Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, August 31, 1966, 5:23 p.m.

38572. Gronouski-Wang talks: Guidance for 131st meeting, September 7, 1966.

1. We are scheduled to start this session. Suggest you open along following lines:

2. Mr. Ambassador, in three meetings in this series in which I have personally participated, I have endeavored to communicate desire of my Government to see improvement in relations between our two countries. I have reiterated that we have no hostile intent toward your country or your people. I have conveyed wish of my Government to enlarge areas of contact and communication between our two peoples so that through increased knowledge may come greater understanding and possibility of gradual reduction in tensions and conflicts that presently exist between us. I have expressed my Government’s interest in discussing problems of disarmament and in pursuing specific views of your side on this subject. We are under no illusion that this process would be easy or rapid one. We are all too aware of great ideological and political differences between our two countries. I deeply regret our inability in these meetings, in part because of these differences, to pursue to a fruitful conclusion any of these potential areas of agreement.

3. But we are deeply convinced that violence and war are not adequate or acceptable means for settling differences between states today. President Johnson stated in speech July 12 that “reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies” was one of essentials for peace in Asia. He emphasized that any “isolation” of your country in world comes not from actions by US or other countries, but by your own choice. FYI: Peking has not so far commented on the President’s speech. End FYI. It is not US which blocks path toward peaceful cooperation and exchange between scientists, scholars, doctors, artists, and athletes of our two countries. We know there is active correspondence on professional matters between many of your scientists and those of US. We know of large purchases of American books and other publications made by your Government in US. You are obviously interested in exchange of knowledge and we understand this, because so are we. What we do not understand is why you are afraid of permitting such exchanges by direct, face-to-face contact? Why not openly acknowledge that such direct exchanges would be of mutual benefit. Mr. Chou En-Lai was reported by New China News Agency on July 31 to have told gathering of scientists in Peking that: “We are willing to learn modestly strong points and experiences of people of other countries.” This is point of view we share and is reason we have indicated our willingness to see such exchanges of knowledge between citizens of our two countries. FYI: If ChiComs reject or do not reply to invitation to attend High Energy Physics Conference in Palo Alto, you should regret such action. End FYI.

4. Even though your Government has so far not agreed to such exchanges as we have proposed, Mr. Ambassador, I would like at this point to note potential mutual benefit which would be derived from exchange of plant and horticultural samples between interested institutions of our two countries. As you may know, exchanges of plant samples provide opportunities for cross-breeding and strengthening of plant strains and thereby provide basis for improving and increasing agricultural production.

5. Mr. Ambassador, we have noted with dismay view expressed in People’s Daily of July 24 that “the Chinese people have always held that a conference table can never bring the oppressed nations a new world of independence and freedom, nor can an international agreement guarantee the oppressed nations a life of liberation and happiness.” Overwhelming evidence of world history in last 20 years repudiates view that peaceful negotiations offers no prospect for social and political change. This position is false reflection on people and governments of dozens of countries in Africa and Asia: Burma, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya, and I could go on and name many more. It is only when your Government realizes impossibility of imposing its will and its ideology upon others through force and is prepared to discuss and negotiate differences at conference table that progress can be made toward goal of peace that is, I am convinced, desire of Chinese people along with those of rest of world. We do not consider valid political and economic premises of your Government in ruling your people. But we have no intention of interfering with your internal affairs. It is not for you or for us to lay down rules and principles by which other governments and peoples should govern themselves.

6. Mr. Ambassador, we have repeatedly stressed that people of South Vietnam should be able to decide their own future and choose their own form of political, economic, and social organization, free from all outside interference. Our entire position in Vietnam can be summed up as an effort to assist the people of South Vietnam to achieve this goal. We do not want to maintain bases in Southeast Asia and we have repeatedly pledged to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam when its security and freedom of choice are assured. We do not oppose the reunification of Vietnam. We support the right of self-determination through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the US does not oppose the neutrality or non-alignment of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire. It is in its opposition to any resolution in Vietnam which is not achieved by violence and war that your Government has found itself isolated from overwhelming majority of people and governments in world. I am sure you are aware, Mr. Ambassador, from your own reading as well as from what I and my predecessor have said in these meetings, that US is absolutely resolved to continue its support of the Government of SVN in resisting communist aggression from north with its goal of imposing by force the political system of North Vietnam on people of South Vietnam. I urge you not to doubt this and not to encourage others to doubt our determination. Military success by communist side in Vietnam is impossible. But we are prepared to seek honorable peace, one with honor for all sides. I have indicated before to you my Government’s willingness to discuss means of achieving such an honorable peace with representatives of your or any other government directly involved. I reiterate that offer to you now. At our last meeting I suggested that one means by which movement toward an end to conflict could be found was through mutual dampening down of hostilities. My Government would be interested in any constructive proposals your side might wish to put forward. We are willing to consider all propositions but we will not accept ultimata. We do not attempt to intimidate others and we cannot ourselves be intimidated. I assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that you have only to test our sincerity by accepting our offer to discuss peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Our willingness to halt destruction and slaughter of war is clear and unequivocal.

