Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

50. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 18, 1965, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Joint Communique to Be Issued by Presidents Johnson and Park

PARTICIPANTS

• Korean Side
• President Chung Hee Park
• Deputy Prime Minister Key Young Chang
• Acting Foreign Minister Duk Choo Moon
• Defense Minister Sung Eun Kim
• Minister of Information Jong Chul Hong
• Presidential Secretary General Hu Rak Lee
• Ambassador Hyun Chul Kim
• Assembly Defense Committee Chairman Chong Kap Kim
• Minister Suk Heun Yun, Korean Embassy
• Foreign Ministry American Bureau Director Sang Moon Chang
• American Side
• The Secretary
• AID Administrator Bell
• Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy
• Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown
• Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand
• Assistant Administrator for Far East Rutherford Poats
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Marshall Green
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Barnett
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Solbert
• Robert A. Fearey, Director for East Asian Affairs
• Christopher A. Norred, Jr., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Secretary Rusk said that he wished to extend to President Park a cordial welcome to the Department of State. He regretted he had not been able to remain at the White House the previous evening to say good-bye, but he had worked in his office until 5:00 a.m.² He and his staff and associates were available for any matters the President might wish to raise. He suggested, however, that they might address themselves to the Joint Communique.

President Park thanked Secretary Rusk. He said he had had a very good talk with President Johnson the previous day, and had found that President Johnson had a good understanding of the Korean situation. There remained, however, several problems that should be discussed.

President Park said that President Johnson on the preceding day had agreed that there were no serious problems remaining on the status of forces agreement negotiations. On reduction of UN Forces in Korea, President Johnson had said that he hoped there would not be any reduction, but if there were it would be discussed fully with the Koreans beforehand. Secretary Rusk commented that we were in agreement on what should be said on this point—that the U.S. would continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea. He also reminded President Park that President Johnson in his welcoming speech on President Park’s arrival had said that the U.S. would stand side by side with the Koreans as long as a danger exists.

President Park reported that at breakfast with Secretary McNamara and others, he had discussed the “MAP transfer” problem, which has an effect on the Korean economy and morale. He said he hoped that this problem would be carefully considered in the Communique. He then referred to the phrase “over the next few years” which qualified the $150 million Development Loan funds in paragraph 9B.³ He said he understood the appropriation and executive processes that would be involved in use of those funds, but that its inclusion in a public Communique would invite Opposition criticism of his Government.

Status of Forces Agreement Negotiations

Secretary Rusk said he always enjoyed talking with President Park because they were clear in their expressions to one another, and did not waste time. He suggested they address themselves to the status of forces negotiations.

Secretary Rusk said he had a statement to make on those negotiations, and he asked that his remarks be interpreted sentence by sentence. Secretary Rusk said that we should all be pleased to note that several major issues had been resolved during recent weeks. A number of important issues remained to be resolved, however, so it did not seem possible to agree upon the text of an agreement during President Park’s stay. It seemed that two principal differences remained—on the criminal jurisdiction and labor articles. With respect to the criminal jurisdiction article, the Secretary said we had gone as far as we could go on the waiver proposal and trial safeguards, and he believed that the Korean Government should try to meet our position on these two points.

We were not expressing any lack of confidence, the Secretary went on to say, in the legal systems of the two countries. Our attitude had nothing to do with special arrangements, such as those of the 19th Century period which gave so much trouble. We were not raising issues with regard to tourists, businessmen, or others who were in Korea on a voluntary basis. But where we required men under compulsory military service to serve in Korea—taking farmers from Kansas and workers from Pittsburgh—we believed they have the right to protection in situations where they inadvertently have difficulty. The formula we had proposed is the one in effect in Germany where the U.S. has over 200,000 troops, and which has worked well on both sides. It would be difficult to explain why this formula would not be acceptable in Korea. We hoped the Koreans could meet us on this point.

On the labor article, the Secretary said we were prepared to accept the Korean proposal on the right of Korean employees to strike if a labor dispute was not resolved by the end of a 70-day period. A Joint Committee would designate certain essential categories where the right to strike would not be exercised. If the Korean Government was willing to agree to our proposals on the waiver and trial safeguards, then we could announce that agreement in principle had been reached and agreement on the remaining issues could be reached in the very near future.

President Park agreed.

“MAP Transfer” Program

Secretary Rusk then referred to the differences of view regarding reference to the “MAP transfer” program in the Joint Communique. He suggested a further addition to paragraph 5 of the Communique, as follows: “It was agreed that the program should be reviewed each year in light of the condition of the Korean economy.” President Park agreed.

