Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

92. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Honolulu, October 10, 1966, 0115Z.

100115Z. Exclusive for General Wheeler info General Beach from Admiral Sharp. US–ROK Relations (U).

1. In view of Gen Beach’s recent Korean tour I feel that his message to me which follows re US–ROK relations is of particular significance.

“1. There have been a series of events within the past several weeks that cause me concern with respect to our relations with the Koreans. Because of my past and continuing interest in Korea, I wish to bring to your attention my views concerning the importance of ensuring that the relationships between our government and the Republic of Korea, particularly with respect to the armed forces of our two countries, are maintained as closely and as strongly as they have been in the past.

2. I am referring to a series of announcements, both official and unofficial, which may give the Koreans reason to believe that the US is losing interest in Korea. These events have added impact on the Koreans when taken in context with their desirable but tough decision to support, actively, US undertakings in SVN. Among the items which cause this concern are:

A. Senator Russell’s recent suggestion that a US division be withdrawn from Korea. While I recognize that Senator Russell’s statement does not represent national policy, it was taken very seriously by the ROK Govt, particularly in view of his important position in the Senate. When the ROK Govt resolved to provide combat troops in RVN, they had official assurance that the US would not change its force structure in Korea without prior consultation. In addition certain assurances were given to the Korean Govt with respect to improving the strength and equipment of the ROK army to accommodate their deployments to SVN without weakening their defensive posture in Korea.

B. Temporary personnel drawdowns levied on Eighth Army in order to support timely deployments to VN have been taken to mean a decreased interest in our contribution to the defense and strategic importance of Korea.

C. Our continued delay to provide the ROK Govt with a formal document agreeing to an upward adjustment and approved force levels, or some other agreement to compensate for those ROK forces deployed to SVN, is undoubtedly being taken by the ROK as a sign that we may renege on our agreements.

D. While not a direct US responsibility, the recent Govt of Turkey (GOT) decision to reduce their UN contingent to a token force was strongly opposed by ROKG and their effort to get the GOT to reconsider the action did not, in the ROK view, receive any strong US support. The rumored Swiss withdrawal from the ICC is still another indicator of declining international interest in the problem of Korea. The current move on the part of the Ethiopians to withdraw is yet another indication of diminishing international interest. There appears to be a constant lessening in the UN presence in Korea. This is extremely important since it is from the UNC that the US acquires OPCON of FROKA. No doubt if erosion of multi-national commitment continues, we will reach a point when ROK will reevaluate their position concerning UNC OPCON of FROKA.

3. Korea remains a strong and staunch ally but, like any newly emerging democratic nation, requires frequent reassurances of our interest and support. We cannot appear to minimize the importance of their in-country requirements. The Koreans join us in the recognition of the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the Western world at this particular point in time. Overshadowing as it does the industrial heartland of Communist China, Korea stands in ChiCom eyes as a strong free-world threat to this vital area. This hard, cold fact is a principal element of deterrence in the power balance between free world forces and the Chinese Communists. The retention of our strong strategic posture in Korea is essential to the overall balance of power in the Pacific and East Asia. Any actions that we take which give the appearance of diminishing the value to us of Korea’s strategic position must be avoided if we are not to permit Communist China greater freedom of action in Asia. We cannot, apparently or actually, degrade the importance, the strength or the resolve of the Koreans as valued partners in a joint endeavor.

4. Accordingly I feel that it is essential that all of us on the PACOM team be aware of the potential problem which seems to be developing from the chain of events enumerated above. I feel that we should, through both political and military channels, make our superiors in Washington aware of the need to fulfill in a complete and timely manner, our commitments and assurances to the ROKG. I am convinced that we must evaluate all force-level actions with respect to Korea in terms of their likely interpretation by the Koreans as sign posts of our determination and resolve to maintain a multi-lateral position of strength in Korea.”

I concur with thoughts expressed in Gen Beach’s message and recommend that we take every opportunity to stress the need to fulfill our commitments and assurances to the ROKG.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966. Secret;SPECAT. Repeated to CINCUARPAC. Passed to the White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Defense Intelligence Agency.