Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

269. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 6, 1968, 1515Z.

2708. Ref: State 110351.²

1. I delivered the President’s message to Kosygin at 3 p.m. today.

2. Upon hearing translation of message, Kosygin asked me to convey his thanks to President. At same time he wanted me to tell President that it was difficult for him to understand this situation. When a vessel got into territorial waters of other nations, matter should be resolved in accordance normal procedures. As US itself had said, Soviet vessels, although admittedly they were fishing vessels, had intruded in US territorial waters. US had seized vessels, put captains to trial, and levied fines which USSR then paid. Similar incidents had taken place in Norwegian territorial waters, but Soviets again used diplomatic channels, apologized, paid fine and settled matter. In no instance had the Soviets dispatched their naval vessels although, in case of Norway, there was powerful Soviet surface and submarine fleet in vicinity. In every instance Soviets had sought settle incidents through diplomatic channels without raising tensions and without creating possibility of conflict. On other hand, US reacted to Pueblo seizure by dispatching aircraft carriers and other vessels, which indicated that there were many hotheads in Pentagon who needed tranquilizers. Kosygin said time had passed when threats worked or when great powers could simply flick their fingers and have smaller nations do what they wanted them to do. It was in desire to put Pueblo incident in proper perspective that he had said in New Delhi that this was local conflict which should be settled by two parties concerned.

3. Referring to President’s mention of infiltration, Kosygin asserted infiltration going in both directions and merely reflected natural desire Korean people for reunification their divided country. If US were divided, we would also have infiltration in both directions. In any event, area was close to Soviet territory and Soviet Union could not but be concerned about increased tensions and possibility of incidents there. He reiterated that it better to work through diplomatic channels through exchange of messages, etc., and not to resort to show of force.

4. This connection he noted Soviets had not dispatched their fleet when recently US destroyer collided with Soviet merchant vessel. In this case too, US decided not even to apologize but rather to argue that Soviet vessel was at fault. At sea, there were certain rules to be abided by and if they were violated, apology was in order. Fortunately, Soviet vessel was damaged above rather than below water line, otherwise it would have sunk.

5. I pointed out we had delivered a note to MFA yesterday in which we described circumstances of collision and indicated fact that our destroyer had right of way under international regulations. Kosygin countered by asserting our case not convincing and we simply trying protect our captain by stretching the truth. Soviets dealt with their captains committing similar violations quite differently: they demoted them and deprived them of ship command.

6. Reverting to Pueblo incident, I pointed out that while incident cited by Kosygin involved Soviet fishing vessels, Pueblo was a naval vessel. There was difference between procedures for handling fishing vessels and those regarding naval ships. There had been cases where Soviet naval vessels intruded in US territorial waters, but we merely asked them to leave and did not seize them. As Kosygin knew, our position was that Pueblo had been seized in international waters. However, even if it had intruded into North Korean territorial waters, proper procedure should have been to ask it to leave rather than seize it. I then pointed out that coincidence of recent events in Korea, such as North Korean plan for assassination of President Park and our Ambassador and Pueblo seizure, created great concern among South Koreans who did not know what to expect next from North Korea. I also pointed out that we were trying to use diplomatic means to secure release of Pueblo and its crew, and expressed hope that meetings at Panmunjom would soon bear fruit.

5. [sic] Kosygin said he thought discussions at Panmunjom were proceeding normally and should be continued. Direct US-North Korean talks much more useful than intercession by third party. He felt that Panmunjom meetings apparently gave some satisfaction to both US and North Korea.

6. When I reiterated my hope for prompt successful outcome those talks, Kosygin said Soviets also interested in prompt settlement of incident since there were enough conflicts in world already and there was no need to have a new one.

7. Kosygin then raised Middle East and Vietnam, which reported separately. At end of meeting I asked him what he proposed to give to press about our meeting. He said that, as last time, he would issue statement that he had met with me at my own request, with no indication of subjects discussed.

Thompson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis.
2. Document 268.