Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, October 12, 1968, 2130Z.

254615. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-fourth Meeting—Part 1.

1. We are of course somewhat disheartened by Pak’s apparent surprise when acknowledgement of receipt defined in precise terms. We had been reasonably confident that Pak had at least suspected our intentions, since para added to their document at 22nd meeting was clearly designed to undercut it. Pak’s strong reaction may thus be explained partly in terms of hope, now dashed, that we would allow ambiguity to persist until moment of transfer. Whether he planned to confront Woodward with last minute demand for naked signature or planned to present overwrite to his superiors as trivial detail or had genuinely not foreseen overwrite we will probably never know. Wisdom of clarifying our intent seems, however, quite evident since last minute breakdown would be most painful.

2. Whether Pak’s surprise was genuine or feigned and how serious his objections will prove to be will only come out in next meeting or two. It is clear NKs thought they were close to resolution of matter and were more than willing to liquidate it on their terms. We will have to wait and see whether this has generated momentum favorable to overwrite compromise. Meanwhile we will activate whatever additional pressures might move them to a favorable decision, e.g., threatening noises toward ships being built in Netherlands.²

3. Our general line for next meeting or two should therefore be stonewalling on main point combined with indications of flexibility on side issues.

4. If Pak has made no move to call meeting by October 18, General Woodward should indicate through JDO that he is ready any time.

5. Pak will presumably open with expanded version of closing statement last meeting and with renewed demand that Woodward state willingness “sign the document of apology and assurance.” He will probably elaborate on charge Woodward is going back on “agreement in principle.”

6. Woodward should reply on following lines:

• “A. At the last meeting I made a clear, specific proposal for settling this matter. You have responded with a general attack on my position. I deny that I have in any way gone back on an agreement in principle.’
• B. I refer again to my specific proposal at the last meeting that we solve this problem by using your draft document presented on September 30. I will write on that document the words ‘I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew’ and I will sign my name and title. Do you have any specific objection to these arrangements?”

7. If Pak’s opening statement contains no general attack but simply avoids either concurring with or objecting to overwrite, Woodward should use only point B above.

8. Pak may respond to para 6 above with flat negative or specific attack on overwrite phrase, or may again deliver general attack. In any case, Woodward should reply making following points:

A. He should note Pak’s statement.

B. He should regret, if appropriate, Pak’s belligerent tone after businesslike atmosphere which had characterized recent meetings.

C. He should then say May 8 document most repugnant to us. We would much prefer to have nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, to secure release of captives, we have consistently indicated since Seventeenth Meeting that we might find it possible to move to a solution based on that document.

D. We have consistently proposed since May using their draft and acknowledging on it that crew was simultaneously being released. We have consistently said, “I will acknowledge receipt on a document satisfactory to you.” Pak can verify from record that we have not deviated. In fact, at conclusion of last meeting in attacking our position he accurately quoted it. (Woodward may wish to read back first two sentences of para 15 Seoul 10340.)³ Concept of simultaneous release was eventually accepted by Pak. Our offer to acknowledge it on NK document was repeatedly misinterpreted by Pak but these misinterpretations have been regularly and carefully corrected. We are surprised Pak should now reopen problem which we had believed was closed. Pak must study record carefully. He will see there is no inconsistency in our position.

E. NK side may not be completely satisfied with procedure we have proposed. Nevertheless they have interest in accepting this proposal and resolving issue. Dragging matter out is obviously undesirable for us since crew being made to suffer as hostages. But prolongation also not desirable from NK point of view. Their relations with other countries—both political and economic—cannot fail to suffer from their contemptuous disregard of international law and morality. It will be to their benefit to begin to conform to these international standards and it will only harm them more and more seriously if they do not.

F. Pak should bring these considerations to attention of his authorities.

9. If Pak persists in flat rejection of overwrite proposal, Woodward should express surprise and regret, say he had thought we had found a solution, urge Pak to reconsider, and suggest adjournment.

10. If at opening or in response to any of foregoing statements Pak indicates acceptance of our proposal, Woodward should say he is prepared to comment on Pak’s suggestions for handling press and other procedural matters. He should not do so in absence of clear acquiescence to overwrite, since we wish to present stiff front to maximize pressure for NKs to accept compromise. If it would at any point be helpful, however, Woodward may in his discretion indicate that he sees no insuperable obstacles in technical procedures outlines by Pak.

11. Septel will give instructions on procedural matters which are still under discussion here.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Steadman, Salans, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach.
2. Four fish-factory ships for North Korea were being built in the Netherlands for completion between October 1968 and July 1969. Some consideration had been given to ways they might be used to pressure the North Koreans. (Memoranda from Jenkins to Rostow and from Rostow to the President, September 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security History, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Vol. 8, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 16)
3. That portion of telegram 10340 from Seoul, October 10, quotes Pak as having said: “At the last meeting your side suggested to discuss the specific procedural matters, asking us ‘If I agree to acknowledge receipt of the crew on the particular document which you have just presented can you release them to me against my signature?’ and at today’s meeting too you have confirmed it and suggested to discuss the specific procedural matters, the next subject. Thus, at today’s meeting the specific procedural matters are being discussed on the basis of such an agreement.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
4. Telegram 255214 to Seoul, October 14, covered instructions on procedural matters, specifically, publicity for the agreement, presence of the press and photographers, the actual transfer of crew members, and an acceptable time delay between signing and transfer. (Ibid.) The Embassy raised some potential problems about those procedures, suggesting they needed to be addressed to preserve the integrity of operational plans. (Telegram 10725 from Seoul, October 29; ibid.) In telegram 268226 to Seoul, November 7, the Department of State sent modified procedural instructions to Woodward. (Ibid.)