179. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- ChiRep Item at Secretary’s Meeting on UN Problems
Background
1. Prior to Red Guard excesses and Lin Piao’s redeclaration of global “People’s War,” majority U.S. opinion—public, academic, congressional and bureaucratic—seemed to hold that effort should be made to bring Communist China into the world community. The clear trend in international opinion was similar.
2. The effects of recent Peking extravagances on sentiment for a UN invitation is not yet known, and could go either way. (My Chirep memo of Aug. 31, para 6.)2
3. Our ability to defeat an Albanian-type resolution (ejecting the GRC and seating the PRC) is at present questionable. A recent field round-up of voting predictions produced too many “uncertains” to be very meaningful, and did not take account of (a) most recent Peking belligerence, or perhaps more importantly, (b) the following lament in U Thant’s resignation statement:
“I must confess to a sense of dissatisfaction with the fact that the organization has not yet achieved universality of membership.”
Alternatives
4. Of a whole spectrum of possible approaches to the problem, the following two appear to be the only ones which at this late date warrant U.S. consideration:
- a.
- Attempt to have a friendly member introduce a resolution along the lines of the draft at Tab A,3 which reaffirms GRC status and also invites the PRC to occupy seats in the General Assembly.
- b.
- Attempt to defeat the Albanian-type resolution, without having any other one introduced.
The two alternative drafts at Tab B4 may be discussed at the meeting, but have not elicited much interest so far. Either of them would probably be widely viewed as a too-patent gimmick, or overly moralistic.
Considerations
5. Alternative a) would be responsive to the President’s desire that we get off the defensive.
It would surely keep the PRC out of the UN, for it would be interpreted by the Chicoms as an insult. It would provoke a blast and an indignant rejection from Peking.
It would nevertheless be interpreted by many who have considered our policies as too rigid, as welcome evidence of movement in those policies.
6. However, evidence is we would have difficulty in finding a suitable sponsor, partly because of the lateness of the shift in our tactics, and partly because many on both sides of the China issue could not support this resolution. Even we presumably would have to abstain on the second part of this two-part resolution, and hence on the later vote on the resolution as a whole—if only because the prerequisite and exceedingly difficult ground work with the GRC has not been laid (Secretary’s visit to Taipei).
Furthermore, a number of our friends who have been uneasy with the “puppet” tag from their support of us in the past, have asked that we give them fair warning if we ever depart from our position, so that they may at least precede us in that shift. It is very late to give such warning now.
7. With alternative b), we would remain on the defensive, with a policy the effectiveness of which is of doubtful longevity. Although there is some indication that the voting could even be slightly more favorable than last year, the crucial uncertain vote (especially African) is more unpredictable than ever, and we could end up with the PRC in and the GRC completely out of the UN.
8. There are many other considerations, but these are the more salient. There is no course which is attractive and safe.
[Page 382]Recommendation
9. All things considered, I recommend that you take the following position:
Since requisite groundwork for a clear change in policy or tactics has not been laid, we should
- a.
- State more unequivocally than in our last message to the field our continued opposition to an Albanian-type resolution and our expectation as of now that this is the only resolution which will be presented.
- b.
- Keep constant tabs on likely voting on such a resolution. If the chance of losing becomes too great, consult immediately for sponsorship and support of a para 4, a) type resolution. (A last minute shift in extremis would be more acceptable to our friends—including the GRC—than a planned shift before that, at this late date.)
- c.
- If that alternative, too, should go awry (e.g. no appropriate sponsor, too much friendly opposition, or amendment putting PRC in Security Council) attempt to shift immediately to a resolution establishing a study group to consider this complex question, and report back to the Assembly. This alternative is a poor third, since we could not predict or perhaps greatly influence the outcome. It is a stop-gap if something deemed worse should loom. Timing and mechanics are complex, but we could probably gain support for the desired priority sequence in voting, where more than one resolution is tabled.
10. Finally, we should bear in mind that the mood on the mainland is ugly, not yet fully understood, and probably not yet settled into a definitive course. U Thant was not far wrong when he said China was having a nervous breakdown—a malady requiring on the part of others patience and firmness, understanding and wariness, flexibility, and at times forceful opposition. We cannot yet predict the dominant conclusions which the UN membership will draw from China’s present madness. We should therefore keep an open mind concerning resolutions which may be introduced by others than the Albanian group. Especially if we are otherwise in trouble, it is possible that such initiative might bring some of the advantages sought in a “non-defensive” approach, without the costs which would be associated with our having initiated it.
Meanwhile, as the situation permits, we can continue our quiet, carefully measured program of attempted reconciliation. It will not be reciprocated, but as a minimum it helps throw Mao and company off balance, and hopefully builds for the non-Mao future.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a September 6 memorandum from Harold K. Saunders of the NSC staff to Rostow, which transmitted NSC staff views on the main issues to be discussed at Rusk’s UNGA strategy meeting. Concerning the Jenkins memorandum, Saunders commented, “I have deliberately stayed an outsider on this one, but I am wondering whether we shouldn’t soon give the President a rundown on where we stand. Time is getting very short. The ticklish aspect of this problem is that the Secretary is somewhat alone in resisting change.”↩
- The memorandum reported the status of the issue. (Ibid., Name File, Jenkins Memos)↩
- The tabs are attached but not printed.↩
- Both affirmed that the Republic of China was a founding and continuing UN member. The first requested the President of the General Assembly to inquire of the PRC whether it was prepared to accept the obligations of the UN Charter; the second expressed willingness to consider General Assembly membership for the PRC on being informed that it had accepted the Charter and its obligations.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