Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

99. Telegram From the Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, Korea, and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Seoul, November 10, 1966, 0817Z.

KRA 1795. [5 paragraphs (35 lines of source text) not declassified]²

[3 lines of source text not declassified] NK side has shown no effort to cooperate, in fact has deliberately frustrated every constructive suggestion made to permit the Commission to do its intended job. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

His second comment, in regard to NK and Chinese illusions that US was hopelessly bogged down, was that the facts were that war in Vietnam was really being fought with only part of our power and without mobilization. We are fighting it without calling up a single reservist, let alone reserve units. US has available large number of reserve divisions, many of which have been brought to high readiness, backed up by tremendous pool of other trained reservists. US had not used the military power deployed to Vietnam as anyone could see by the restraint our air alone is exercising. He suggested [5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Before coming out here I discussed with you the strategic importance of Korea as a significant element in the overall deterrent against the ChiComs (and North Koreans) more overtly intervening in South East Asia. I suggested that, even though completely supporting the concentration of our resources to meet Vietnam requirements and the needs of the training base, we should be careful not to let the military power of our Korean element of our overall strategy vis-a-vis Communist China fall to the point where its credibility is affected.

Except in the area of army aviation, particularly helicopter pilots, where we are scheduled to fall severely below a safe minimum, and in ammunition war reserves, particularly illuminating rounds, I am not gravely concerned at our military capability here to fight a major conventional action not involving massive ChiCom reinforcements. You know status of possible US reinforcements better than I.

However, it is not what we can do but what the ChiComs and North Koreans think we can do that will affect their further actions regarding Vietnam. The North Koreans and to a degree the ChiComs, unlike the Soviets, do not have an intelligence and analysis capability enabling them to arrive at a sound evaluation of either our intentions or our real military capabilities if emergency powers were granted the President.

There follows an interesting tidbit for what it is worth. It was said by a reporter of the North Korean Central News Agency to our source during a conversation [3 lines of source text not declassified].

The reporter said: “We want to know if they (President Johnson and President Park) have discussed sending more troops to Vietnam. You see we are ready to send our troops at any time whenever Vietnam (North) wants our participation. Should a war break out in Korea the US won’t be able to send its troops to Korea since it’s so deeply involved in the Vietnam war.”

The incident involving US troops of the 2nd US infantry division was the most vicious and flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement and of ROK territory in many years.³ It may have been staged as a test. If we react to this flagrant violation only by the protest at Panmunjom and without any tangible indication of an increasing capability to improve our forward area security, we may reinforce the current North Korean and ChiCom misconceptions.

Our ability to effectively cope with the NK aggressive killer-patrol actions in or near the DMZ is not as good as I’d like it to be. There are three major reasons: (a) the NK flagrant violations of the DMZ while we abide by it and require the ROK’s to do likewise; (b) the basic military difficulty of reacting effectively against guerrilla hit and run tactics at NH’s initiative, usually at night, in a 150 mile band of generally rugged terrain covered now with fairly dense vegetation and natural cover and from which the DMZ offers an immediate sanctuary (this is what is very seriously intensifying ROK frustration, anger and desire to make retaliatory raids);⁴ and (c) inexperienced soldiers and junior leaders.

The above is for your background and information.

I have had two conferences on improving effectiveness of DMZ and adjacent operations with C/S, ROKA and CG’s I Corps and FROKA, one on 28 October and one a couple of days ago. I started staff working several weeks ago to get under way an integrated analysis of DMZ situation to consider together enemy tactics and, on our side, possible improvements in organization, materiel (including any new ideas from US R&D and CDC), tactics and techniques, training, lessons learned from Vietnam and here, and so on. This is now under way with a joint US and ROK analysis team. All commanders are also looking at more immediate steps feasible to take with resources here.

I have no particular thoughts as to what tangible evidence of our power potential which we can show NK’s except, as we are all trying to do, to clobber some of the NK patrols if incidents continue. We may use more night illumination ammo outside of DMZ. Perhaps the early provision and use south of DMZ of a few Hu-1D’s each with a battery of searchlights—such as we understand are being tested in Vietnam—might be a sort of little thing to show US is not stretched too thin. At least, the ROK’s would feel bolstered by some tangible evidence of US recognition of problem.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Sharp and Beach at CINCPAC and to General Johnson, Chief of Staff-Army, Washington; forwarded by the Defense Intelligence Agency to Helms at the Central Intelligence Agency, Rusk at the Department of State, and Rostow at the White House.
2. Richard G. Ciccolella was the Senior Member of the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission. The Embassy sent memoranda of his conversations [text not declassified] to the Department of State as enclosures to airgram A–199, November 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–14 KOR)
3. Reference is to the border incursions on November 2; see footnote 3, Document 96. Airgram A–201 from Seoul, November 17, contained a UNC report outlining casualty-causing incidents occurring along the DMZ and elsewhere in the ROK between 1961 and November 2, 1966. For the period 1961 to 1965 the number of casualties was listed by year, while the incidents in 1966 were briefly described and the number of casualties given. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–4 KOR/UN) Airgram A–203 from Seoul, November 18, contained a report prepared by the Korean Foreign Ministry describing the incidents and resulting casualties occurring along the DMZ during October 1966. (Ibid.) In telegram 2687 from Seoul, November 17, the Embassy also forwarded a summary of recent incidents along the DMZ, the Korean responses, the implications of the incidents, and the actions taken by the Embassy. (Ibid., POL 27–14 KOR)
4. In a telegram, KRA 1804, November 12, Bonesteel reported having received information [text not declassified]. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III) [text not declassified] (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–14 KOR/UN) The objective of U.S. policy was “to prevent further escalation of tension, to de-escalate if possible, and to ensure the ROK troops do not violate Armistice Agreement.” (Telegram 85861 to Seoul, November 16; ibid.)