Development Loans “over the next few years”

Secretary Rusk said that we all understood what was intended with regard to the Development Loan funds of $150 million, that the language should not be interpreted as a one-year commitment. It was difficult because on the Korean side there were popular sensitivities, while on our side there was the caution of the U.S. Congress. Last year Korea used $26 million in development loans, while this year it has used $46 million. It was important that the development loan language in the Communique not be interpreted as a one-year figure, as this would cause us difficulties. We try as a matter of general policy to avoid specific figures in communiques with distinguished foreign visitors. We had made an exception in this case because of our strong interest in Korea and in the success of its Government. We would like to meet the Korean needs on this point. He suggested that the words “over the next few years” be deleted from the second sentence of paragraph 9B of the draft Communique, and inserted in the fifth sentence. This should help the Korean side, although it would cause us some difficulty.

Secretary General Lee commented that this would still leave these difficult words in the Communique. He suggested they be rephrased to make reference to U.S. constitutional requirements and U.S. procedures.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that in the fifth sentence, the words would apply also to the additional monies to be made available which would clearly be available over a period of years.

Secretary Rusk added that to use a specific figure, to say that the funds would be used as rapidly as possible, and to say that other monies would then be made available would give us serious difficulties with Congress, if it appeared that the funds were to be used in one year. We were prepared to say the funds would be used as rapidly as possible. He hoped the Koreans would be able to accept the words “over the next few years” in the latter part of the paragraph.

Secretary General Lee said that, if the commitment were put this way, it would be vague and meaningless to the Korean public. It would weaken the whole impact.

The Secretary said there must be some misunderstanding of what we propose. Under our proposal the $150 million would be used as rapidly as possible. Then after that is used we anticipate the provision of additional loan funds. Obviously the combination of the two comprises a commitment extending over the next few years. We might find language without the use of any figure. We might just refer to continuing development loan backing for the Korean Government with no reference to amounts or time. But when we say we will provide $150 million as soon as possible, and then more, that seems the best formulation for the Korean Government. If we say that, we need the phrase “over the next few years” or an unlimited blank check would be implied which we could not explain to our own people.

Secretary Rusk made the point that it seemed to him that the basic point to be made was that a Korea-Japan agreement would not mean that the U.S. would run away. We were trying to say so eloquently, and it seemed to him that $150 million was an eloquent figure.

Secretary General Lee said that he believed it would be better not to use the figure if that required the qualifying words “over the next few years”. He said it was well understood that the Korean Government would not use the funds in one year, or extend the use over an indefinite number of years.

Ambassador Brown commented that the Communique would say not that $150 million would be used over the next few years, but that $150 million plus additional monies would be used in such a period. It should be easy to explain that.

Secretary Rusk said he was concerned lest there be too wide a gap between the explanations of the Communique by the Korean and U.S. Governments. The Korean Government should be able to explain to its Assembly that the U.S. had created a fund of $150 million, which would be used as rapidly as possible, and then more monies would be available. This should make it clear that the U.S. was not losing interest in Korea.

At this point the Secretary said he had some matters to discuss with President Park alone. He suggested they step across the hall into his office, and let the other members of the party try to resolve language differences in the meanwhile.

In the absence of President Park and Secretary Rusk, the other participants reached agreement on the following changes:

1) The following sentence was to be added to paragraph 7: “He confirmed that U.S. military and economic assistance to Korea would continue to be extended, as set forth in paragraph 9 below, after normalization of Korean-Japanese relations.” Accordingly, the following closing words of the first sentence of paragraph 9 would be deleted: “after the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan.”

2) The words “over the next few years” would be deleted in the second sentence of paragraph 9B, and the fifth sentence of that paragraph would be rephrased to begin as follows: “Such development loan funds would be made available, in accordance with annual legislation and joint economic judgments, to finance… .”

Upon their return, Secretary Rusk said that the Korean Government was getting the money, and would it not give the U.S. Government the words? President Park said he did not understand all the words in the Communique, but he was prepared to trust the U.S. Government. Where would we be if we did not trust one another?

Secretary General Lee asked whether it would not be possible to drop the words “in accordance with annual legislation and joint economic judgments”. Secretary Rusk said the U.S. could not drop them.

Secretary Rusk suggested that each side name a coordinator to agree upon the approved text, and named Mr. Green for the U.S. President Park named Acting Foreign Minister Moon for Korea.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. 11, July 1964 to August 1965. Confidential. Drafted by Norred and approved in S on May 25. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Office.
2. The previous evening Rusk and his wife attended the State Dinner at the White House held in honor of Pak. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) Rusk apparently returned to his office to monitor events in the Dominican Republic.
3. The joint communique released at the conclusion of Pak’s visit is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 779–781.