Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

276. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 15, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Sixth Closed Meeting at Panmunjom

The sixth closed meeting of Senior Representatives was held yesterday afternoon at two o’clock Korean time and lasted twenty-two minutes. The whole meeting was devoted to presentation of the North Korean position on the Pueblo case.²

The North Korean representative sharply attacked our version of both the facts and law bearing on the case. He made the following principal points:

a. The intrusion of the Pueblo into North Korean territorial waters is proved by confessions of the crew, the ship’s log and navigational plot, and by “other material evidence, including intelligence data.”

b. When challenged by North Korean patrol craft, the Pueblo attempted to escape “while committing provocative firings.” The North Korean vessels returned fire in “self-defense.” (This charge was first made at the January 24 open MAC meeting.)

c. The Geneva Convention of 1958 concerning territorial waters refers to “violations of order in navigation” and cannot be applied to “the case of an armed spy ship.” (We are not clear what the former phrase means. Possibly navigational error.)

d. The US side has signed treaties recognizing “the inviolability of territory of states.” The North Koreans were therefore fully justified in seizing the Pueblo.

The concluding North Korean statement apparently indicates their terms for the release of the crew of the Pueblo. The word “vessel” is significantly omitted.

“Therefore, we will give considerations to (will be able to consider) the issue of returning the crew members only when your side apologizes for the fact that the US Government dispatched the armed spy ship Pueblo to the territorial waters of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, conducted espionage activities and perpetrated hostile acts, assuring (and assure) that it will not commit such criminal acts again.”

It is the US turn to set the date of the next closed meeting. We believe that we should call for such a meeting as soon as possible. We will prepare an instruction for Admiral Smith and seek clearance on it by 6:00 p.m. today (8:00 a.m. February 16, Korean time), which will enable us to ask for a meeting the afternoon of February 16. In this instruction we will provide answers to the major points raised by the North Korean side and focus particularly on language that deals with “apologies” and “assurance” not to violate territorial waters.³

We will also prepare a message to Seoul giving Seoul the text of the Pueblo’s Sailing Order which instructed the ship to go no closer than thirteen nautical miles from the North Korean land mass/offshore islands. Admiral Smith should be authorized to use the Sailing Order in the event that the North Koreans captured a copy of a 1966 CINCPAC Fleet directive which authorized surface patrols up to three nautical miles of the North Korean coast.⁴ This instruction was, of course, superseded by the Pueblo’s Sailing Order.

We have checked with the office which controls reconnaissance flights over North Korea and have been informed that such flights are suspended pending receipt of approval from you. In a separate memo to you I am recommending that no reconnaissance be scheduled until there is a “go” sign from you.

If no progress is made at the next closed meeting, we shall have seriously to consider possible pressure tactics against the North Koreans. The Korean Working Group has staffed out five such measures:⁵

a. Air reconnaissance over North Korea;

b. Sailing Banner offshore North Korea under escort;

c. Seizing a North Korean vessel;

d. Limited blockade of North Korean naval vessels; and

e. Aerial feints against North Korean territory.

We are now considering a phased combination of some of these measures, possibly in conjunction with a stepped up psychological and diplomatic offensive against North Korea.

Recommendation:

That you approve the general course of action outlined above.⁶

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis.
2. The meeting took place on February 15 in Korea. A summary of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 4262 from Seoul, February 15; the verbatim text in telegram 4261 from Seoul, February 15. (Both ibid.)
3. Instructions for Admiral Smith for the seventh closed meeting were transmitted in telegram 116188 to Seoul, February 15, and modified in telegrams 116350 and 116402 to Seoul, both February 16. Smith was instructed to repeat the U.S. proposal “to conduct a full and impartial inquiry” after the ship and crew have been released, “to express regrets if any facts revealed by this inquiry would justify our doing so,” and to assure that all U.S. naval ships would “remain more than twelve nautical miles from your coast.” (All ibid.)
4. Telegram 116189 to Seoul, February 15, transmitted the text of the Sailing Order. Instructions for Smith on presenting the instructions to the North Koreans were transmitted in telegram 116190 to Seoul, February 15. (Both ibid.)
5. A paper prepared by the Korean Working Group, entitled “North Korean Aggression and the Pueblo Incident, Possible Future Strategies,” includes an attachment discussing the rationale behind each option. The paper was undated, but it is attached to a February 13 note from Jenkens. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A [beginning February])
6. The memorandum does not indicate whether Rusk approved the course outlined by Berger.