Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 18, 1968.

For the President

Text of Cable From Ambassador Porter (Seoul 4321)

1. The following is in response to your request for an assessment of the outlook for the Pueblo case and contains my advice as to the next steps.² I have no doubt that you have considered all the possibilities I list below in the form of gradually increasing pressure on North Korea. They seem to contain, up to a point at least, a useful course of action short of open conflict which may change the North Korean attitude. However, such actions as I list would lead inevitably to even greater engagement of U.S. prestige and therefore, if they fail to achieve the desired result, to a hard decision whether to strike a blow. They also involve the fate of the crew, the reaction of North Korean allies, and the problem of deciding and coordinating the South Korean role.

2. The North Koreans are now fully aware of the value of the men³ and are undoubtedly extracting very valuable information from them through use of hypnotic drugs and perhaps other devices. It would seem that this process could go on for some time and that, consequently, we will be kept waiting, cap in hand, at Panmunjom. It is but a short step from general “confession” to “request” of some crew members at least (probably the most valuable) to be allowed to remain in North Korea and serve the people in atonement for “past crimes.” In fact, almost anything can be expected from a regime like that of North Korea, whose super-Maoist outlook requires that the leader’s name be mentioned at least once in practically every sentence of hours-long broadcasts.

3. Your latest instructions to the U.S. senior representative at Panmunjom contained a fairly obvious warning to the North Koreans that seven meetings have proved unsatisfactory.⁴ That will not move them. They are fully aware of our dissatisfaction, but as long as we are meeting and doing nothing else, they will not be moved by our views about progress or lack of it.

4. If it is now decided to apply other measures, I would begin by not responding for the time being to the next North Korean request for a closed meeting. I would not refuse a meeting—I would simply not respond. A brief message could be sent to North Korea through another channel to the effect we have had enough, that seven closed and three open meetings have proved useless. A clear warning about welfare of crew and responsibility of highest North Korean level should be included.

5. We could then commence a series of non-decisive measures, without verbal threats, which would engage North Korean attention. The first of these would be cancellation of leaves of all UN military elements along the DMZ.

6. After a short period (two or three days) to permit us to note any North Korean reaction, we could announce a black list of shipping to and from North Korean ports. The effect would be more psychological than substantial.

7. The next step would be to alert American dependents and non-essential personnel in Korea that the situation is not improving and that we advise visitors not to make plans to come to Korea for the time being. This would cause considerable comment and might have adverse effect on investment in Korea.

8. This would be followed by an air demonstration well inside [South] Korea, so handled as to have high press visibility.

9. At this point we would assess the North Korean reaction, if any, and decide in light of intelligence gathered through other sources whether to resume private meetings. This decision could of course be made anywhere along the line. If it seemed necessary to continue the process cited above, other measures such as blockade, closer-in naval/air demonstrations and actual evacuation of non-essential Americans here could be considered. Certainly, the last mentioned step would have ominous overtones.

10. I suggest serious consideration be given to the steps listed, in paragraphs 4 through 8, at the present time. If and as such a procedure is approved, we should take steps concurrently at the UN and elsewhere, to make known our feeling that we have done our best with the North Koreans who do not wish to settle the matter in a peaceful or honorable way.

11. I recommend this course of action because I have always felt it desirable to look and plan beyond what we are actually doing, especially with dealing with Communists. For understandable reasons, we have been a little too eager in this case and they have made us dance to their tune. As the process of recovering the men and ship now seems likely to be long drawn out for the reasons I have cited, I think our people would support a change of roles.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. V. Secret. This is a retyped version of the telegram given to the President with an attached memorandum from Rostow, February 20, who wrote: “I am not at all sure that his [Porter’s] particular scenario is the right one; but we had better get a scenario soon.” A note on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
2. The telegram as sent to the Department of State referenced telegram 117379 to Seoul, February 17, in which Katzenbach requested Porter’s assessment and advice on the Pueblo situation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. Intelligence reports indicated that Communist China had sent an interrogation team to question 17 crew members who had previously gathered intelligence off the Chinese coast and that the Soviet Union sent a team of electronics and decoding experts to assist with the interrogation of Pueblo crew members. (Telegram from the Commander of Naval Intelligence in Japan, February 16, 1529Z; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 to December 1968)
4. Smith had been instructed to state at the Seventh Meeting that it was clear “that further meetings will only be repetitious on both sides.” (Telegram 116350 to Seoul, February 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)