Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, May 23, 1966, 11:19 a.m.

1752. Guidance for 130th Meeting, May 25, 1966.

1. Wang is scheduled to open. We anticipate that he will make bitter attack on U.S. for May 12 plane incident. Chicoms have charged that shooting down of Chinese plane over Yunnan was deliberate, planned war provocation. Wang’s statement will probably echo May 13 Liberation Army Daily editorial which stated “While flagrantly extending the war of aggression in Vietnam, US imperialism has openly declared that China is its chief enemy and clamored that ‘there exists the danger of war with China.’ It was at this very moment that US air pirates intruded into China’s airspace and made a surprise attack on Chinese aircraft. This was by no means an isolated or accidental case but a well planned act of the Johnson Administration—in attempt to extend further war of aggression against Vietnam to China. . . . Nefarious US imperialism is the biggest scoundrel of our times and an arch-enemy of the Chinese people.”

2. Wang probably will also list U.S. acts of “aggression” against mainland China including: occupation of Taiwan, “several hundred” intrusions into China’s territorial airspace and waters, and strafing attacks on Chinese fishing boats. He may repeat ChiCom allegations that U.S. intensifying war in Vietnam and bent on spreading flames of war to China. It is likely Wang will refer to recent 4 points Chou En-Lai gave in interview with Dawn (China will not provoke war, China means what it says, China is prepared, a war will have no boundaries). See FBIS 90, May 10.²

3. Wang may raise air attacks on ChiCom Economic and Cultural Delegation quarters in Khang Kay on March 24. He may attempt justify ChiCom shoot-down of US A3B near Luichow Peninsula on April 12 and claim A3B’s flight as additional evidence U.S. hostile intent. Considering recent nuclear test, also possible Wang may raise ChiCom’s 1964 draft agreed announcement on meeting heads of states to discuss complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. (See record 123rd meeting.)³ Similar proposal repeated in Sino-Albanian communique of May 14.

4. FYI: Following response has been cleared with Ambassador Gronouski. Suggest Harding prepare translation based on this text. You will be informed of any changes. End FYI.

5. Mr. Ambassador, in response to your charges concerning an intrusion of your border on May 12 by U.S. aircraft and the subsequent shooting down of one of your aircraft there appears to be considerable confusion about what actually did occur. We did have aircraft in the NW sector of NVN on that date. Our pilots claim, however, that they at all times remained south of the Red River. They state they were attacked by an unidentified aircraft and returned its fire. They saw it explode but saw no parachute. We have checked carefully with our pilots and with the careful navigational equipment that was available on the American aircraft involved; these accounts concur that the U.S. aircraft were at all times over DRV territory. We repeat that American pilots have explicit instructions to avoid flying into your air space. If the evidence available to us should have been in error, we would of course have regretted this intrusion into your territory.

6. Reverting to the case of Captain Smith’s flight in the Hainan area, we repeat that this was a case of mischance and navigational error.

7. As to the A3B aircraft on April 12, it too was far off course because of navigational errors when it was attacked by your pilots. Nonetheless, we understand that this plane was not over Chinese territorial waters when it was shot down. We would like to know if there were any survivors.

8. I am deeply disturbed by these incidents on both sides because misinterpretation of the motives behind these incidents by either side could lead to a further increase in tensions. I should like to repeat what I said in our last meeting. We have no hostile intent towards your government or your people. President Johnson has said that we seek the end of no regime and our Secretary of State has recently said we do not intend to provoke war. We have acted with restraint and care in the past and we are doing so today. FYI: Ambassador Gronouski is fully briefed on details May 12 air incident. End FYI.

9. Mr. Ambassador, by this time it should be clear that we intend to live up to our commitments to the Government of SVN. We are prepared to continue our present action as long as it is required to convince Hanoi and the Viet Cong that their efforts to take over SVN by force, terror and infiltration will not succeed. At the same time we are equally and sincerely prepared to seek a peaceful solution. We have stated time and again that our objective in South Vietnam is a condition of peace in which the South Vietnamese people can be free to choose their own future without outside coercion or force. We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination nor military alliance in Vietnam. There are many roads towards a peaceful solution. We are willing at any time to engage in discussions or negotiations leading towards peace, without conditions. Alternately we are willing to undertake a reciprocal dampening down of the war. We will respond if others are prepared to reduce their use of force. Specifically, we are willing to suspend or even cease our air attacks on North Vietnam if Hanoi gives clear evidence that it is prepared to take reciprocal action, for example with respect to its infiltration of military personnel and equipment into South Vietnam and its military activity and terrorism in South Vietnam. Such evidence and suspension of the bombing could be determined by mutually acceptable observers.

10. It seems clear to me that Hanoi will eventually realize that a military victory is not possible. The DRV may hope to wait until the military position is reversed, but this will not occur. As Hanoi continues to send more reinforcements south we will be compelled to reinforce the GVN. Over a period of time the VC and DRV forces will face further losses and defeats. The DRV, eventually, will realize that it could avoid all this bloodshed and destruction by evidencing willingness to engage in negotiations leading to a peaceful solution.

