Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, May 14, 1965.

1191. Ref: Embtel 1190 rptd Tokyo 423, Taipei 77, Manila 182 CINCPAC 181.² For Bundy from Ambassador.

1. The long and painful chapter of SOFA negotiations is drawing to a close. Only one real obstacle remains. The means of surmounting it with satisfaction and respect on both sides are set forth in reftel.

2. The obstacle in question is our hitherto adamant insistence on a provision denying Korean employees of US forces the ultimate right to strike and the equally adamant refusal of ROKG, unanimously and vocally supported by public, legislative and editorial opinion to agree to this prohibition.

3. Long and strenuous negotiations have convinced us that we have no hope of getting the Koreans to agree to such a clause. Its enforceability is highly questionable. It would provide an instance of what all Koreans of whatever party will rightly or wrongly consider injustice and discrimination and which those who wish us ill both in Korea and elsewhere can and will exploit to our disadvantage.

4. The Korean Government would find it most difficult successfully to defend this clause before its Assembly and public opinion. It does not appear in any of our other SOFAs, not with China, nor with Japan, nor with the Philippines.

5. This is a matter of public discussion in Korea now. If agreed to, there is serious likelihood of a strike against this clause when it is announced. The government, which is genuinely anxious to help us avoid strikes, could not oppose this one.

6. The proposal contained in reftel gives real, and we think sufficient, protection for our interests. It even provides for a qualified no strike clause under conditions of need, but does so on a basis which the ROKG will be able to support us. We will need this support in such a case.

7. I am convinced that the Koreans cannot be pushed further on this point. I believe that the clause we propose is in the best interests of the US, both in terms of the SOFA itself and in terms of our overall interests in Korea and elsewhere. I believe that with this clause in hand we can now get satisfactory agreement and close the deal. Without it there is little or no chance of agreement.

8. I therefore endorse the reasoning of the negotiating team contained reftel and recommend Washington’s speedy acceptance of this proposal.

9. For CINCPAC: General Howze concurs.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15–3 KOR S–US. Confidential; Priority. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Manila, CINCPAC for POLAD, and SJA USARPAC.
2. Telegram 1190 from Seoul, May 14, transmitted the proposed text of the labor provision to the SOFA agreement being negotiated with Korea. It provided for a 70-day period of compulsory arbitration before workers actually went on strike, denied certain categories of workers the right to strike, and limited the right to strike in times of emergency. (Ibid.)