Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 1, 1966, 0915Z.

805. ROK Forces for RVN.

1. I met with Yi Tong-won morning February 1. He announced immediately that his govt had decided “in principle” to accept the proposals contained in our letter of January 29.² Accordingly, President had ordered that detailed military planning and preparations be started with a view to meeting our April and July deadlines. As we knew, these had been under way jointly with COMUSK since beginning of week.

2. However President does not wish to announce the decision until after his return from Southeast Asia trip on February 17.³ Yi asked therefore that we strive together to give impression that negotiations are continuing.

3. Although President has agreed to despatch requested additional force, FonMin asked that we give consideration to following requests of ROKG which however are not put forward as conditions.

A. Per Diem Allowances. Yi says that this has become a politically sensitive matter. Both opposition and some members of DRP are arguing strongly for increase in allowances. Yi had resisted such arguments on grounds that ROK soldiers in Vietnam are much better treated than RVN troops. However MND insists that this is true only of officers and senior enlisted grades, but not of soldiers in lower grades, and he feels ROKG would be very vulnerable if it could fairly be said that ROK GI’s were being paid less to fight in RVN than RVN GI’s.

B. Additional Development Financing. DPM Chang Ki-yong is very unhappy at U.S. unwillingness to announce additional commitment. FonMin had argued with DPM that U.S.D.L. commitment really open-ended, with actual amount of financing dependent upon ROKG ability to come forward with suitable projects. Still it would be helpful if our willingness to make additional loans after $150 million is fully utilized could be stated more explicitly.

C. Program Loans. DPM is unhappy with $15 million offer and with encouragement from Yi Hu-rak want to hold out for $30 million. He also wants commitment untied to stabilization program with no mention of further Washington review.

4. According to FonMin, DPM also complaining about our refusal even to discuss his requests for funds for education and remuneration for property utilized by UN forces. FonMin had persuaded President that these requests were undignified and irrelevant. DPM also professes not to understand our undertaking in regard to procurement for Vietnam and is afraid that they are excessively qualified by such references as “natural source,” “reasonably competitive price” and “selected types.”

5. I expressed deep appreciation on behalf of U.S. Govt and asked him to convey this at once to President Pak. I said I understood fully the reasons for deferring any announcement until after the President’s return and said that I would entreat Washington to guard against any premature disclosure. I went on to say that we would consider points which he had raised and expressed further appreciation for his statement that these points were not to be regarded as conditions. On question of allowances I said that we had recently learned that in some cases ROK soldiers in Vietnam in lower enlisted grades might receive less than their Vietnamese counterparts, especially those with large families and in certain assignments. We were trying to get more information about this. I undertook to look again at language of our proposal on development loans. FYI: I had in mind possibility of a somewhat revised offer along lines of Embtel 792 and Dept’s AIDTO unn reply thereto.⁴ On program loans I said I doubted very much if we could modify our proposal. In regard to procurement arrangements, I stressed difficulty of blanket a priori commitment and assured FonMin that we were doing everything to bring about favorable opportunities. This was something that we would be working at continually with ROKG officials.

6. At this point FonMin assumed a conspiratorial air and said, “Now, Mr. Ambassador, we must stage a little play.” He assumed we had noticed that he was utilizing the press to create impression that negotiations with us were difficult and going slow.

Certain obstacles had been reported in the press which, as we knew, had actually been removed by our proposal. Such a stratagem was necessary and would have to go on for some days longer so that when President’s decision was announced the Korean public would think that their govt had extracted great concessions from the U.S. by end of strenuous bargaining. To elaborate this impression, he was asking the Vice Minister to hold a series of meetings with the DCM. He himself would continue to report little progress to the press. Immediately upon the President’s and his return from Southeast Asia he and I would meet again, the decision would be announced and immediately submitted for Assembly approval. I indicated that I would cooperate within the limits of propriety, but urged that he not carry the stage play so far that the Korean public would have an exaggerated expectation of the results and then be disappointed.

7. FonMin also asked for my cooperation after President’s decision has been announced in making results of negotiations seem impressive to Korean public. He has in mind some kind of joint statement which would not embody whole contents of our letter of January 29, but merely those highlights, such as death benefits, MAP transfer suspension, modification of “buy American” policy, which seem so important in Korean public opinion. The statement would also stress that Korea was acting in its own interest and in common defense rather than as result of financial bargaining with U.S. At that stage ROKG did not want it to appear that its forces were being used as mercenaries. The favorable concessions which had in the previous act been extracted from the U.S. with such difficulty would at this stage be represented as spontaneous actions of U.S. expressing our appreciation for sacrifices being made by ROK.

Comment:

8. I believe we have attained our goal even if we are unyielding on the points on which FonMin sought our reconsideration. I do however feel that U.S. as well as ROKG would be vulnerable if ROK soldiers are paid less than RVN soldiers. We are asking USMACV for further facts. When these are received will submit our recommendations as to whether any adjustments should be made in our rates of per diem allowances. We may wish also to propose some modifications in language though not substance of our proposals on both development and program loans.

9. As we had begun to suspect (Embtel 804)⁵ FonMin has been applying himself not only to actual negotiations but in his inimitable way to preparing climate of public opinion for a decision, the political hazards of which should not be underestimated. We must give him credit and, within limits set by our own standards, try to help him. If to our Western eyes there appears to be some inconsistency between the themes of act one and act two of his proposed play, we should not be too concerned. I gained the distinct impression that, while DPM may feel that he lost out somewhat, President and ROKG as a whole feel that our offer is fair and even somewhat better than some of them expected, so that decision was taken in any atmosphere of self-respect and good will which has value for our future relations.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to DOD and repeated to Saigon, Tokyo, CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV.
2. When Brown presented the letter contained in Document 76, the Korean Foreign Minister’s response seemed promising. (Telegram 800 from Seoul, January 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S) Discussions between Embassy and ROKG officials over the next few days, however, led Brown and members of his staff to believe that the Koreans were “nearing decision but hoping to go on squeezing out more concessions right up to the wire.” Their impression was buttressed by a “barrage of calculated press leaks hinting at decision to send only a regiment on grounds U.S. concessions inadequate justify additional division.” (Telegram 803 from Seoul, January 31; ibid.)
3. In a follow-up telegram, Brown recommended that a message be sent to Pak, preferably from President Johnson, thanking him for his decision and expressing understanding for his decision to announce it only after returning from his trip. (Telegram 806 from Seoul, February 1; ibid.) A letter from President Johnson incorporating Brown’s recommendations was subsequently given to Pak. (Telegram 793 to Seoul, February 2, and telegram 818 from Seoul, February 3; both ibid.)
4. In telegram 792 from Seoul, January 27, the Embassy recommended authorizing a development loan of up to $10 million with which the ROKG could purchase heavy equipment to perform contract work in Vietnam or for U.S. forces in Korea. In AIDTO 1399 to Seoul, January 31, the Department of State indicated that the Embassy’s alternative proposal was being considered in light of various contingencies and restrictions. (Both ibid., POL 27–3 KOR S)
5. Telegram 804 from Seoul, January 31, contained summaries of press reports on the U.S. response to the conditions set forth by the ROKG before Korean troops could be sent to Vietnam. Initial positive reports were soon followed by reports of negative responses within the ROKG. The Embassy believed the Foreign Minister was responsible for creating the impression that the “USG is cold toward much of what ROKG considers essential and justifiable,” while bringing the “press to point of accepting troop request as fact.” The Embassy speculated “that FonMin engaged in audacious piece of news management which could redound both to his and to our benefit.” (Ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S)