Attachment
Washington, September 4, 1968.
Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to Secretary of State
Rusk
SUBJECT
- Status of Pueblo Talks at
Panmunjom
The talks have, for some time, been at an impasse. The North Koreans
insist on our admitting, and apologizing for, espionage and
intrusion into their territorial waters. Then, they say, we “need
not worry about the release of the crew.”
We have refused to admit espionage or to apologize for acts we are
morally certain we did not commit. Various forms of conditional
apology (e.g., we regret any intrusion that may have occurred) have
been rejected.
[Page 698]
Consequently, by authorization of the President on May 18, we began
to explore the possibility of General Woodward writing across the face of a document
presented by the North Koreans an acknowledgment of the receipt of
the crew and signing it. If the North Koreans accepted this they
would presumably claim that we had signed their piece of paper and
we would say that we had signed only what Woodward had written. We tried to
explain this ploy in detail to the North Koreans through an
Australian contact in Tokyo, but we are not sure whether this really
ever got through to Pyongyang or whether Pak knows about it.
Under Secretary Katzenbach
reviewed the situation on August 13 with Ambassador Dobrynin without mentioning the
over-write plan. There has been no feedback from this demarche. At
our request, a number of other governments have approached the North
Koreans but were given the standard response: “Let the Americans
apologize.”
President Park has been kept informed by Ambassador Porter.3
For the last two or three meetings we have been asking the North
Koreans if they would release the crew if Woodward acknowledged receipt of
the men “on a document” satisfactory to the North Koreans.
The Twentieth Closed Meeting on August 29 produced an interesting
exchange.4
General Woodward repeatedly
tried to get General Pak to say yes or no to our latest formulation:
“If I were to acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document whose
language was satisfactory to you, would you simultaneously release
the crew?” On the third go-round Woodward said, “If you were to simultaneously
release the crew, I would acknowledge receipt of a document whose
language was satisfactory to you.” Pak pounced on this, “noted that
your side is ready to sign our document of apology and assurance”,
and promised a further comment later. Woodward said, “Your statement contains language I
did not use,” and recessed.
The question is what instructions to give Woodward for the next
meeting.
It seems clear that we should continue to try to pin Pak down to
release of the crew simultaneously with any signing. It is unlikely,
however, that he would do more than agree to release the crew within
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a day or two after a
document was signed. Are we willing to take the risk of signing and
relying on North Korean promise to deliver the crew? How long could
we wait?
In the case of the helicopter pilots (1964), the North Koreans
demanded and got our signature on a receipt—admitting
espionage—without any promise of when the pilots would be released.
They then immediately offered to release the next day and they did
so. They keep saying at Panmunjom “There is a precedent. What more
assurance do you want?” We feel that Pak is most unlikely to agree
to actual release simultaneous with signature, and that 24 or 48
hours between signature and release would probably not hurt but that
we need a commitment that it would be no longer.
Recommendation: That we accept up to a 48
hour interval.
It is possible that Pak might agree to simultaneous release and bring
the crew to Panmunjom, but would reject a document if it consisted
only of an over-write with Woodward’s signature, and threaten to take the crew
away again. Under those conditions, should Woodward then sign the document
the North Koreans want?
Comment: It is probable that an officer of
Woodward’s rank and
experience would sign even though his instructions did not authorize
such action, unless he were expressly forbidden to do so.
We had planned, if Pak agrees to simultaneously, to tell him
precisely what we would do, i.e. over-write but not sign the actual
North Korean draft. Pak might well reject this ploy if he understood
exactly what we planned to do. What then should be our position?
Recommendation: That we do not spell out our
proposal further. The ploy might just work, and explanation is
likely to kill it.
It is possible that the North Koreans would release only part of the
crew, for example, all of the enlisted men but not the officers.
Would we sign either the over-write or the North Korean apology in
order to get part of the men back?
It would be difficult to reveal nothing to the press and Congress on
their debriefings, difficult to prevent leaks, yet difficult to say
anything of what we learned from those released without hurting
those still held. And it would seem logical for the North Koreans to
hold some back as hostages to deter our denouncing whatever
“receipt” we may sign, to prevent us from issuing a White Paper,
etc. Yet obviously we cannot refuse to accept a part of the crew
unless the terms are utterly outrageous.
Recommendation: If we can get back all the
enlisted men, or even half or more, we should sign while reiterating
our demand for release of the others. We should refuse to sign
anything for a merely token release.
The papers today and previous rumors have reported that there would
be a major development with respect to Pueblo
on September 9
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at the
celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the DPRK. Should we call for a meeting before or after
September 9?
Recommendation: That we wait until after
September 9. If anything is to happen on that date the decision was
probably taken some time ago. We are unlikely to learn anything from
Pak. If he wants to comment constructively on Woodward’s statement at the 20th
Meeting, he can let us know. Any further clarification on our part
might cool him off.
Decisions on these points are needed as soon as possible, since
Woodward needs
instructions in case of unexpected developments.
