Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, February 24, 1968, 1901Z.

120291. For Ambassador. We now believe oral demarche to Soviets is more appropriate at this juncture of Pueblo situation than formal communication.² Request you see Gromyko soonest and discuss situation along following lines (Bohlen discussed problem with Dobrynin February 23 when latter called on another matter, but only in general terms):³

1. It is now a month since North Korean patrol boats forcibly seized the USS Pueblo in international waters. Despite the clear illegality of this action and despite the strong emotions which it has aroused in the United States, we have shown considerable restraint and made every effort to arrive at a quick, peaceful solution. As you know, we have acted on your advice by making certain adjustments in our posture in the hope of facilitating a prompt settlement.

2. We have now had eight private meetings in direct talks at Panmunjom. As you know, copies of the verbatim transcripts of the meetings have been given to Ambassador Dobrynin, since we wish to be sure you are fully informed on what has transpired at Panmunjom.

3. Our position in these talks has been moderate and reasonable. We offered to conduct a full and impartial inquiry after the ship and its personnel have been returned to us. We further offered to express our regrets if that inquiry develops facts which would warrant our doing so. The North Koreans reacted negatively to these proposals. At the next meeting, we will offer to submit the Pueblo problem to an impartial fact-finding body provided the personnel are first released into our custody or into neutral hands. We will tell the North Koreans that if the commission should find that, in violation of its instructions, the Pueblo entered waters closer than 12 miles to the North Korean coast, we would express regret.

4. We do not see how we can go further. Nor do we believe that by any objective standards should we be expected to do more. The present acute tensions in the area have not diminished. I think you will agree that it is in your interest as well as ours that this vexing problem is resolved without further delay.

5. These tensions have their origin primarily in the behavior of the North Koreans. You know of the raid on Blue House and of the numerous violations of the DMZ. Beyond this, the North Koreans have recently voiced irresponsible threats which can only serve to inflame the situation.

6. Let me give you just a few examples. At the open meeting of Military Armistice Commission on February 19, senior North Korean representative declared that North Korea would exchange “punishment for punishment, retaliation for retaliation, and all-out war for all-out war.” Just prior to this, on February 17, North Korean Vice Premier Pak Song-chol made an equally intemperate statement in which he concluded: “If the US imperialists and the Pak Chong-hui clique should dare attempt some retaliatory action, it will at once mean the beginning of war. The US imperialists and their stooges should take a square look at reality and act with discretion. Whether a new war will break out or not in Korea depends entirely on the attitude of the US imperialists and their stooges. The more the US imperialists cling to intimidation, blackmail, and war clamors, the more complicated the current situation will become. If they gain anything from this, it will be only corpses and death.”

7. North Korean spokesmen have said publicly that the Pueblo crew may be tried and punished. This was said here in Moscow by the North Korean Charge d’Affaires. This is highly irresponsible behavior, and clearly any such action would seriously aggravate the already tense situation.

8. Mr. Cyrus Vance recently returned from talks with high officials in Seoul and confirms reports from our Ambassador that the South Koreans’ patience is sorely tried. They are angered at what the North Koreans have already done and what they understand they plan to do in the future. Captured agents over the past years have provided a picture of size and character of North Korean training program to infiltrate saboteurs and assassins. There are other indications that point to a step-up in campaign of violence against Republic of Korea in the very near future. We should both consider very carefully what might develop in this potentially explosive situation, if Republic of Korea is subject to more depredations such as attack on Blue House on January 21.

9. We are doing our utmost to restrain the Republic of Korea, and we hope Soviets are exerting similar effort with North Koreans. Neither of us is in complete control of situation, but we should do what we can to prevent a flare-up. Immediate release of Pueblo and its crew will contribute to relief of the tension. We wanted you to know these facts regarding the situation before the North Koreans made any reply to our offer.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to Seoul. Drafted by Toon; cleared by Walsh, Clifford, Yager, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach.
2. The Department of State had earlier considered sending a letter from Rusk to Gromyko. The thrust of the draft letter paralleled the instructions contained in telegram 120291. (Telegram 117432 to Moscow, February 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus Ia, Cactus State Cables, February 11 to 29, 1968)
3. A memorandum of their February 23 conversation and telegram 120035 to Seoul, February 24, summarizing the meeting are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. On February 15 Rusk and Bohlen met with Dobrynin and briefly discussed the Pueblo incident. (Memorandum of conversation, February 15; ibid.)
4. Thompson met with Gromyko on February 26; see Document 286.