Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, June 15, 1965, 0600Z.

1316. Ref: (A) Deptel 1272; (B) Tokyo’s 4210 to Dept.² I told President Pak today of Washington’s concern about the slow progress of the talks in Tokyo. We were not afraid of a breakdown, but were very worried at the amount of time it was taking to solve minor issues. If agreement were not reached by the 20th the matter could cause serious delay in view of the forthcoming Algiers conference,³ the elections in Japan, and the US-Japan Cabinet meetings in Washington. Everyone was agreed that this was a good psychological moment to conclude the agreement and it would be a pity if the moment were lost. This concern was personally felt by President Johnson, who had asked that President Pak be informed of his personal interest. I said that Ambassador Reischauer had been asked to express the same concern to Prime Minister Sato.

President Pak replied that he entirely shared our point of view that this was the psychological moment for settlement, which must not be lost. He had written a personal letter to Ambassador Kim, instructing him to conclude the agreement by June 15 and giving him full authority to do so. He was assured by Ambassador Kim that agreement could be reached in time for every issue, except that of Tokto.⁴ This had emerged as the sole remaining major obstacle to an agreement.

The Japanese were insisting that agreement on Tokto should be specifically mentioned in the agreement. This the Koreans could not possibly accept. It would present an almost insuperable obstacle to ratification of the agreement by the Assembly and its acceptance by Korean public opinion. They realize that Mr. Sato had told the Diet several times that settlement of the Tokto issue would be included in the agreement with Korea and therefore that he had a political problem, but this was nothing compared to the problem which would be presented in Korea were Tokto to be mentioned in the agreement.

To meet the Japanese problem, the Koreans were ready to include a paragraph at the end of the agreement which would say that any remaining issues unsolved by the agreement would be the subject of subsequent consultation. If the Japanese desire, as they had indicated that they did, that the matter be the subject of discussions with a third party as well as the two principals, the Koreans were ready to make provision for third party participation in the discussion of “remaining issues”.

The Japanese could say that Tokto was such an issue and that discussion about it was contemplated by the agreement. The Koreans could say that Tokto was not covered by the agreement. Both would be technically correct. This should help the Japanese was as far as the Koreans could go [sic]. The President stated flatly more than once that there was no give in this position.

I suggested it might be useful to have a further meeting between Foreign Ministers Shiina and Yi Tong-won. The President said that if the Japanese persisted in their position on Tokto there was no point in a Foreign Minister’s meeting and that if they would accept the Korean proposal on Tokto there was no need for such a meeting, since Ambassador Kim had full authority to settle all the issues.

I suggested that our reports had indicated that there were a number of smaller issues which, though causing difficulties for the technicians, might very easily be settled at the political level. The President was not receptive to the idea of a further Foreign Minister’s meeting. The President asked the United States to intercede with the Japanese on the Tokto issue. I said that Ambassador Reischauer had mentioned it to Mr. Sato, but had found him quite sticky.

Comment: It is quite clear that the Korean position against any mention of Tokto in the agreement with Japan is adamant. I believe that the government’s appraisal of the adverse effect which any mention of this ill-fated subject would have on the prospect for ratification and especially upon the principle of mobilization of indispensable support from the members of the DRP is probably accurate.

Although Yi Tong-won told me yesterday he is quite prepared to meet again with Shiina if it would be helpful, I think it unlikely that President Pak would wish him to go to Tokyo unless it is quite sure that the Japanese will give on the Tokto issue. He might then be willing to have him go and his presence might be really helpful in buttoning up a number of lesser issues.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JAPAN–KOR S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 1272 to Seoul, June 12, (also sent to Tokyo) instructed Brown and Rei-schauer to meet with Pak and Sato, respectively, to urge a conclusion to negotiations. In telegram 4210 from Tokyo, June 14, Reischauer reported on his discussion with Sato, who was optimistic that an agreement could be reached very soon. (Both ibid.)
3. Algiers was the site of the upcoming Afro-Asian Conference, which Shiina and Ushiba were to attend.
4. The remaining issues were the length of time a fisheries agreement would remain in effect and the procedures to settle disputes, claims issues involving property rights and other legal issues, and the status of Koreans in Japan, as well as the issue of Tokto/Takeshima. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JAPAN–KOR S)