7. Your Government, Mr. Ambassador, appears to consider that Geneva Agreements no longer exist. People’s Daily commentary I quoted earlier alleges that Geneva Agreements have been “reduced to ashes”. It scoffs at willingness of US to work toward settling conflict in Vietnam on basis of Geneva Agreements and at efforts of numerous distinguished and sincere international figures to achieve this end, one which authorities in Hanoi claim they also seek. Mr. T’Ao Chu in a speech on July 22 said that “whoever still attempts to use the Geneva Agreements to tie the hands of the Vietnamese people, the Chinese people, and the revolutionary people of the world will never succeed . . . . The Geneva Agreements are already non-existent”. This is position which authorities in North Vietnam have not advanced.

8. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to note that apparent position of your Government on peaceful resolution of disputes (including your rejection, as stated in the People’s Daily of June 20, 1966 of any disarmament negotiations at the present time) and statements by your Government’s officials setting forth extraordinary “conditions” under which your Government would even consider joining UN raise strong doubt that your Government has any interest whatsoever in participating in peaceful international organizations. The very foundation of UN is conviction that resolution of disputes and conflicts by peaceful means is not only possible but necessary. On this issue every member of UN is in agreement.

9. Mr. Ambassador, I regret to call your attention to unprovoked firing by vessel Nan Hai 155 belonging to your country on US military aircraft on July 30 at 20 degrees 37’ N, 107 degrees 32’ E. A second US military aircraft was fired upon by armed vessels of your country’s flag on August 2 at 34 degrees 35’ N, 123 degrees 05’ E. Both incidents took place on open seas and in clearly international waters. US aircraft on neither occasion returned fire directed at them but only this restraint and forebearance in face of blatant provocation averted what could have been grave incident. I strongly urge that you request your Government to take appropriate measures to avoid recurrence of such incidents which could lead to consequences I believe neither of us would wish.

10. Mr. Ambassador, at our 118th meeting on November 13, 1963 and again at 127th meeting on September 20, 1965 we requested that your side provide us with names on American dogtags (identification tags) reportedly on exhibit in War Museum in Peking. I am sure you will understand strong desire on part of parents of American soldiers missing-in-action in Korea for any information that might pertain to their sons. I hope that on humanitarian grounds you will find it possible to meet this request.

11. We anticipate that in his presentation Wang may protest press leak of last meeting. We would not plan to respond other than to reiterate regret already conveyed. (Deptel 1837)² Wang will probably respond to our query on non-first use agreement and WDC Preparatory Meeting along lines of People’s Daily Commentary June 20 (FBIS June 20). Commentary rejects any connection between test ban and “non-first use.” It implicitly replies to letter handed Wang at last meeting on WDC with flat rejection of ChiCom participation in WDC in any disarmament negotiations. Wang may also raise question of alleged US attack on ChiCom fishing boats in Tonkin Gulf May 28 and SEATO naval exercise Sea Imp and may revert to shoot-down of ChiCom plane May 12 which was discussed last meeting. He may also protest Syrian defector case or Dutch case involving attempted ChiCom defection. Kreisberg will provide you with detailed rebuttals on these and other points Wang may raise.

12. It is Wang’s turn to suggest timing of next meeting. You may agree to any date within next three months—we prefer November 30 or December 7.

13. FYI: In general, we anticipate that tension on mainland and indications of continuing international CCP dispute will result in Wang’s taking particularly hard line in this meeting and we do not exclude possibility of last minute postponement at their initiative. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on August 19; cleared in draft by Vietnam Working Group Director Robert H. Miller, Aldrich, UNP Deputy Director William Gleysteen, and J. Stapleton Roy of SOV, and by SCA Deputy Administrator Barbara M. Watson, Dr. Creech of USDA, Anderson of DOD/ISA, Bundy, Harriman, and William Jorden; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
2. Telegram 1837 to Warsaw, June 3, transmitted the text of a brief letter of apology for the leak of the talks reflected in a New York Times article of June 3; telegram 1853, June 4, authorized delivery of the letter. (Ibid.) The article stated that the United States had raised the possibility of making an agreement with China that neither would be the first to use nuclear weapons if the Chinese would agree to stop nuclear testing. Information about the leak was sent to Rusk in Tosec 38 to Oslo, June 3. (Ibid.)