147. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
1258. 1. Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) called me in today to request reconsideration decision to withdraw F–104As and Bs.
2. He made it clear he was not questioning right of USG to withdraw 104s but he was questioning manner in which USG had handled this matter and wished to point out some of the problems caused to GRC.
3. He said 18 aircraft could not be crucial element in USG deployments and likewise they were not crucial to defense of Taiwan. He did not wish to make an appeal on military grounds but was more concerned about other aspects.
4. He said after 18 March notification that 104s would be temporarily retained President Chiang had approved organizational structure, selection of pilots for training, and other activities directed toward utilization these aircraft. If they now to be withdrawn “it would be very difficult to explain to President Chiang” (he said exactly this to Adm Sharp yesterday). Also would inevitably cause morale problems in CAF as well as adding to widespread uncertainty in Taiwan about future course of US policy. Some Legislative Yuan members, for instance, have apparently [Page 298] given credence to rumors that 7th Fleet mission in Taiwan Straits is to be curtailed or eliminated. CCK of course understood that such rumors have no basis but abrupt and untidy withdrawal of 104s will likely be misinterpreted along similar lines.
5. CCK asked me to convey urgently to Washington his request that decision be reviewed and reversed.
6. I said I understood his concern over way in which this had been handled and that in spite of best of intentions it would with hindsight have been much better if USG had never authorized temporary retention. None of us had any idea that “temporary” would mean only a few weeks with consequent inconvenience to GRC and possibilities for misunderstanding.
7. I suggested that imminent temporary deployment of one USAF F–100 squadron to Tainan during May and June would help relieve some local apprehensions, to which CCK agreed, saying he intended to visit the squadron as soon as it arrived, presumably in order to generate local publicity.
8. I said I knew enough from Washington communications to be sure there was virtually no chance of reversal of decision now. However I would report fully to Washington and see what could be done.
9. Comment: Admiral Ni made similar comments to me last night, and Adm Sharp and Adm Gentner have had separate requests from CCK. It is obvious there is genuine GRC concern, coupled with justifiable irritation over US handling of this matter. However believe deployment USAF F–100s is the best answer to GRC concern and that Department should authorize me to reply in a day or two regretting that decision on 104s cannot be changed.2
10. Adm Sharp has spoken to CCK of additional possibility temporary deployment USMC F–4 squadron. He has seen this message and is reporting separately today on his conversations.