Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, July 10, 1965, 0510Z.

40. Ref: A. Deptel 15, B. Deptel 27.² For Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. Subj:ROK Deployment RVN-MAP Transfer and Pay Raise.

1. If Korea provides a combat division for RVN this will add a new dimension to our relationship.

2. Korea, a small country bordering on the Communist world, will be in actual combat in one of the most active areas of RVN against Communist forces. It will have provided very substantially greater combat manpower than any other free world country great or small except the United States. This is a decision of great import for any country to make.

3. It comes at a rather crucial period for Korea, a sort of watershed in its current history. For if the settlement with Japan is ratified, as we hope it will be, a period of new relationships and new problems will begin which will provide great opportunities, but also problems the solution of which will tax all ROKG’s capabilities and all our skill and understanding.

4. Tensions with the Communist world are heightening everywhere. This is no time to drop our guard. Rather we should accelerate our effort to build free world strength wherever opportunity offers.

5. At the moment trained combat manpower is a crucial need in RVN. It is fair to say to Korea that this battle is hers as well as ours, that she can afford the men, that it is her duty to return in some measure the help rendered her so unstintingly by the free world in the past, and that we will ensure that this will not involve her in extra cost.

6. But it is also a cold fact that Korea does not have to do this, that it does involve Korea in some additional risk, that a well-trained combat division can be a real contribution to the struggle, and that it can save us a great deal in blood and treasure.

7. This question is now about to be considered by the Assembly in an atmosphere which for a variety of reasons has become superheated and casts doubt upon the outcome. It is not just the opposition which is causing the trouble, but also many members of the DRP. The question is mixed up with the feeling against Japan and the ever present haunting doubts about US support. The opposition, already in full cry on the ratification of the K–J settlement, is beginning to attack on the second front of the troop issue. Some members of the DRP are accusing the govt of failure to get proper recompense from the US for what the ROKG is prepared to do in RVN. On top of this, public opinion has been inflamed by distorted reports that the US expects flesh and blood from Korea while concentrating its purchases of war materials in Japan to the advantage of that economy rather than the ROK.

8. The question of a pay raise has become a current political issue in specific reference to the question of sending troops to RVN. This pay raise is unquestionably not only justified, but is essential if morale and efficiency in the armed forces and civil service is to be maintained. That it is long overdue is clear from the fact that the cost of living has increased about 75 percent since pay was last adjusted. The 1966 budget, shortly to be presented to the Assembly, will have to deal with this question in some form. In every phase of service, military, govt, education, low pay is a drag upon progress and efficiency which the country can ill afford. Yet the cost is also great for it to afford.

9. A 75 percent pay raise plus the present MAP transfer program would, for example, increase the military budget by about 35 percent.

10. I have devoted a lot of thought as to what we could do to meet this combination of political and economic problems in a way most consistent with our current economic strategy. We need a measure which will meet the political objections which the govt faces in seeking to send combat troops to RVN, which will contribute at least partially to the solution of the economic problems which the govt faces, which will recognize the real contribution which Korea will in fact be making, and which will be consistent with our aid policy and stabilization program.

11. There is a solution which meets all of these criteria and meets most of them dramatically, namely a suspension of the ROK funding requirement of the MAP transfer program for so long as ROK maintains substantial forces in RVN by means of US offshore procurement from Korea of those items now scheduled for transfer, upon the understanding that ROKG budgetary savings from this action be a contribution to a substantial military and civilian pay raise.

12. We cannot give preference to Korea in procurement for RVN as they want us to do, for reasons of law and principle. But we can meet political difficulties and show our appreciation without sacrifice of either by this adjustment of MAP transfer.

13. Such action would have a considerable effect. It would be represented by the ROKG as a great political victory. It would go far to ensure united DRP support for despatch of a division to RVN. It would correct the adverse effects of the untimely release of the Poats and McNamara statements, which, however proper in their context, have caused untold political difficulties for us and for the ROKG here.³ It would be consistent with Secretary McNamara’s promise to President Pak to review the MAP transfer program in the light of Korea’s real economic needs. It would not finance all of a pay raise, but would help make a pay raise possible.OSP of items programmed for transfer would continue the stimulation of local industry which we have so strongly emphasized as important and would set the stage for budgetary transfer when the ROKG is equal to the task. Korean dollar earnings would be increased. The stabilization and SA policies would not be weakened.

14. Realize that this course will add something to our dollar outflow. But the amount pales into insignificance in comparison with the cost of sending a US division to RVN instead of a ROK division.

15. Of course to suspend MAP transfer and still make good on our recent commitment (refs A and B) to increase ROK active army divisions combat effectiveness and to bring 3 ready reserve divisions to full equipment levels, Korea MAP funding must necessarily be further increased. But in my view this is a lesser evil than a reluctant despatch of the division or failure to send it at all, or indeed the loss of a substantial pay raise.

16. We may lose some face in yielding on a point on which we have for so long held firm. But the possibility of a change of view was established at the highest level during the Pak visit to Washington and we do have more facts and new circumstances. So this doesn’t worry me.

17. I think a suspension of the MAP program is now both politically expedient and economically and militarily justified.

18. I therefore recommend that we agree to it and do so promptly, so that it can have its effect upon current Assembly consideration of the troop issue.⁴

19. All members of the Country Team concur.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegrams 15 and 27 to Seoul, July 5 and 8, outlined the terms Washington was prepared to meet, if ROKG agreed to provide additional troops to Vietnam. (Ibid.) With reference to the ROKG requests, Brown stressed the importance of four military matters to the U.S.-ROK relationship: maintenance of U.S. troop strength in Korea, suspension or modification of the MAP transfer program, an increase in MAP, and financial assistance for a Korean military pay raise. Noting ROKG dissatisfaction with the U.S. response to these concerns thus far, Brown stated that without some concessions on those points the U.S. would be strongly criticized by the Korean press and public and the National Assembly could refuse to approve the dispatch of troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 12 from Seoul, July 3; ibid.)
3. The Korean Minister of National Defense obtained news reports quoting McNamara as having said that Korea would bear the full 75 percent military pay increase and stating that Poats believed that Korea could easily shoulder $7 or $8 million in defense increases. News that the United States intended to purchase munitions from Japan for use in Vietnam also reached Korea. (Telegram 1390 from Seoul, June 29; ibid., DEF 19 US–KOR S)
4. In a Joint State-Defense-AID message, the Embassy received authorization to inform ROKG that the MAP transfer program would be suspended as long as Korean troops served in Vietnam and funding of the offshore procurement program for transfer items had been approved. The savings Korea realized from those actions was to go to covering the costs of military and civilian pay increases. (Telegram 47 to Seoul, July 12; ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S) Brown notified the Department of State that he would keep the information secret until he had determined the most appropriate manner and time to utilize it. (Telegram 45 from Seoul, July 13; ibid.) But Brown feared that without an increase in MAP funds for Korea the United States would be unable to meet other promises to provide military equipment and investment funds. (Telegram 53 from Seoul, July 14; ibid.)