11. Mr. Ambassador, I have noted that NCNA has commented on Secretary Rusk’s statement of March 16 before the House Subcommittee on the Far East. NCNA said that “all talks about ‘improving relations’ and ‘avoidance’ of a state of hostility are a sham.” The People’s Daily of April 6 said that the hints of “goodwill dropped by the U.S. are obviously part of its counter-revolutionary dual policy, an attempt to undermine the Chinese people’s fighting determination and reduce their combat-readiness . . . The evidence is increasingly clear that the U.S. imperialists are preparing to impose war on the Chinese people.” Similarly observer in the March 29 People’s Daily said that “these blasts of good will set off by Washington at a time when U.S. imperialism is working more energetically than ever to concentrate its aggression on China, are indeed absurd and ridiculous . . . . All such expressions as a flexible policy, ‘without isolation,’ and ‘more contact’ are only pretenses for intensifying the U.S. containment of China.”

12. Mr. Ambassador, I regret that your government seems to reject all our proposals for easing tensions. Judging from what your side says it appears that you choose to believe that U.S. does not seek a better mutual understanding. Despite our statements to contrary you say that U.S. only wants war with China. As I have tried to indicate, such a conclusion is not warranted by the facts.

13. There may be other reasons, both internal and external, why you wish to avoid a better relationship. Mr. Ambassador, we are willing to try to reach some mutual agreement on peaceful solutions of such critical problems as Vietnam but your side has rejected all such moves. We would like to work towards a reduction of tensions and a better understanding but your side rejects our efforts, We have explained our intentions towards your country but your side rejects our statements because you claim we are not sincere. You say we must prove our sincerity by actual deeds, by accepting, in fact, your own solutions. Mr. Ambassador, your side has its own convictions. So do we. In the interests of peace we are willing to search for a just solution. Are you willing to do the same? Mr. Ambassador, I intend to continue my efforts to convince you that my government seeks a just and lasting peace. We stand ready to fulfill the commitments we have made concerning travel contacts and visits, joint investigations, and discussions concerning peaceful solutions of the problems confronting us in the Far East.

14. I would like to draw your attention to the remarks I made at our 128th meeting on December 15, 1965.⁴ At that time I said that “peace and stability in the Far East is as much in your interest as it is in ours . . . It would permit the withdrawal of U.S. forces. If we could be assured of peace throughout the Far East and the whole Pacific, our fleets and our bases would no longer be necessary.”

15. There are a few additional matters I should like to raise. At our last meeting, I told you that I would ask for a further report on your charges that the Chinese Consulate in Phong Saly was attacked. I am informed that we have no additional information concerning this incident.

16. Mr. Ambassador, I have noted with considerable interest Premier Chou En-Lai’s statement of May 10 in which he said that China must conduct nuclear tests to develop nuclear weapons, because, although China had proposed a non-first use agreement to the United States, we had rejected the proposal. Mr. Ambassador, does this statement indicate that your government would consider an agreement to ban nuclear tests if it were linked to a non-first use agreement? This is an important point and I would like to ask you to seek clarification from your government. Perhaps you could let me know about this matter at your earliest convenience. While we believe that any disarmament agreement must be a rounded one which covers all types of forces and weapons, we are interested in any serious proposal that would contribute to disarmament. We are willing to explore disarmament issues with your government either here at Warsaw or elsewhere. In this connection, I would like to comment on Premier Chou En-Lai’s statements about the World Disarmament Conference in his April 10 interview with a Pakistani reporter for Dawn. He said that “a world disarmament conference in the present circumstances will yield no useful, practical results and will only provide U.S. imperialism with a smoke-screen of peace under which it will freely expand its war of aggression against Vietnam.” You may recall my earlier comments about the proposed World Disarmament Conference. Last December I told you that we had our doubts about the effectiveness of a World Disarmament Conference because we believe it to be an unwieldy body that could make little positive contribution to disarmament. Nevertheless, I indicated to you that we were prepared to discuss the prospects for such a conference with you in a small exploratory group. We hope that Premier Chou’s statement does not imply that your government believes that such an exploratory group for a World Disarmament Congress would not be able to make progress towards meaningful disarmament.

17. FYI. Request you send following letter to Ambassador Wang after 130th meeting:

“The Government of the United States has expressed its willingness to participate in an exploratory group to prepare a possible World Disarmament Conference. We note that your government has also called for a meeting of all heads of state to discuss disarmament. The Government of the United States would like to learn the views of the Government of the People’s Republic of China with regard to its possible participation in an exploratory group to examine questions relating to convening a World Disarmament Conference or disarmament talks on some other basis.” Ambassador Gronouski will sign letter. End FYI.

18. Mr. Ambassador, I have been requested by some of the families of the American prisoners in China to raise their cases with you once more. At our last meeting you informed me that it was your country’s practice to grant time off for good behavior. I hope this regulation can be applied to our prisoners and I would appreciate any information you can give me concerning their cases.

19. Lately I have been receiving an increasing number of letters addressed to me from serious-minded Americans who have a great interest in establishing communication with individuals or organizations in China. They do not know the appropriate addresses or what ministry or organization they should write. Would it be possible for me to send these letters to you for the requested information?

20. It is our turn to propose date of next meeting. Suggest August 17.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Dean; cleared by Jacobson, George B. Roberts, Jr., of FE/VN, Barber of Defense, Jacob D. Beam of ACDA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs George H. Aldrich, Sisco, Bundy, and Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, and Saigon.
2. The May 10 Foreign Broadcast Information Service report included the text of a May 9 New China News Agency release quoting Chou’s four-point statement, which he had reportedly made to a Pakistani correspondent on April 10. McNaughton sent a copy to McNamara with a May 19 memorandum calling it to his attention. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 092 China Reds) The full text of Chou’s four-point statement is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 666.
3. See Document 69.
4. See Document 114.