Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

39. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, April 15, 1965.

1008. For Bundy. Ref: Deptel 982.² ROK Troops for Vietnam.

Following telegram was on point of despatch when reftel received. It is nevertheless transmitted in order to stress importance in Korea of really substantial contributions by other countries, and in the hope that at least some of the considerations set forth therein may be helpful to Ambassador Lodge in his efforts to secure same.

1. Following are further thoughts referred to in last para Embtel 931.³

2. The basic danger to be averted if possible lies deeper than the immediate questions of whether ROKG will respond affirmatively to a request and the extent of political difficulties in National Assembly. It is the risk of creating a situation in which Korea appears to its own people and to others in the world not as an independent and willing contributor to a struggle in which it has a vital interest, but as a puppet or vassal of the US, brought into danger in distant Southeast Asia and at home to serve the interests of the US. If Korea is the only country besides the US which sends significant combat units to SVN, such an impression can be created. It certainly will be fostered and exploited to the utmost by the opposition here and if established will corrode US/ROK relationship.

3. Despite forthcoming attitude of President Pak and other leaders, Koreans generally are not yet psychologically prepared play large role on international stage. Conscious of economic and political weakness Koreans are preoccupied with proximate interests, e.g. normalization with Japan, unification, and with domestic problems. Country is divided, government is still weak and economy requires large scale external aid. Living under shadow of two most powerful Communist countries, its relations with nearest free world neighbor (Japan) are just, with difficulty, being restored to normal. With other free world and neutral nations, ROK has problem maintaining and extending recognition as only legitimate government in Korea. Thus by ordinary standards ROKG in no position to play important international role or to give economic or military assistance.

4. Relations with SEA countries (RVN itself, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia) are friendly enough, and Thai and Filipino troops fought in Korean War. Except for thin layer of leadership in govt, however, Koreans do not think of themselves as heavily involved in SEA problems by virtue of either political or economic interests there.

5. ROKG’s traditional anti-communism, the immense stake of all Asia, including Korea in free world success in SVN, Korea’s special relationship with US and existence of large and powerful ROK military force in being, all constitute persuasive arguments for invoking ROK assistance. But strength of these arguments is diluted so long as US NATO partners remain aloof, and Asian allies much closer to scene, much further from enemy and with more obviously direct interest in SE Asia, e.g. Thailand and Philippines, do not send combat troops in any substantial number. Moreover, mission Korean forces in Korean eyes is to defend ROK, and if not needed for that purpose, many Koreans would wish to see force reduced. Force is not now adequately MAP supported and pay and allowances are heavy drain on limited budgetary resources which will be increasingly needed for local costs of economic development program. On other hand existence of unemployment on large scale in ROK will pre-dispose many in favor of sending volunteers to fight in Vietnam. This feeling especially strong among veterans. A division of volunteers would create far less domestic political difficulty, but would of course take much longer to activate and make ready.

6. These considerations emphasize importance of substantial contribution of forces by other countries to counteract impression ROK forces being used as mercenaries to fight US war in SE Asia. We recognize that Japan is not expected to contribute forces at this time, but reasons are not appreciated in ROK. A substantial economic contribution from Japan for Vietnam would at least help to lessen objections in Korea that other Asian countries not making proportionate sacrifices.

7. Finally, strong and stable Korea is important anchor for our security interests in Far East. Our concern is whether those interests will be best served by contributions of manpower in SVN, if that contribution adds to instability and weakness here. Chief domestic political task for present ROKG is to build public confidence which it now lacks. Before sending even volunteers to fight in RVN, it ought to be sure of broad measure of public support over and above majority party approval in National Assembly. Externally chief task is to ensure normalization results in successful ROK-Japan relationship. Active role of Korean military in RVN might well have adverse impact upon developing relations with Japan. We would value Amb Reischauer’s judgment on this question.

8. Foregoing is submitted for consideration by Washington, along with the many other relevant factors of which we cannot have adequate understanding, in making decision whether to ask ROK to provide combat troops for SVN, and as possibly useful background for Ambassador Lodge on his trip.”

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram.
2. In telegram 982 to Seoul, April 14, the Department of State acknowledged the political difficulties arising from the troop issue in Korea and stated the “urgent need for introduction of additional Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops in SVN.” The Department wanted the ROK to furnish a 3,000-man regimental combat team, with the probable future requirement of one division. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
3. Document 37.