Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, May 25, 1966, 1955Z.

2066. Gronouski-Wang talks.²

1. Wang opened 130th meeting with prepared statement containing no surprises. He started with claim that May 12 plane shoot down over Yunnan was deliberate, systematic act of war provocation and repeated ChiCom Defense spokesman statement of May 12. Wang then handed over photographs of US fuel tanks and rocket parts and claimed these were iron-clad evidence of incident. Wang said incident definitely not accidental. He then read list of other “war provocations” against China including serious warning 399 through 402, the April 12 A3B intrusion, April 7 air attack on Chinese fishing boats. Wang claimed facts show US war provocations have been growing in frequency and intensity. He said he was authorized to lodge serious warning and protest most strongly to USG. Wang added, “You should think over carefully what grave consequences you will have to face if you go on like this.”

2. Wang then commented on US China policy. Said top US officials recently have said US has changed its posture towards China from containment plus isolation to containment without isolation. He said these statements by bigwigs of USG indicate worn-out policy of containment plus isolation has gone bankrupt. Also said policy of containment without isolation is out and out fraud. “How can you succeed in containing China? China can never be isolated. USG says it wants to enlarge unofficial contacts with China and discuss questions of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with Peking and does not intend to attack China . . . US tries to cover its aggressive designs with flimsy veil, but it can never succeed.”

3. Wang said US has occupied China’s territory of Taiwan by force, built strings of military bases around China, incessantly sent warships and military aircraft to intrude in China’s territorial air and sea space in its “unbridled military provocations.” He also claimed US opposes restoration to China of its legimate seat in UN; “US has imposed trade embargo on China; openly declared China its principal enemy; shifted its global strategy to Asia; and is feverishly planning carry its war of aggression from Viet-Nam to China.”

4. Wang read complete text Chou En-Lai four points (China will take no initiative to provoke war with US, they mean what they say, China is prepared, if war breaks out it will have no boundaries, see FBIS 90, May 10). He said whatever policies of hostility US may adopt, China will never make slightest change in its solemn position.

5. Wang switched to Viet-Nam, claimed US had further intensified its war of aggression, increased troops, stepped up air raids, used B–52s against North Viet-Nam, used poison gas, US bent on extending flames of war of aggression to whole of Indo-China, US instigating attacks by its Thai and SVN puppets on Cambodia and Laos, US planes bombed Chinese economic cultural mission in Khang on March 24. Wang claimed Mansfield’s call for peace talks was swindle. Claimed defeat of US in Viet-Nam a foregone conclusion, said US had already changed 13 horses in SVN and having difficulty finding 14th horse. “Like ants in frying pan, US in very difficult position in Viet-Nam.” Wang said only way out was for US to accept DRV’s four points and Front’s five points, withdraw all troops and recognize Front as sole representative of SVN prople.

6. Using Department’s instructions I responded by telling Wang that American pilots have explicit instructions avoid flying into ChiCom airspace. I said that if evidence concerning May 12 plane incident available to US should have been in error, we would of course have regretted incident. Said I was deeply disturbed by incidents on both sides because misinterpretation of motives by either side could lead to further increase in tensions. I repeated President’s statement that we seek end of no regime. Followed up with Department’s guidance on Viet-Nam, US relations with Communist China, American prisoners, and disarmament. I added that by not taking up our proposals for exchange newsmen, doctors, educators, his side was making it difficult to prevent its own isolation. I defined our concept of containment—defense of non-Communist countries who are threatened by outside-directed force of subversion, and told Wang that as long as Peking seeks spread its views through force and revolution we will continue defend ourselves and allies. I said our objective was to live in peace with his and all other countries, and that I hoped in time his government will adopt same objective. Said we hopefully looking forward to day when on cultural, philosophical and other grounds there could be maximum of intercourse between all nations. I denied use of poison gas in Viet-Nam.

