioned exchange to anyone, including allies so far).

7. I responded by reviewing usefulness of people-to-people exchanges, rejected as completely false allegation on poison gas (and of McNamara justification), and emphasized we had never intentionally struck at any nonmilitary target in Vietnam. I queried why DRV unwilling allow outside neutral observers (ICC, ICRC) inspect alleged U.S. activities in North if these actually existed. I emphasized if ChiCom aim to see U.S. troops out of VN, they should use their influence to prevail on DRV to halt infiltration and end conflict. On disarmament, I regretted ChiCom rejection of exploratory group and reiterated hope they at some point would recognize usefulness of genuine exchange of views on arms control issues.

8. Wang responded that U.S.-CPR tension due to “occupation of Taiwan,” “provocations” against CPR territory, and aggression against CPR’s “most intimate neighbor”. By leaving these issues unsettled and haggling over side issues, U.S. shows “insincerity.” U.S. should show “sincerity” by withdrawing from Taiwan and halt use of force in Vietnam. He then once more went over old ground on Vietnam and I decided no point in prolonging discussion.

9. Wang suggested Jan 11, 1967 for next meeting, noting in response my attempt move date up to December 7 or 14 that this period “inconvenient” for him and that “under current circumstances,” he did not think more frequent meetings were necessary. After further back and forth, I agreed to Jan 11 date.

10. Wang then expressed strong ChiCom regret at U.S. violation of confidence of talks, alluding to past leaks and referring to Bundy’s Feb. 12 speech to our offer at 128th meeting in December on nonreciprocal admission of ChiCom newsmen. Said Peking had decided release opening ChiCom statement at current meeting. I expressed strong regret, noting my May letter said leaks were unintentional and unauthorized. I said we could not prevent their releasing statement but reserved right to make whatever response we believed appropriate. Wang seemed defensive, anxious to show his release not unprecedented (we do not here recall precedent for publication of full text of statement although partial revelations have taken place before) and that U.S. really responsible for ChiCom move.

11. Overall atmosphere of meeting was relaxed, even at end, and Wang did not at any time appear agitated or excited although ChiCom side exhibited considerable surprise at my reference to Ch’en Yi-Kosaka conversation.

12. I assume ChiCom opening statement intended for Soviets as well as us and that this accounts, at least in part, for its utter sterility. I am somewhat concerned at obvious ChiCom effort prolong gaps between meetings longer and longer (next gap will be four months). Wang’s casual remark that “in current circumstances” more frequent meetings not necessary was first flat indication he has given of intention continue stretch out periods between meetings. I am determined on our side to try and narrow this gap in future. ChiComs obviously apparently continue find existence of Warsaw channel useful both for facade of effort to deal with U.S. and for potential crisis communication but disinclined encourage frequent contact.

Gronouski

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Moscow, Saigon, and Taipei and passed to the White House, CIA, and USIA.
2. Gronouski sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram A–205, September 8. (Ibid.)
3. Dated September 7. (Ibid.)
4. Document 177.
5. Telegram 41808 to Warsaw, September 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
6. For the U.S. letter of May 26, see Documents 153 and 155. Telegram 539 from Warsaw, September 7, transmitted the text of a letter rejecting the U.S. proposal, which the Embassy had received from the Chinese Embassy the day before. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)