Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

152. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, May 20, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Draft Warsaw Instructions

1. The instructions for the next meeting between Amb Gronouski and the Chicoms on May 25 present many issues. The President has expressed his personal interest and desire to clear the instructions himself.

2. The attached draft (Tab A)² has been cleared in Defense and throughout the Department, except for the ACDA reservation noted in sub-paragraph e below. The following are the key points:

a. The discussion in paragraph 5 of the May 12 incident, particularly the last sentence.

b. The general language of assurance in paragraph 8. This substantially repeats prior language, but obviously takes on special importance at the present time.

c. The discussion of South Vietnam in paragraph 9. This too repeats themes previously used, but emphasizes them specifically in order to cover in detail two points raised by the President with Ambassador Gronouski: that we would cease bombing in Vietnam if there were an appropriate response, and the underscoring that our objective in Vietnam is a peaceful settlement.

d. The discussion in paragraphs 11–14 of our peaceful intentions toward Communist China. This too repeats earlier themes, but the tone is important.

e. The discussion in paragraph 16 of the Chicom proposal concerning non-first use. In this paragraph, ACDA has a reservation concerning the first three full sentences at the top of page 7 (“Mr. Ambassador . . . convenience.”) These sentences have been cleared with Defense, but ACDA points out that they imply our willingness to accept a non-first use agreement, which as you know we have consistently rejected in Europe and which, in Asian terms, would be inconsistent with our actual military plans for the defense of Korea and Taiwan. The question is whether we wish to be this responsive when we know that in fact we could not accept a non-first use agreement which did not cover other types of forces and weapons. Defense reports that Secretary McNamara believes that this degree of forthcoming response is warranted, without significant risk. Ambassador Gronouski strongly favors it. Our own inclination is that this would not be a serious risk, but we must weigh the possibility of leak and serious concern in Seoul and Taipei.

f. The extensive discussion in paragraph 16 of our willingness to engage in disarmament discussions, and the specific communication stated in paragraph 17. The President has told Ambassador Gronouski that he wishes the message to emphasize our interest in disarmament and our wish for serious discussions. Mr. Sisco has prepared the message in paragraph 17 specifically in order to smoke out the Chicoms on the WDC exploratory group. There is general agreement that these elements of the instructions are wise, but I flag them for your attention.

3. In preparing these instructions, we have re-evaluated the proposal discussed with you last week that we give the Chicoms a message suggesting a meeting at Foreign Minister level. Such a message might be furnished in writing, and could be done at any time without regard to the specific date of the talks. In the last two days, Messrs. Ball, Johnson, and Thompson have concurred in the judgment that in the existing political circumstances in South Vietnam such a message at the present time would only be construed as a sign of weakness by Peiping, and would not have the positive effect we had envisaged a week ago. Thus, it would be our recommendation that we put this on ice for the present, while arming Ambassador Gronouski with a draft message which could be readily reviewed and authorized if the circumstances changed at any time. Ambassador Goldberg’s views are discussed in the note from Joe Sisco attached at Tab B.³

4. In view of the President’s desire to review this finally, and Ambassador Gronouski’s departure Sunday, there would be advantage if you could complete your review not later than Saturday.⁴ For this purpose I am asking S/S to make a simultaneous immediate distribution of this memorandum, with the draft instructions, to Mr. Ball, Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Sisco. Ambassador Gronouski has already seen it and concurs.

5. If you approve these instructions, subject to any amendments you may make, I will prepare a Read-Rostow memorandum for submission to the President. You might wish to indicate by checks (in the margin of paragraph 2, above) which points in this memorandum you would specifically wish me to include in the memo to Rostow.

Recommendations:⁵

A. With regard to instructions at Tab A:

B. With regard to Presidential clearance:

1 Approve preparation of Read-Rostow memorandum incorporating points indicated in Paragraph 2 above.

2 No need for memo to Rostow

3 Prefer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Exdis.
2. Not attached to the source text, but see Document 153.
3. The attached memorandum from Sisco to Rusk, May 20, stated that he had had a further talk with Goldberg “with a view to getting him to go along with” the draft message to Gronouski without the proposal for a meeting at the Foreign Minister level and that Goldberg was “now agreeable” to this provided that Gronouski was given a draft message with the proposal which could be reviewed and authorized “as soon as circumstances changed.”
4. May 21.
5. Rusk initialed his approval of recommendation A. Next to the line “With regard to Presidential clearance,” the following notation appears in his handwriting: “Show him full text. DR.”