Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 15, 1965, 5 p.m.

866. Country Team Message.

1. CT has considered various implications of cuts in US forces Korea which we understand are impending, for implementation between now and June 30, 1965. Our information stems from DA instructions received by COMUS Korea which indicate decision has been taken to subtract 9,000 spaces from present authorized strength of 8th US Army amounting to 51,000. The decision is reportedly based on balance-of-payments considerations.²

2. Cut of this magnitude represents reduction of about 18 percent in level of US Army Forces in Korea. This reduction in numbers of personnel would be likely sooner or later to attract public attention and give rise to rumors that US forces are “pulling out” of Korea. By the same token it would be virtually impossible to conceal fact and extent of reductions from ROKG. If we attempt to do this we are almost certain to fail, and to be accursed of bad faith by the ROKG. If, on the other hand, we inform ROKG at outset, result likely to be immediate leaks to press and National Assembly setting off widespread alarm that US is withdrawing its forces from Korea in anticipation of ROK-Japan settlement. It goes without saying that such a furor at this time would jeopardize prospect for successful conclusion that settlement which we have been expecting after so long this spring. As Dept aware, one of chief fruits ROKG seeking from forthcoming Washington visit President Pak is assurance that present US force levels will be maintained (Embtel 861).³ President and Foreign Minister have indicated that ROKG relying heavily on this and related assurances of continuing US commitment to Korea to help win public support for Korea-Japan settlement.

3. As indicated in previous para, failure on our part to give prior notification to ROKG of impending cut would give rise to accusation we not complying faithfully with our stated intention to consult with ROKG on this question. Most explicit assurance on this point was given personally by Secretary Rusk to President Pak at their meeting in January 1964 when Secretary said force reduction was not a current problem and US approach would be to examine question later on in consultation with Korean Govt (93540, para 32, Jan 31, 1964).⁴ Whether or not our recommendation given below that cut be postponed is accepted we believe that we must honor this commitment, at least by going through motions of consultation.

4. However, now is not a good time to hold such consultations. It would spoil the atmosphere which both we and the ROKG hope to generate for President Pak’s forthcoming visit to Washington and for the successful conclusion Korean-Japan talks. A settlement with Japan is almost within grasp; the outcome will be known, probably with certainty, before June 30. We believe that this accomplishment which for years has been a paramount objective of US policy in East Asia is so vitally related to the US national interest that the balance of payments savings which would accrue from the contemplated reduction over the next few months can and should be foregone until the outcome of the current negotiations is decided one way or the other.

5. Our rough estimate is that the reduction contemplated might reduce total US military spending in Korea by somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually depending on how the reductions are carried out.CT does not deprecate the contribution this reduction in spending would make to a solution of our balance of payments problem, although doubting that it will be entirely a net gain to US in view US position as residual supporter of ROK balance of payments. Meeting high priority US objectives for Korean economic development may require additional offsetting supporting assistance.

6. Ideally, as set forth in agreed language of draft national policy paper on Korea, now in process final revision Washington,⁵ we believe no reductions in either ROK or US forces should be considered until after Korea-Japan normalization. In accordance with that carefully thought out recommendation we strongly urge that any reduction in US Forces Korea be postponed until a suitable period after a settlement with Japan is reached this year. If a settlement is reached, say by June 1, our judgment is that a period of at least six months should be allowed for the dust of that action, and its ratification by the National Assembly, to settle. Consultations with the ROKG on reduction of US Forces could then begin toward the end of the year.

7. General Howze, as member Country Team, agrees with general sense of foregoing subject to qualification that as CG 8th Army he is not appealing decision to carry out strength cut.

Doherty

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–2 US–KOR S. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and the Department of Defense.
2. Reduction of forces in Korea was part of an effort to reduce U.S. military expenditures around the world, except in Vietnam, and improve the U.S. balance-of-payments position by maintaining overseas military forces at the September 30, 1964, level. Additional documentation on proposed reductions in Korea is ibid.
3. In telegram 861 from Seoul, March 12, the Embassy outlined the subjects Pak wanted to discuss during his Washington visit. With regard to Korea’s security, Pak wanted to maintain U.S. and Korean force levels, increase MAP funds, and modernize Korean military equipment. (Ibid., POL 7 KOR S) The Minister of National Defense had also raised the issue of maintaining U.S. force levels in Korea during the negotiations in January on sending Korean forces to Vietnam. (Telegram 621 to Seoul, January 18, and telegram 658 from Seoul, January 22; ibid., DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S)
4. Not found, but telegram UK 60079 from CINCUNC, January 31, 1964, contains Rusk’s comments to Pak on the question of force reduction. (Ibid., POL 27 KOR S) The joint communique released at the conclusion of Rusk’s visit also addressed the issue; see footnote 4, Document 3.
5. The National Policy Paper on the Republic of Korea, consisting of Part 1, “U.S. Policy,” November 9, 1965, and Part 2, “Factors Bearing on U.S. Policy,” August 1965, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Country Files.