7. Wang, his advisor, and interpreter took special note of my question whether Chou En-Lai’s May 10 statement linked banning of nuclear testing to a non-first use agreement. They consulted amongst themselves for several minutes. Later Wang made no mention of this statement nor did he refer again to subject of disarmament. This is unusual since Wang almost always responds to each subject I bring up.

8. Wang responded to my statement with long commentary on US policy of containment. Said US only purpose was to carry out policy of hostility to China. “US says one thing and does another.” He said, “If US does not change and completely abandon old policy of aggression against China, and refuses to withdraw all forces from Taiwan Straits and Taiwan, then China cannot believe so-called sincere desire of US to improve relations.”

9. Wang denied China aggressive. Said China would strive shoulder to shoulder and hand in hand with all oppressed people for liberation, but that China has not committed aggression against any country nor engaged in terrorist action or subversion against any foreign country.

10. Wang returned to subject of Viet-Nam but offered nothing new. Wang also referred again to May 12 incident and said US explanation completely untrue. “Since US calls itself strong power why shouldn’t you have courage to admit this crime?” Referred again to US air attack on Chinese Consulate at Phong Saly.

11. Wang said he had already made clear his answer concerning Captain Smith. Smith is criminal who intruded into Chinese airspace and will be dealt with according to Chinese law. As regards Walsh, he was spy and must be dealt with in accordance with Chinese law. Wang said he had nothing further to say on this matter.

12. I replied with rebuttal touching on May 12 plane incident, fishing boats, and Viet-Nam. I repeated that if we in error concerning May 12 plane shoot-down and incident occurred over Chinese territory, I would extend sincere regrets for this accidental encounter. Also said I was concerned about his claim US planes attacked Chinese fishing boats and would like to investigate them further to make sure that if incidents did take place, they do not reoccur. Told Wang I disappointed by his earlier rejection my suggestion we jointly investigate these incidents. I also told Wang again that US not hostile to his government or people. Said US forces are in Asia in direct response to situations not of our own making. His leaders preach war and revolution and should not be surprised if other countries, particularly those in Far East, are fearful of this threat to their own peace and security. Consequently, many have asked for our assistance. I said Wang’s side ought to test our willingness to negotiate to prove if we have sincere desire reach peaceful solution.

13. Wang’s reply contained nothing new. I suggested next meeting convene on August 17. Wang replied he busy in August. He suggested September 7 for next meeting. Meeting lasted two hours fifty minutes.

14. At conclusion meeting I asked Wang and his staff to farewell drink for Dean on May 26. Wang regretted and said he would not have time.

15. Atmosphere of meeting was relatively mild. The Chinese did not make an emotional issue of the May 12 plane incident, attacks on fishermen, or other US “war provocations.” When Wang read from his instructions his voice was low and deliberate. In some of his rebuttals, particularly when discussing US hostility to China, he abandoned his papers, raised his voice and became more excited, gesturing and sometimes groping for words. He played same line over and over, particularly on containment. He made no new points or new commitments. His statement on Viet-Nam was routine as was his statement on US relations with China. He rejected all prospect of relaxing tensions through increased contacts.

16. Department may wish to inform Captain Smith’s wife and brother about Wang’s comments concerning Smith since both are aware we intended raise subject this meeting.

17. Suggest delay in briefing GRC in Washington and Taipei until we submit more detailed telegram for GRC briefing. Delay could be explained by referring to fact previous briefings based only on partial, incomplete reports.

18. Dean and Harding will deliver letter on World Disarmament Conference (para 17 reftel) at 10:30 am May 26.³

Gronouski

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, and USUN. Passed to the White House and USIA.
2. Gronouski sent a detailed record of the meeting in airgram A–877, May 30. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 2071 from Warsaw, May 26, reported that they had delivered the letter (see Document 153) that day, and that the Chinese had asked about the meaning of Gronouski’s query about Chou’s May 10 statement on nuclear testing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)