149. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Need for New Tactics on Chinese Representation
Recommendation
As you requested, Ambassador Goldberg and I have reviewed the problems of Chinese Representation at the next United Nations General Assembly to see whether the onus can be shifted more clearly to the Chinese Communists for their exclusion.
There appears to be little prospect that our traditional position will be sustained by the forthcoming General Assembly. In the last Assembly there was a tie vote, and the question whether a two-thirds majority is required was sustained by a very small margin. The two principal alternatives which have been discussed in the General Assembly, as an alternative to our traditional position, have been (a) a resolution expelling Taipei and seating Peking and (b) a resolution inviting Peking to take a seat while retaining Taipei as a member. The second alternative would almost certainly not be accepted by Peking and would be far preferable from the point of view of the United States.
We recommend that you authorize us to discuss these tactical problems with the Republic of China in Taipei in an attempt to get them to stand steady, rather than withdraw from the UN, if parties other than the United States develop a “two Chinas” tactic at the 21st General Assembly along the lines indicated in the discussion below.
Similarly, we should discuss the tactics with certain other countries, in the first instance with Canada and Japan.2
Discussion
Both Ambassador Goldberg and I conclude that relying on our previous tactics on Chinese Representation involves an unacceptable risk of defeat and expenditure of U.S. influence. As you know, in the past our approach has consisted of obtaining Assembly agreement that any change in Chinese Representation requires a two-thirds majority and defeating resolutions calling for the replacement of Chinese Nationalists [Page 302] by the Chinese Communists. A number of our friends such as the Canadians, are no longer prepared to go along with this approach. If we do not now devise new tactics, we might see the next Assembly evict the GRC and invite the Chinese Communists to occupy the Chinese seat in all UN organs. The international and domestic repercussions of such a development would be strongly adverse to us.
In canvassing the alternatives, we concluded that one course with the fewest risks involves a “two-Chinas” approach, and that we should not oppose such a course if others raise it. The objective would be to reaffirm that the GRC has a right to representation in the UN, while opening the possibility for the Chinese Communists likewise to be seated. We would seek to confine this proposition in the first instance to the General Assembly, leaving the question of China’s Security Council seat in abeyance until Peking is actually in the Assembly.
If unexpectedly Peking were to make a complete reversal and decide to take a seat in the Assembly along with the Republic of China, the Chinese seat in the Security Council would be at once at issue. While there would be great difficulty in retaining Chinese Nationalist representation in the Security Council, it might be possible to avoid seating the Communists pending a study of the whole question of permanent membership in the Council.
Both Peking and the Republic of China will vigorously resist any two-Chinas solution. Our first problem, therefore, will be to convince the GRC that our shift in tactics is required to avoid total defeat and is designed to assure them continuing representation in the United Nations. We would add that if they accepted the two-Chinas outcome, there is every present prospect, although without complete certainty, that Peking would not take a seat in the Assembly.
Domestic opinion in this country would be more receptive today than formerly to such a shift in our policy. A Gallup Poll taken last month indicates that 56% of those questioned would favor Red China’s admission to the UN if this would improve relations between us. The recent Congressional debate also indicates a moderation of sentiment on this subject, as does the general reaction to the steps we have taken offering the opportunity for increased contacts if the Chinese Communists desire them.
Our plan would be to have Ambassador McConaughy, shortly after he arrives, take up the question with the Chinese, inform them of our decision to shift our policy as the best way to protect the position of the Republic of China in the Assembly, and explain to the Chinese that the best way to continue to exclude Red China would be for the Republic of China to hold on to its seat in the Assembly. In addition, we would ask Governor Harriman some time in June to make a supplementary [Page 303] approach along the same lines. I intend to be in Taipei in early July and I could do any follow-up work necessary to tie this down.
Ambassador Goldberg and Assistant Secretary Sisco will be in Ottawa on May 16 to have a full day’s discussion on UN matters. The Canadians are very anxious to be “unleashed” on this question, and the Pearson statement of the other day, for all practical purposes, puts the Canadians publicly in favor of a two-Chinas solution. Ambassador Goldberg and I are agreed that we should hold off the Canadians from launching a new tactic until we have had fuller discussions with the Chinese in Taipei. However, the indications are that the Canadian ideas are already reasonably well developed. Rather than run the risk of the Canadians developing a new tactic inconsistent with our objectives, Ambassador Goldberg and I are agreed that he should indicate great interest on our part to consult fully with the Canadians on the details of a new strategy on the understanding no new move will be launched by them pending our discussions in Taipei in June.
Congressional consultations would await further exploration with Taipei.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations. Top Secret. Filed as an attachment to a May 17 memorandum from Rostow to the President (Document 150).↩
- The source text bears no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval, but see Document 150.↩