Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

319. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, October 10, 1968, 0955Z.

10338. Subject: 23rd Senior MAC Members Closed Meeting at Panmunjom October 10, 1968. Reference: State 251495.²

1. Meeting began at 1100 hours October 10 local time and ended 1418 hours.³

2. General Woodward opened meeting by suggesting that discussion of practical details of release of crew be held. He asked if his assumption was correct that 24 hours would be adequate time from the moment all aspects of the problem had been settled to the moment of release.

3. General Pak did not reply to 24-hour question but handed Gen Woodward detailed paper giving NK proposal for release of crew (text included in transcript of meeting which follows) and roster of crew with proposed order of release (being pouched). Paper made clear NK desire for maximum publicity at time of release and NK intention to publicize agreement to sign as soon as agreement reached. Paper made no mention of time interval between agreement to sign and actual release but did specify two-hour interval between actual signing and time of release.

4. Department will note from transcript of meeting that arrangements for release proposed by NK side differ considerably from Breeches Buoy concept⁴ and are designed to provide maximum NK advantage (e.g. by use of bridge of no return rather than JSA as release point). NK sketch of area of release being pouched.

5. General Woodward pushed hard for exclusion of press at time of signing. Pak took line that NK wanted to have three photographers present at signing and had no objection if US made similar arrangement. As noted above, NKs obviously arranging for big propaganda show at time of actual release of crew.

6. General Woodward then took up need to maintain secrecy at this stage of negotiations. General Pak did not reply to this point, presumably because NK proposals for arrangements concerning release openly state NK intention to publicize US agreement to sign as soon as agreement given.

7. Final matter raised by Gen Woodward was statement for record contained in para 9 reftel and explanation our concept of acknowledgement of receipt contained para 11 reftel. There was 33 minute pause while NK considered response. Pak eventually replied that General Woodward’s statement meant that US was not willing to see early solution of the question of the Pueblo crew and it could not be understood otherwise. US side would never get crew back unless it made the apology and guarantee suggested by NK side.

8. General Pak’s reply to Gen. Woodward’s statement on acknowledgement of receipt did not directly reject this concept. Pak stated inter alia “Your side agreed to the matter of principle for the solution of the question of the Pueblo crew but has now taken an insincere and arrogant attitude for frustrating the agreement. Whom are you fooling?” General Woodward considers it possible that our definition of acknowledgement of receipt came as a surprise to Pak and he had no instructions to cover this matter.

9. If NK side genuinely believes we were on point of agreeing to sign and considers overwrite ploy a “trick,” it is possible they will now seek to increase pressure on US through stepped-up propaganda campaign. One obvious avenue of approach would be to reiterate threat to try crew. Other would be to announce that NK had made specific offer to release crew and US had not seen fit to accept it.

10. Summarizing recent meetings we now know:

1. Details of NK proposals concerning actual arrangements for release.

2. NK agreement to “simultaneous release” which actually would be two hours after signing.

3. Time between agreement to sign and actual release of crew would be long enough for NK to publicize US agreement.

4. Question of overwrite still pending.

11. Prior to recess General Woodward agreed to consider detailed arrangements presented by NK side and to comment at next meeting.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis, Cactus. Rostow forwarded this document to President Johnson under an October 10 covering memorandum stating, “The North Koreans herewith pretend not to have understood the ‘over-write’ ploy on the Pueblo crew—or, in fact, did not understand it. The issue remains in the air.” The memorandum indicates the President saw the documents. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IIb, Cactus Seoul Cables, March 1, 1968 to October 31, 1968)
2. Document 318.
3. Telegram 10340, October 10, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
4. Breeches Buoy was the name given to the operational plan for the recovery, return, and intelligence debriefing of the crew members.