Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, May 13, 1966.

SUBJECT

• ChiCom-U.S. Foreign Minister’s Meeting

I attach a suggested draft letter to the Chinese Communists (Tab A) proposing a Foreign Minister’s meeting to discuss means of lessening tensions in the Far East. We recommend that the letter be signed by the President. A Presidential letter will both give the proposal greater authority and prestige and, in the future, provide proof that the highest authority took positive measures to reduce the risks of a wider war in the Far East.

The letter could be delivered in Warsaw at the time of the next scheduled talks on May 25. Ambassador Gronouski might hand it to Wang without discussing its contents to avoid eavesdropping by the Polish and others. Alternatively, the letter could be delivered by Ambassador Gronouski’s advisor (Dean) before or following the next meeting when he goes to the Chinese Communist Embassy to exchange texts of the opening statements. Or, thirdly, Embassy Warsaw could deliver the letter to the Chinese Communist Embassy prior to the May 25 talks.

While we are inclined to believe that the Chinese will reject the proposal, it is possible that they may believe a refusal would be interpreted by others as a further sign of Peking’s intransigence. In the event they did accept and specified Warsaw as the meeting place we would hope the meeting or meetings would be held in a place (the U.S. and Chicom Embassies, perhaps) safe from eavesdropping.

We believe that the GRC should be informed beforehand that we are proposing a Foreign Minister’s meeting in an effort to prevent Chicom miscalculations of our intentions. We must also tell the GRC, that, while we believe the prospects for a Chicom acceptance are remote, we believe it is essential to take all possible measures to avoid a wider war growing out of tensions or miscalculations in the Far East.

We believe that, after transmitting the letter, we should also inform the British, Australians, and South Koreans, at the highest levels only, that we have taken this step.

We would recommend that this initiative be handled with great care. In the event Peking declines the President’s offer we should avoid the temptation to make public the proposal and their refusal (unless the Chinese themselves publicize the exchange). If it is necessary, at some future time, to make known the offer the fact that we did not use it for propaganda purposes at the time will lend added weight and meaning to our move.

Tab A

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In the light of mounting tensions in the Far East I have considered for some time whether it would be wise to have meeting of our respective Foreign Ministers to discuss the grave issues of peace and war and to seek some means of lessening tensions in Asia.

You may recall that your representative at the Ambassadorial talks in Geneva originally raised the question of a foreign minister’s meeting. Now I should like to propose such a meeting. My Secretary of State would be willing to meet with your Foreign Minister either at the next session of the Warsaw talks or at some other time or place convenient to your Foreign Minister. I would propose an open agenda. Our objective would be to provide each side an opportunity to discuss at a higher level some of the questions we have dealt with in Warsaw, to consider frankly and authoritatively our respective policies and intentions, to correct misconceptions about our respective views, and to seek means to dampen down the risks of a wider war in Asia.

In the interests of working towards peace and a better understanding between the American and Chinese people I hope your Foreign Minister will be able to meet with my Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dean on May 13. Bundy did not initial the memorandum, but it bears notations indicating that it was received in the Executive Secretariat, and Document 152 indicates that it was discussed with Rusk. The date is handwritten on the source text.